Dennis A. Yao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Dennis A. Yao has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Anoop Menon
Eisengard AI, San Francisco, California 94108
1 shared publication Anoop R. Menon
Management Department, Wharton School Philadelphia Pennsylvania
1 shared publicationChrista Van Anh Vecchi
Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Yao
1 shared publicationFelix Oberholzer-Gee
Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163
1 shared publicationGautam Ahuja
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853
1 shared publication- James J. Anton
Duke University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 9 (2) , 97-117
Rationalizing Outcomes: Interdependent Learning in Competitive Markets
In this article, we use simulation models to explore interdependent learning in competitive markets. Such interactions require attention to both the mental representations held by the management of the focal firm as well as the beliefs of that management about the representations held by rival management. When jointly determined outcomes are the primary input to the learning process, understanding rival beliefs—what we call strategic empathy—becomes a crucial factor driving performance. To illustrate these processes, we focus on mental representations that a manager has regarding market demand. In our simulation models, learning occurs through market observations, which recalibrate a manager’s representation about demand. But the flexibility allowed by this recalibration is also a way through which managers rationalize incorrect representations. We find these processes sometimes lead to distortions of initially correct representations and may result in superior relative performance by the firm whose manager holds less correct representations. Finally, we explore how superior knowledge of a rival’s demand representations can improve own performance through market actions that intentionally shape how a rival learns.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2018.0083 .
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 9 (2) , 97-117
Rationalizing Outcomes: Interdependent Learning in Competitive Markets
In this article, we use simulation models to explore interdependent learning in competitive markets. Such interactions require attention to both the mental representations held by the management of the focal firm as well as the beliefs of that management about the representations held by rival management. When jointly determined outcomes are the primary input to the learning process, understanding rival beliefs—what we call strategic empathy—becomes a crucial factor driving performance. To illustrate these processes, we focus on mental representations that a manager has regarding market demand. In our simulation models, learning occurs through market observations, which recalibrate a manager’s representation about demand. But the flexibility allowed by this recalibration is also a way through which managers rationalize incorrect representations. We find these processes sometimes lead to distortions of initially correct representations and may result in superior relative performance by the firm whose manager holds less correct representations. Finally, we explore how superior knowledge of a rival’s demand representations can improve own performance through market actions that intentionally shape how a rival learns.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2018.0083 .
- 3 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 43 (1) , 3-29
Pushed into a crowd: Repositioning costs, resources, and competition in the RTE cereal industry
Research summary: This article exploits a natural experiment involving self‐regulation in the ready‐to‐eat (RTE) breakfast cereal industry to evaluate the performance impact of product repositioning. It then examines how a product's brand equity value declines with repositioning distance and explores various nonprice responses of firms to increased own and rival competition. Self‐regulation led to a crowding of the product space by forcing differentiated products to become more similar. We find that products constrained by regulation performed relatively worse than unconstrained products. Furthermore, brand equity specific to a product was tightly linked to existing product positions. Increased competition also led to increased brand equity investments and some products with strong brand equity repositioned more aggressively than those with weak brand equity. Managerial summary: This article illustrates how firms respond to newly‐imposed regulatory constraints and how product brand equity is tightly linked to underlying product positions. The analysis is an empirical examination of a self‐regulatory initiative that placed advertising restrictions on high sugar RTE breakfast cereal products targeted toward children. We explore the impact of the regulation on performance and then use the setting to examine the connection between brand equity and changes in product positions. Finally, we examine firm responses to rival entry that include exiting, repositioning, and increasing investments in differentiation.
- 3 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 43 (1) , 3-29
Pushed into a crowd: Repositioning costs, resources, and competition in the RTE cereal industry
Research summary: This article exploits a natural experiment involving self‐regulation in the ready‐to‐eat (RTE) breakfast cereal industry to evaluate the performance impact of product repositioning. It then examines how a product's brand equity value declines with repositioning distance and explores various nonprice responses of firms to increased own and rival competition. Self‐regulation led to a crowding of the product space by forcing differentiated products to become more similar. We find that products constrained by regulation performed relatively worse than unconstrained products. Furthermore, brand equity specific to a product was tightly linked to existing product positions. Increased competition also led to increased brand equity investments and some products with strong brand equity repositioned more aggressively than those with weak brand equity. Managerial summary: This article illustrates how firms respond to newly‐imposed regulatory constraints and how product brand equity is tightly linked to underlying product positions. The analysis is an empirical examination of a self‐regulatory initiative that placed advertising restrictions on high sugar RTE breakfast cereal products targeted toward children. We explore the impact of the regulation on performance and then use the setting to examine the connection between brand equity and changes in product positions. Finally, we examine firm responses to rival entry that include exiting, repositioning, and increasing investments in differentiation.
