Xinzhu Meng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Xinzhu Meng has a total of 124 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Tonghua Zhang
Department of Mathematics, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, Australia
21 shared publications - Tongqian Zhang
Shandong University of Science and Technology
21 shared publications Lansun Chen
17 shared publicationsZhengbo Chang
Shandong University of Science and Technology
11 shared publicationsTonghua Zhang
Department of Mathematics, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia
7 shared publicationsAbdullah Khames Alzahrani
King Abdulaziz Univ, Fac Sci, Dept Math, POB 80203, Jeddah 21589, Saudi Arabia
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 May 2026
- Published by Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge Inc. in Journal of Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Applications
- Vol. 2 (2) , 74-90
Strategy Dynamics of Three-Strategy Snowdrift Game Induced by Reward Strategy and Payoff Delay
In the evolutionary game, the introduction of the third or more specific strategies to study cooperative evolution has attracted widespread attention recently. The main feature of this paper is to adopt a special reward strategy as the third choice to observe the evolution dynamics. This strategy can improve the utilization of resources and help cooperators and defectors get greater benefits. We investigate the evolutionary game dynamics of a three-strategy snowdrift game with special reward strategy and payoff delay. First, for the nondelay system, we discuss the dynamic properties of strategies, including the existence, stability and bistability of equilibrium states. Furthermore for the time-delay system, we explore the existence conditions of Hopf bifurcation with payoff delay as a parameter. Then we get the direction and stability of Hopf bifurcation through theoretical derivations and numerical simulations. The results show that (i) cooperators, defectors and rewarders can coexist stably; (ii) as the reward increases, the defective strategy gradually disappears, which helps to promote cooperation; (iii) the stable equilibrium becomes unstable when the payoff delay is large, and Hopf bifurcation and stable periodic oscillation appears; (iv) when the payoff delay is large enough, the defective strategy disappears. Our work may promote the prosperity of cooperation among biological populations.
- 10 May 2026
- Published by Institute of Central Computation and Knowledge Inc. in Journal of Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Applications
- Vol. 2 (2) , 74-90
Open AccessStrategy Dynamics of Three-Strategy Snowdrift Game Induced by Reward Strategy and Payoff Delay
In the evolutionary game, the introduction of the third or more specific strategies to study cooperative evolution has attracted widespread attention recently. The main feature of this paper is to adopt a special reward strategy as the third choice to observe the evolution dynamics. This strategy can improve the utilization of resources and help cooperators and defectors get greater benefits. We investigate the evolutionary game dynamics of a three-strategy snowdrift game with special reward strategy and payoff delay. First, for the nondelay system, we discuss the dynamic properties of strategies, including the existence, stability and bistability of equilibrium states. Furthermore for the time-delay system, we explore the existence conditions of Hopf bifurcation with payoff delay as a parameter. Then we get the direction and stability of Hopf bifurcation through theoretical derivations and numerical simulations. The results show that (i) cooperators, defectors and rewarders can coexist stably; (ii) as the reward increases, the defective strategy gradually disappears, which helps to promote cooperation; (iii) the stable equilibrium becomes unstable when the payoff delay is large, and Hopf bifurcation and stable periodic oscillation appears; (iv) when the payoff delay is large enough, the defective strategy disappears. Our work may promote the prosperity of cooperation among biological populations.
- 9 April 2026
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos
- Vol. 36 (09)
Bifurcations and Chaos in the Spatio-Temporal Evolution of Strategies Induced by a Nonlinear Public Goods Game
Classical evolutionary game models typically assume a fixed population size and neglect spatial migration among individuals. However, during the game, participants undergo birth and death processes through evolution, leading to continuous changes in total population size, while the spatial movement of individuals further affects their strategic interactions. Therefore, within the framework of nonlinear public goods games, we develop game dynamics models that simultaneously account for spatial diffusion and variable population size. We analyze the dynamical properties of the temporal system, including the existence, stability, and bistability of equilibria, as well as transcritical and Hopf bifurcations and their associated characteristics. In the context of spatial evolutionary games, we further investigate the spatial stability, Turing instability, Hopf bifurcation, Turing–Hopf bifurcation, and chaotic behavior of the diffusion system. Our findings demonstrate that the evolutionary outcome of the temporal system is determined by key sensitive parameters and initial conditions. Furthermore, diffusion induces new chaotic dynamics in the steady-state solutions of the time-evolving system, rendering the density variations of cooperators and defectors unpredictable. Several counterintuitive dynamical phenomena occur: a decrease in the birth rate or an increase in the death rate of defectors leads to a simultaneous increase in the density of both cooperators and defectors, whereas an increase in payoffs results in a reduction in their densities. Our findings provide a novel perspective on variable-population evolutionary game systems modeled by partial differential equations.
