Ronald Fischer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ronald Fischer has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eduardo Engel
Yale University
3 shared publications - Alexander Galetovic
Universidad de los Andes Santiago, Chile
2 shared publications - Alexander Galetovic
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES, CHILE
2 shared publications Alexander Galetovic
1 shared publication- Alexander Galetovic
Universidad de los Andes
1 shared publication Diego Huerta
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Centro de Estudios Publicos in Estudios Públicos
- p. 53
Evolución de la asignación de riesgos en las concesiones chilenas
Este artículo estudia la evolución de la legislación chilena en cuanto a la asignación de riesgos en concesiones de infraestructura desde sus comienzos, en la década de 1980. Asimismo, examina los efectos de los cambios legales tanto en la inversión como en el comportamiento de los agentes, y en los aumentos de costos de los proyectos debido a renegociaciones poscontractuales. Nos concentramos en las renegociaciones, porque estas pueden alterar la asignación original de riesgo en los contratos. Nuestra conclusión es que la evolución de la asignación de riesgos ha sido positiva, modificando los incentivos para las partes de los contratos, con una asignación más eficiente de los riesgos.
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Centro de Estudios Publicos in Estudios Públicos
- p. 53
Evolución de la asignación de riesgos en las concesiones chilenas
Este artículo estudia la evolución de la legislación chilena en cuanto a la asignación de riesgos en concesiones de infraestructura desde sus comienzos, en la década de 1980. Asimismo, examina los efectos de los cambios legales tanto en la inversión como en el comportamiento de los agentes, y en los aumentos de costos de los proyectos debido a renegociaciones poscontractuales. Nos concentramos en las renegociaciones, porque estas pueden alterar la asignación original de riesgo en los contratos. Nuestra conclusión es que la evolución de la asignación de riesgos ha sido positiva, modificando los incentivos para las partes de los contratos, con una asignación más eficiente de los riesgos.
- 1 March 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Money and Finance
- Vol. 91, 105-125
The inequality-credit nexus
- 1 March 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Money and Finance
- Vol. 91, 105-125
The inequality-credit nexus
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 121 (3) , 478-481
Financial openness, market structure and private credit: An empirical investigation
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 121 (3) , 478-481
Financial openness, market structure and private credit: An empirical investigation
- Top Cited Papers
- 15 January 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 11 (1) , 83-111
THE BASIC PUBLIC FINANCE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
- 15 January 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 11 (1) , 83-111
Top Cited PapersTHE BASIC PUBLIC FINANCE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
- 18 June 2010
- Published by MIT Press
- p. 161-196
Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation
The object of this chapter is to propose an environment in which expropriations cannot be ruled out because of ex post political pressures. General conditions are derived that characterize the optimal ex ante contract, in the sense that the government maximizes social welfare under the threat of expropriation. Here, it is also shown how the optimal contract can be implemented using a competitive auction. In the model utilized in this chapter, the government has a natural resource project that requires up-front sunk investment, as in the case of a mining or oil extraction project. Since the problem of expropriation usually arises with foreign investment, profits are not included in the welfare function of the planner, and because the good is not consumed at home but exported, the government only cares about the revenues it can obtain from the project.
- 18 June 2010
- Published by MIT Press
- p. 161-196
Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation
The object of this chapter is to propose an environment in which expropriations cannot be ruled out because of ex post political pressures. General conditions are derived that characterize the optimal ex ante contract, in the sense that the government maximizes social welfare under the threat of expropriation. Here, it is also shown how the optimal contract can be implemented using a competitive auction. In the model utilized in this chapter, the government has a natural resource project that requires up-front sunk investment, as in the case of a mining or oil extraction project. Since the problem of expropriation usually arises with foreign investment, profits are not included in the welfare function of the planner, and because the good is not consumed at home but exported, the government only cares about the revenues it can obtain from the project.
- 12 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 29 (1) , 27-53
Privatizing Highways in the United States
- 12 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 29 (1) , 27-53
Privatizing Highways in the United States
- 23 September 2004
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 52 (3) , 427-455
How to Auction a Bottleneck Monopoly When Underhand Vertical Agreements are Possible
- 23 September 2004
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 52 (3) , 427-455
How to Auction a Bottleneck Monopoly When Underhand Vertical Agreements are Possible
- 13 March 2004
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 4 (1)
Toll Competition Among Congested Roads
- 13 March 2004
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 4 (1)
Toll Competition Among Congested Roads
- 1 November 2003
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 11 (5) , 745-757
WTO Exceptions as Insurance
- 1 November 2003
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 11 (5) , 745-757
WTO Exceptions as Insurance
- Open Access
- 1 November 2001
- Published by World Bank
Regulatory Governance and Chile’s 1998–99 Electricity Shortage
- 1 November 2001
- Published by World Bank
Open AccessRegulatory Governance and Chile’s 1998–99 Electricity Shortage