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 3 (2) , 463-480
Integrated Strategy: Residual Market and Exchange Imperfections as the Foundation of Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Market imperfections are central to understanding the mechanisms that permit firms to capture value. Many of these imperfections are competed away when firms struggle to attain and defend competitive advantages, making markets more efficient in the process. The remaining imperfections can become a primary impetus for government intervention. Hence, an understanding of residual market imperfections—those imperfections that persist after market competition and regulation are accounted for—must inform any assessment of the long-term attractiveness of firm strategies. Our framework provides an integrated view of competition and government intervention, two of the principal forces that influence variation in firm profitability.
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 3 (2) , 463-480
Integrated Strategy: Residual Market and Exchange Imperfections as the Foundation of Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Market imperfections are central to understanding the mechanisms that permit firms to capture value. Many of these imperfections are competed away when firms struggle to attain and defend competitive advantages, making markets more efficient in the process. The remaining imperfections can become a primary impetus for government intervention. Hence, an understanding of residual market imperfections—those imperfections that persist after market competition and regulation are accounted for—must inform any assessment of the long-term attractiveness of firm strategies. Our framework provides an integrated view of competition and government intervention, two of the principal forces that influence variation in firm profitability.
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 3 (2) , II-x
Strategy and the Institutional Envelope
Classical approaches to strategy are built around two dominant pillars to explain firm performance: industry structure and firm strategy and capabilities. Firm performance is typically seen as a result of a “fit,” or complementarity, between industry structure and firm strategic choices. We supplement the classical model of strategy with a third pillar, that of the institutional envelope. We argue that the institutional envelope, as its name suggests, is a pervasive influence on the strategy-performance relationship. Both firm strategy and industry structure are simultaneously shaped by, and shape, the institutional envelope, which is both a primitive to and product of firm strategy and industry structure. It also moderates the relationship between firm strategy and industry structure. Institutional considerations are therefore not simply a subfield of strategy research. The institutional envelope is a critical component of any consideration of strategy. Theories of industry structure and strategic choice are insufficient without a fully formed model of the institutional envelope at their very foundation. All strategies, market or non-market, are consciously or unconsciously related to their institutional envelope—being tailored to conform to the institutional envelope or tailoring the institutional envelope to suit them. We see this institutional project that we are advancing as nothing less than the third great wave of strategy research, building off the previous waves emphasizing industry structure and firm choice and resources. It is in the context of this institutions-based strategy model that we preview the papers in the special issue.
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Strategy Science
- Vol. 3 (2) , II-x
Strategy and the Institutional Envelope
Classical approaches to strategy are built around two dominant pillars to explain firm performance: industry structure and firm strategy and capabilities. Firm performance is typically seen as a result of a “fit,” or complementarity, between industry structure and firm strategic choices. We supplement the classical model of strategy with a third pillar, that of the institutional envelope. We argue that the institutional envelope, as its name suggests, is a pervasive influence on the strategy-performance relationship. Both firm strategy and industry structure are simultaneously shaped by, and shape, the institutional envelope, which is both a primitive to and product of firm strategy and industry structure. It also moderates the relationship between firm strategy and industry structure. Institutional considerations are therefore not simply a subfield of strategy research. The institutional envelope is a critical component of any consideration of strategy. Theories of industry structure and strategic choice are insufficient without a fully formed model of the institutional envelope at their very foundation. All strategies, market or non-market, are consciously or unconsciously related to their institutional envelope—being tailored to conform to the institutional envelope or tailoring the institutional envelope to suit them. We see this institutional project that we are advancing as nothing less than the third great wave of strategy research, building off the previous waves emphasizing industry structure and firm choice and resources. It is in the context of this institutions-based strategy model that we preview the papers in the special issue.