- 9 April 2026
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos
- Vol. 36 (09)
Bifurcations and Chaos in the Spatio-Temporal Evolution of Strategies Induced by a Nonlinear Public Goods Game
Classical evolutionary game models typically assume a fixed population size and neglect spatial migration among individuals. However, during the game, participants undergo birth and death processes through evolution, leading to continuous changes in total population size, while the spatial movement of individuals further affects their strategic interactions. Therefore, within the framework of nonlinear public goods games, we develop game dynamics models that simultaneously account for spatial diffusion and variable population size. We analyze the dynamical properties of the temporal system, including the existence, stability, and bistability of equilibria, as well as transcritical and Hopf bifurcations and their associated characteristics. In the context of spatial evolutionary games, we further investigate the spatial stability, Turing instability, Hopf bifurcation, Turing–Hopf bifurcation, and chaotic behavior of the diffusion system. Our findings demonstrate that the evolutionary outcome of the temporal system is determined by key sensitive parameters and initial conditions. Furthermore, diffusion induces new chaotic dynamics in the steady-state solutions of the time-evolving system, rendering the density variations of cooperators and defectors unpredictable. Several counterintuitive dynamical phenomena occur: a decrease in the birth rate or an increase in the death rate of defectors leads to a simultaneous increase in the density of both cooperators and defectors, whereas an increase in payoffs results in a reduction in their densities. Our findings provide a novel perspective on variable-population evolutionary game systems modeled by partial differential equations.
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 92 (1) , 12
Spatio-temporal evolution of cooperation: multistability, pattern formation, and chaos in resource-driven eco-evolutionary games
In biological systems, cooperative behavior forms the foundation for the survival and prosperity of many organisms. However, the finite nature of resources often drives selfish individuals to exploit resources through deceptive tactics, thereby instigating conflicts between collective and individual interests. These strategic interactions not only alter the availability of environmental resources but also feedback on the strategic choices of populations, leading to the co-evolution of environmental resources and behavioral strategies. By integrating population dynamics with replicator dynamics, we develop models for both well-mixed and spatially heterogeneous distributions that incorporate resource feedback mechanisms to analyze the intricate interplay between cooperative behavior and resource dynamics across temporal and spatial scales. Our findings reveal complex evolutionary dynamics, including rich multistability, transcritical and Hopf bifurcations in the temporal system, alongside spatial stability, Turing instability, Turing-Hopf bifurcation, and chaotic behavior in the spatial diffusion system. In homogeneous distributions, payoffs result in stable periodic solutions, while heterogeneous distributions disrupt stable periodicity and lead to chaotic dynamics. Notably, increasing the initial density of cooperators, the rate of resource growth, and reducing the initial resource stock are favorable for sustaining cooperation. Interestingly, high payoffs for cooperators and low payoffs for defectors do not necessarily promote cooperative behavior, as evolutionary outcomes also depend on resource abundance. We provide the conditions that sustain cooperation, revealing the critical role of resource dynamics and spatial diffusion in shaping the evolution of cooperative strategies. Our findings have important implications for studying ecosystem management, conservation biology, and animal social behavior.
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 92 (1) , 12
Spatio-temporal evolution of cooperation: multistability, pattern formation, and chaos in resource-driven eco-evolutionary games
In biological systems, cooperative behavior forms the foundation for the survival and prosperity of many organisms. However, the finite nature of resources often drives selfish individuals to exploit resources through deceptive tactics, thereby instigating conflicts between collective and individual interests. These strategic interactions not only alter the availability of environmental resources but also feedback on the strategic choices of populations, leading to the co-evolution of environmental resources and behavioral strategies. By integrating population dynamics with replicator dynamics, we develop models for both well-mixed and spatially heterogeneous distributions that incorporate resource feedback mechanisms to analyze the intricate interplay between cooperative behavior and resource dynamics across temporal and spatial scales. Our findings reveal complex evolutionary dynamics, including rich multistability, transcritical and Hopf bifurcations in the temporal system, alongside spatial stability, Turing instability, Turing-Hopf bifurcation, and chaotic behavior in the spatial diffusion system. In homogeneous distributions, payoffs result in stable periodic solutions, while heterogeneous distributions disrupt stable periodicity and lead to chaotic dynamics. Notably, increasing the initial density of cooperators, the rate of resource growth, and reducing the initial resource stock are favorable for sustaining cooperation. Interestingly, high payoffs for cooperators and low payoffs for defectors do not necessarily promote cooperative behavior, as evolutionary outcomes also depend on resource abundance. We provide the conditions that sustain cooperation, revealing the critical role of resource dynamics and spatial diffusion in shaping the evolution of cooperative strategies. Our findings have important implications for studying ecosystem management, conservation biology, and animal social behavior.
