Hylke Dijkstra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hylke Dijkstra has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Leonard Schütte
International Security Fellow, Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, USA
16 shared publications - Giuseppe Zaccaria
University of Glasgow Glasgow UK
14 shared publications - Laura von Allwörden
Kiel University , Kiel
14 shared publications - Maria Josepha Debre
Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany
4 shared publications Petar Petrov
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands
4 shared publications- Ewa Mahr
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Campus Brussels, Maastricht University, Maastricht, Netherlands
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
- Vol. 26 (1)
The AIIB as an ordinary development bank? China and the design of international institutions
The institutional design of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established by China, follows best practices for multilateral development banks, thereby challenging the widely held assumption that domestic regime types affect institutional outcomes. Through qualitative content analysis and process tracing, this article argues that China’s design choices for the AIIB nevertheless reflect domestic political needs. To enhance the bank’s reputation, China made concessions during negotiations in order to secure membership from various European countries. Yet China preserved flexibility by leaving room for reforms of the AIIB in the longer term. These institutional design outcomes stem from China’s strategic goal of gaining status, which is rooted in its domestic political needs of demonstrating regime legitimacy and achievement. The case of the AIIB suggests that long-term strategic advantages can override short-term institutional concessions, and that authoritarian states may adopt liberal institutional designs in response to demands from democracies when doing so serves broader strategic objectives.
- 8 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
- Vol. 26 (1)
Open AccessThe AIIB as an ordinary development bank? China and the design of international institutions
The institutional design of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established by China, follows best practices for multilateral development banks, thereby challenging the widely held assumption that domestic regime types affect institutional outcomes. Through qualitative content analysis and process tracing, this article argues that China’s design choices for the AIIB nevertheless reflect domestic political needs. To enhance the bank’s reputation, China made concessions during negotiations in order to secure membership from various European countries. Yet China preserved flexibility by leaving room for reforms of the AIIB in the longer term. These institutional design outcomes stem from China’s strategic goal of gaining status, which is rooted in its domestic political needs of demonstrating regime legitimacy and achievement. The case of the AIIB suggests that long-term strategic advantages can override short-term institutional concessions, and that authoritarian states may adopt liberal institutional designs in response to demands from democracies when doing so serves broader strategic objectives.
- Open Access
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 17 (1) , 4-12
Second Attempt at America First: Donald Trump and the Survival of International Organizations
The second Trump administration poses an existential challenge to many international organizations (IOs), putting them at risk of no longer being able to perform their core functions. Compared to the first term, the scope of America First is much wider and the speed much faster. Trump no longer sticks to IO rules and is structurally undermining the US domestic agencies that provide input for IOs. At the same time, the academic literature highlights the overwhelming resilience of IOs over the last two centuries, and the demand for IOs to address international problems remains high. The loss of US funding, membership, and input is real, but an equally important question is how IOs themselves and the other members cope with and counter this challenge. Several leaders of IOs have pro‐actively stepped up and are strategizing on how to protect their organizations. In light of the imminent budget pressures, many IOs will have to downsize and potentially merge with other international institutions. IOs may thus become less central to the conduct of international relations. Yet, unless the Trump administration, in improbably collective action with China and Russia, manages to overthrow the whole postwar international system, IOs will remain relevant actors.
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 17 (1) , 4-12
Open AccessSecond Attempt at America First: Donald Trump and the Survival of International Organizations
The second Trump administration poses an existential challenge to many international organizations (IOs), putting them at risk of no longer being able to perform their core functions. Compared to the first term, the scope of America First is much wider and the speed much faster. Trump no longer sticks to IO rules and is structurally undermining the US domestic agencies that provide input for IOs. At the same time, the academic literature highlights the overwhelming resilience of IOs over the last two centuries, and the demand for IOs to address international problems remains high. The loss of US funding, membership, and input is real, but an equally important question is how IOs themselves and the other members cope with and counter this challenge. Several leaders of IOs have pro‐actively stepped up and are strategizing on how to protect their organizations. In light of the imminent budget pressures, many IOs will have to downsize and potentially merge with other international institutions. IOs may thus become less central to the conduct of international relations. Yet, unless the Trump administration, in improbably collective action with China and Russia, manages to overthrow the whole postwar international system, IOs will remain relevant actors.