- 23 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 38 (10) , 1953-1963
Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions
Research summary: This article proposes an approach for modeling competitive interactions that incorporates the costs to firms of changing strategy. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we term “repositioning costs,” are particularly relevant to competitive interactions involving major changes to business strategies. Repositioning costs can critically affect competitive dynamics and, consequently, the implications of strategic interaction for strategic choice. While the literature broadly recognizes the importance of such costs, game‐theoretic treatments of major strategic change, with very limited exceptions, have not addressed them meaningfully. We advocate greater recognition of repositioning costs and illustrate with two simple models how repositioning costs may facilitate differentiation and affect the value of a firm's capability to reduce repositioning costs through investments in flexibility . Managerial summary: This article illustrates how the decision to make a strategic change is affected by both the cost to the firm of making the various strategy modifications, as well as the cost to its rivals of changing their strategies in response. These “repositioning costs” are important because they shape the responses each competitor would likely make to a move by the other competitor, and should be anticipated when considering an initial change to one's own strategy. The paper shows how repositioning costs can be used strategically to facilitate differentiation, and to assess the value of potential investments in flexibility . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 23 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 38 (10) , 1953-1963
Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions
Research summary: This article proposes an approach for modeling competitive interactions that incorporates the costs to firms of changing strategy. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we term “repositioning costs,” are particularly relevant to competitive interactions involving major changes to business strategies. Repositioning costs can critically affect competitive dynamics and, consequently, the implications of strategic interaction for strategic choice. While the literature broadly recognizes the importance of such costs, game‐theoretic treatments of major strategic change, with very limited exceptions, have not addressed them meaningfully. We advocate greater recognition of repositioning costs and illustrate with two simple models how repositioning costs may facilitate differentiation and affect the value of a firm's capability to reduce repositioning costs through investments in flexibility . Managerial summary: This article illustrates how the decision to make a strategic change is affected by both the cost to the firm of making the various strategy modifications, as well as the cost to its rivals of changing their strategies in response. These “repositioning costs” are important because they shape the responses each competitor would likely make to a move by the other competitor, and should be anticipated when considering an initial change to one's own strategy. The paper shows how repositioning costs can be used strategically to facilitate differentiation, and to assess the value of potential investments in flexibility . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 1 May 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 3 (2-3) , 745-754
Markets for Partially Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping versus Bundling
- 1 May 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 3 (2-3) , 745-754
Markets for Partially Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping versus Bundling
- Open Access
- 1 September 1992
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
- Vol. 11 (2) , 1-11
Information and Decisionmaking at the Federal Trade Commission
Ad interpretation is a central issue in nearly every false advertising case before both the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts (under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act). Part of ad interpretation is the ancillary issue of whether to require extrinsic evidence supporting a disputed interpretation, particularly where the false claim alleged to be made is implicitly rather than explicitly stated. The authors first discuss the legal standard concerning when extrinsic evidence is required. Though the FTC and most federal courts apply different standards in requiring extrinsic proof of an ad's meaning, some federal courts appear to be moving toward the FTC's standard—namely, that extrinsic proof is required only for those implied claims that the decision maker cannot himself interpret with confidence from the face of the ad itself. The authors then use a Bayesian decisionmaking perspective to examine the implementation of the FTC's legal standard. This perspective leads to the conclusion that measures of variability will often be as important to decisionmaking as the mean estimate provided in statistical evidence.
- 1 September 1992
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
- Vol. 11 (2) , 1-11
Open AccessInformation and Decisionmaking at the Federal Trade Commission
Ad interpretation is a central issue in nearly every false advertising case before both the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts (under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act). Part of ad interpretation is the ancillary issue of whether to require extrinsic evidence supporting a disputed interpretation, particularly where the false claim alleged to be made is implicitly rather than explicitly stated. The authors first discuss the legal standard concerning when extrinsic evidence is required. Though the FTC and most federal courts apply different standards in requiring extrinsic proof of an ad's meaning, some federal courts appear to be moving toward the FTC's standard—namely, that extrinsic proof is required only for those implied claims that the decision maker cannot himself interpret with confidence from the face of the ad itself. The authors then use a Bayesian decisionmaking perspective to examine the implementation of the FTC's legal standard. This perspective leads to the conclusion that measures of variability will often be as important to decisionmaking as the mean estimate provided in statistical evidence.