- 8 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Qualitative Theory of Dynamical Systems
- Vol. 24 (2) , 1-44
The Three-Strategy Game System with Interference: Rich Evolutionary Game Dynamics Induced by Information Delays
- 8 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Qualitative Theory of Dynamical Systems
- Vol. 24 (2) , 1-44
The Three-Strategy Game System with Interference: Rich Evolutionary Game Dynamics Induced by Information Delays
- 28 October 2024
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Journal of Biomathematics
- Vol. 19 (05)
Analysis of control measures inducing the evolution of infectious viral diseases
With the continuation of the infectious disease, pathogens mutate and interact with the resident pathogen. In this paper, we develop an SIR model that considers the evolution of viral virulence under the regulation of different defense strengths. By using infectious disease dynamics and evolutionary adaptive dynamics, we obtain the evolutionary criteria allowing for evolutionary branching and continuously stable strategy across varying intensities of prevention and control measures. Our study finds that robust prevention and control measures can contribute to a rapid evolutionary trend toward higher virulence. We perform a critical function analysis to reveal the evolutionary consequences of trade-offs of arbitrary shape and analyze a diverse range of evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore, we investigate the coexistence of two different strains and construct an evolutionary model to obtain their invasion fitness functions and the evolutionarily singular coalition of the dimorphism. We contemplate the presence of secondary branching on a significantly extended evolutionary time scale. Last, we conduct the numerical simulations to prove our theoretical findings. This reveals the law that the evolutionary state of pathogens is affected by the intensity of prevention and control strategies. The results and methods can be used as references for studying the effects of other factors on virus evolution.
- 28 October 2024
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Journal of Biomathematics
- Vol. 19 (05)
Analysis of control measures inducing the evolution of infectious viral diseases
With the continuation of the infectious disease, pathogens mutate and interact with the resident pathogen. In this paper, we develop an SIR model that considers the evolution of viral virulence under the regulation of different defense strengths. By using infectious disease dynamics and evolutionary adaptive dynamics, we obtain the evolutionary criteria allowing for evolutionary branching and continuously stable strategy across varying intensities of prevention and control measures. Our study finds that robust prevention and control measures can contribute to a rapid evolutionary trend toward higher virulence. We perform a critical function analysis to reveal the evolutionary consequences of trade-offs of arbitrary shape and analyze a diverse range of evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore, we investigate the coexistence of two different strains and construct an evolutionary model to obtain their invasion fitness functions and the evolutionarily singular coalition of the dimorphism. We contemplate the presence of secondary branching on a significantly extended evolutionary time scale. Last, we conduct the numerical simulations to prove our theoretical findings. This reveals the law that the evolutionary state of pathogens is affected by the intensity of prevention and control strategies. The results and methods can be used as references for studying the effects of other factors on virus evolution.
