DHDavid B. Hershenov

David B. Hershenov

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years

Research Subjects


David B. Hershenov has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • A single definition and criterion of death

    by David Hershenov

    Buford first criticizes my 2019 paper by relying upon a view about the permanence of death that no one should hold as it makes death due to extrinsic features. The second criticism involves a description of cerebrum transplants that I don’t accept. The continued existence of a transplanted cerebrum doesn’t show that the whole brain death criterion hasn’t been met as the brainstem-less person has gone out of existence and so no longer has a brain and thus trivially meets the whole brain criterion. Buford’s third criticism is that a criterion should be helpful, doctors can make use of it, and legislators can enshrine it in law. I admit that criterion for the death of the person won’t be useful when the person dies but animal remains. But the criterion of existence for the person will be met and one can infer from that the death criterion has been met.


  • Abortion Pills: Killing or Letting Die?

    by David Hershenov

    Christian pro-lifers often respond to Thomson’s defense of abortion that the violinist is allowed to die while the embryo is killed. Boonin and McMahan counter that this distinction does not provide an objection to extraction abortions that disconnect embryos and allow them to die. I disagree. I first argue that letting die and killing are not to be distinguished by differences between acts and omissions, moral and immoral motives, intentional or unintentional deaths, and causing or not causing a pathology. I offer a taxonomy in which hysterotomies turn out to be killings. I then argue that if either the placenta is considered an organ of the embryo or the embryo is construed as a part of the pregnant woman, then abortion pills kill rather than allow death. So, assuming that killing people is morally worse than letting them die, extraction abortions can be condemned to the same degree as other abortions.


  • Conscientious Objection or an Internal Morality of Medicine?

    by David Hershenov

    Doctors, nurses, and pharmacists who refuse on grounds of conscience to participate in certain legal, expected, and standard practices have been accused of unprofessionally introducing their personal views into medicine. My first response is that they often are not engaging in conscientious objection because that involves invoking convictions external to those of the medical community. I contend that medicine, properly construed, is pathocentric, and so refusing to induce a pathology via abortion, contraception, euthanasia, etc., is actually being loyal to the internal morality of medicine. My second response is that even if such refusals are best considered conscientious objection, there is still no personal hijacking of medicine. Doctors refusing to induce pathologies need not refuse qua Christian, but can do so qua doctor. A pathocentric account of medicine provides a principled way of distinguishing conscientious objection from religious, idiosyncratic, and bigoted refusals. Patients’ refused pathology-inducing procedures are not medically harmed.


  • A naturalist response to Kingma’s critique of naturalist accounts of disease

    by David B. Hershenov

    Elselijn Kingma maintains that Christopher Boorse and other naturalists in the philosophy of medicine cannot deliver the value-free account of disease that they promise. Even if disease is understood as dysfunction and that notion can be applied in a value-free manner, values still manifest themselves in the justification for picking one particular operationalization of dysfunction over a number of competing alternatives. Disease determinations depend upon comparisons within a reference class vis-à-vis reaching organism goals. Boorse considers reference classes for a species to consist in the properties of age and sex and organism goals to comprise survival and reproduction. Kingma suggests that naturalists are influenced by value judgments and may rely upon implicit assumptions about disease in their choice of reference classes and goals to determine which conditions are diseased. I argue that she is wrong to claim that these choices cannot be defended without arguing in a circular manner or making certain arbitrary or value-driven judgments.


  • Healthy functioning as the key to fairness in a divinely determined world

    by David B. Hershenov

    Defending a traditional conception of Hell against the charge of unfairness is difficult for any theorist. It would seem to be even more difficult for the Christian semi-compatibilist who believes we can be responsible when determined. If God determined the wrongdoer's choices, then it seems unfair that he is punished for his actions that were manipulated rather than autonomous. I'll argue that healthy mental functioning can explain how some causally determined actions are manipulative while others are under our control. I'll also argue that God can punish even if He lacks the standing to blame.

  • Why psychological accounts of personal identity can accept a brain death criterion and biological definition of death

    by David B. Hershenov

    Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist.


  • The fairness of Hell

    by David B. Hershenov

    The Christian conception of Hell as everlasting punishment for past sins is confronted with two charges of unfairness. The first is the inequity of an eternal punishment. The never‐ending punishment seems disproportionate to the finite sin (Kershnar, Lewis, Adams). A second and related problem is that the boundary between sins that send one for all eternity to Hell and those sins that are slightly less bad that are compatible with an eternity in Heaven is arbitrary and thus it is unfair that sinners so alike are treated differently (Sider). Hell, as traditionally conceived, is then claimed to be incompatible with God's traditional attributes such as his commitment to justice, omniscience and omnipotence. The unfairness can be avoided by appealing to God's foreknowledge and a debt/atonement theory of punishment. My view is analogous to refusing to parole the unrepentant. If a wrongdoer is eternally defiant, then he can never be released from Hell for his debt won't ever be paid if he isn't reformed and reconciled with the wronged. So it doesn't matter that his initial sin was a finite wrong not deserving of infinite punishment nor a sin no worse than that of the penitent in Heaven.