- Open Access
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 211-212
Transformations In Governance
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 211-212
Open AccessTransformations In Governance
- Open Access
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 128-160
Security and Defence
This chapter examines two case studies of the responses of institutional actors in international organizations (IOs) to existential challenges in security and defence. The first case study is about the Trump administration contesting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by demanding that other allies share a larger part of the burden and that the Alliance would adopt a different stance on Russia. The chapter highlights that NATO international actors proactively responded by placating Trump in public and leveraging him to get other allies to increase their commitments. Yet they resisted Trump’s demands on Russia and circumvented the President by working directly with more like-minded U.S. institutions. The second case study concerns the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which faced challenges from competing security institutions, notably the European Union (EU) and whose mandate was simultaneously undermined by Russia under President Putin. The OSCE failed to adequately respond.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 128-160
Open AccessSecurity and Defence
This chapter examines two case studies of the responses of institutional actors in international organizations (IOs) to existential challenges in security and defence. The first case study is about the Trump administration contesting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by demanding that other allies share a larger part of the burden and that the Alliance would adopt a different stance on Russia. The chapter highlights that NATO international actors proactively responded by placating Trump in public and leveraging him to get other allies to increase their commitments. Yet they resisted Trump’s demands on Russia and circumvented the President by working directly with more like-minded U.S. institutions. The second case study concerns the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which faced challenges from competing security institutions, notably the European Union (EU) and whose mandate was simultaneously undermined by Russia under President Putin. The OSCE failed to adequately respond.
- Open Access
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 96-127
Climate and Energy
This chapter analyses two case studies of the responses of institutional actors in international organizations (IOs) to existential challenges in the field of climate and energy. This chapter starts by studying the existential challenge that the Trump administration posed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. Rather than responding publicly, the UNFCCC Secretariat set out to prevent further withdrawals by activating its large external network in support for climate action. The second case study concerns the challenge to the International Energy Agency (IEA) posed by the newly created International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The IEA had long been accused of not doing enough in terms of energy transition and was also criticized for its exclusive membership. It took a while for the IEA to respond. Only with the arrival of a new Executive Director, the IEA adapted itself.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 96-127
Open AccessClimate and Energy
This chapter analyses two case studies of the responses of institutional actors in international organizations (IOs) to existential challenges in the field of climate and energy. This chapter starts by studying the existential challenge that the Trump administration posed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. Rather than responding publicly, the UNFCCC Secretariat set out to prevent further withdrawals by activating its large external network in support for climate action. The second case study concerns the challenge to the International Energy Agency (IEA) posed by the newly created International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The IEA had long been accused of not doing enough in terms of energy transition and was also criticized for its exclusive membership. It took a while for the IEA to respond. Only with the arrival of a new Executive Director, the IEA adapted itself.
- Open Access
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 29-61
Institutional actors and the survival of international organizations
This chapter provides the theoretical framework to address the research question of why the institutional actors of international organizations (IOs) respond differently to existential challenges. It starts by discussing the different types of existential challenges that IOs may face: direct challenges by powerful states and indirect challenges through competing institutions. The chapter notes that IOs are purposeful actors that can strategically adapt or try to resist such existential challenges. They can do so through behavioural and discursive responses. The chapter points out that institutional actors within IOs play a key role in this regard. The chapter puts forward two propositions. First, it proposes that institutional actors tailor their responses to the different types of existential challenges. Second, it proposes that the ability of institutional actors to strategically respond varies depending on their leadership, organizational structure, formal competences, and external network. The chapter concludes by discussing the potential outcomes for IOs.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 29-61
Open AccessInstitutional actors and the survival of international organizations
This chapter provides the theoretical framework to address the research question of why the institutional actors of international organizations (IOs) respond differently to existential challenges. It starts by discussing the different types of existential challenges that IOs may face: direct challenges by powerful states and indirect challenges through competing institutions. The chapter notes that IOs are purposeful actors that can strategically adapt or try to resist such existential challenges. They can do so through behavioural and discursive responses. The chapter points out that institutional actors within IOs play a key role in this regard. The chapter puts forward two propositions. First, it proposes that institutional actors tailor their responses to the different types of existential challenges. Second, it proposes that the ability of institutional actors to strategically respond varies depending on their leadership, organizational structure, formal competences, and external network. The chapter concludes by discussing the potential outcomes for IOs.
- Open Access
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 62-95
Trade and Development
This chapter presents two case studies of the responses of institutional actors in international organizations (IOs) to existential challenges in the field of global trade and development. The chapter begins by analysing the Trump administration’s contestation of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body, which became dysfunctional by December 2019. This first case study identifies the lack of an effective response by WTO institutional actors. These findings on the WTO contrast with the second case study presented in this chapter: The response of the World Bank institutional actors to the challenge posed by the China-led creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This second case study illustrates the proactive and effective role played by the World Bank’s leadership in pushing an adaptive response. When taking both case studies together, this chapter provides an insight into the factors that may explain variation in IO institutional actors’ responses to existential challenges.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 62-95
Open AccessTrade and Development
This chapter presents two case studies of the responses of institutional actors in international organizations (IOs) to existential challenges in the field of global trade and development. The chapter begins by analysing the Trump administration’s contestation of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body, which became dysfunctional by December 2019. This first case study identifies the lack of an effective response by WTO institutional actors. These findings on the WTO contrast with the second case study presented in this chapter: The response of the World Bank institutional actors to the challenge posed by the China-led creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This second case study illustrates the proactive and effective role played by the World Bank’s leadership in pushing an adaptive response. When taking both case studies together, this chapter provides an insight into the factors that may explain variation in IO institutional actors’ responses to existential challenges.