- 5 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nonlinear Dynamics
- Vol. 112 (23) , 21533-21561
Application of a reaction–diffusion model with different incidence rates: COVID-19 strains evolution
- 5 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nonlinear Dynamics
- Vol. 112 (23) , 21533-21561
Application of a reaction–diffusion model with different incidence rates: COVID-19 strains evolution
- 3 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 86 (6) , 1-48
Evolution of Cooperation in Spatio-Temporal Evolutionary Games with Public Goods Feedback
In biology, evolutionary game-theoretical models often arise in which players’ strategies impact the state of the environment, driving feedback between strategy and the surroundings. In this case, cooperative interactions can be applied to studying ecological systems, animal or microorganism populations, and cells producing or actively extracting a growth resource from their environment. We consider the framework of eco-evolutionary game theory with replicator dynamics and growth-limiting public goods extracted by population members from some external source. It is known that the two sub-populations of cooperators and defectors can develop spatio-temporal patterns that enable long-term coexistence in the shared environment. To investigate this phenomenon and unveil the mechanisms that sustain cooperation, we analyze two eco-evolutionary models: a well-mixed environment and a heterogeneous model with spatial diffusion. In the latter, we integrate spatial diffusion into replicator dynamics. Our findings reveal rich strategy dynamics, including bistability and bifurcations, in the temporal system and spatial stability, as well as Turing instability, Turing–Hopf bifurcations, and chaos in the diffusion system. The results indicate that effective mechanisms to promote cooperation include increasing the player density, decreasing the relative timescale, controlling the density of initial cooperators, improving the diffusion rate of the public goods, lowering the diffusion rate of the cooperators, and enhancing the payoffs to the cooperators. We provide the conditions for the existence, stability, and occurrence of bifurcations in both systems. Our analysis can be applied to dynamic phenomena in fields as diverse as human decision-making, microorganism growth factors secretion, and group hunting.
- 3 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
- Vol. 86 (6) , 1-48
Evolution of Cooperation in Spatio-Temporal Evolutionary Games with Public Goods Feedback
In biology, evolutionary game-theoretical models often arise in which players’ strategies impact the state of the environment, driving feedback between strategy and the surroundings. In this case, cooperative interactions can be applied to studying ecological systems, animal or microorganism populations, and cells producing or actively extracting a growth resource from their environment. We consider the framework of eco-evolutionary game theory with replicator dynamics and growth-limiting public goods extracted by population members from some external source. It is known that the two sub-populations of cooperators and defectors can develop spatio-temporal patterns that enable long-term coexistence in the shared environment. To investigate this phenomenon and unveil the mechanisms that sustain cooperation, we analyze two eco-evolutionary models: a well-mixed environment and a heterogeneous model with spatial diffusion. In the latter, we integrate spatial diffusion into replicator dynamics. Our findings reveal rich strategy dynamics, including bistability and bifurcations, in the temporal system and spatial stability, as well as Turing instability, Turing–Hopf bifurcations, and chaos in the diffusion system. The results indicate that effective mechanisms to promote cooperation include increasing the player density, decreasing the relative timescale, controlling the density of initial cooperators, improving the diffusion rate of the public goods, lowering the diffusion rate of the cooperators, and enhancing the payoffs to the cooperators. We provide the conditions for the existence, stability, and occurrence of bifurcations in both systems. Our analysis can be applied to dynamic phenomena in fields as diverse as human decision-making, microorganism growth factors secretion, and group hunting.
- Open Access
- 16 April 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Fractal and Fractional
- Vol. 8 (4) , 232
Stability and Bifurcation Control for a Generalized Delayed Fractional Food Chain Model
In this paper, a generalized fractional three-species food chain model with delay is investigated. First, the existence of a positive equilibrium is discussed, and the sufficient conditions for global asymptotic stability are given. Second, through selecting the delay as the bifurcation parameter, we obtain the sufficient condition for this non-control system to generate Hopf bifurcation. Then, a nonlinear delayed feedback controller is skillfully applied to govern the system’s Hopf bifurcation. The results indicate that adjusting the control intensity or the control target’s age can effectively govern the bifurcation dynamics behavior of this system. Last, through application examples and numerical simulations, we confirm the validity and feasibility of the theoretical results, and find that the control strategy is also applicable to eco-epidemiological systems.
- 16 April 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Fractal and Fractional
- Vol. 8 (4) , 232
Open AccessStability and Bifurcation Control for a Generalized Delayed Fractional Food Chain Model
In this paper, a generalized fractional three-species food chain model with delay is investigated. First, the existence of a positive equilibrium is discussed, and the sufficient conditions for global asymptotic stability are given. Second, through selecting the delay as the bifurcation parameter, we obtain the sufficient condition for this non-control system to generate Hopf bifurcation. Then, a nonlinear delayed feedback controller is skillfully applied to govern the system’s Hopf bifurcation. The results indicate that adjusting the control intensity or the control target’s age can effectively govern the bifurcation dynamics behavior of this system. Last, through application examples and numerical simulations, we confirm the validity and feasibility of the theoretical results, and find that the control strategy is also applicable to eco-epidemiological systems.
- 6 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 181
Stability, period and chaos of the evolutionary game strategy induced by time-delay and mutation feedback
- 6 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 181
Stability, period and chaos of the evolutionary game strategy induced by time-delay and mutation feedback