Maria Petrova
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Maria Petrova has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
Paris School of Economics, Campus Paris-Jourdan, #A104, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France, and New Economic School ( )
3 shared publicationsRuben Enikolopov
3 shared publications- Ruben Enikolopov
New Economic School
3 shared publications Maja Adena
2 shared publicationsVeronica Santarosa
2 shared publicationsAlexei Zakharov
School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (11) , 8030-8043
Are Political and Charitable Giving Substitutes? Evidence from the United States
Using microdata from the American Red Cross (ARC) and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in two natural experiments, we provide evidence that political giving and charitable giving are substitutes. In the first natural experiment, we estimate the effects of a positive shock to charitable donations to the ARC: foreign natural disaster events. We find that although charitable donations to ARC increase by 34.9% in the six weeks following a disaster, political donations decline by 18.8% in the same period. Put differently, each 1% increase in the charitable giving to ARC is accompanied by a 0.53% drop in political donations. At the average county-week–level donations, the implied effect of a $1 increase in charitable giving is a $0.42 decline in political donations. In the second natural experiment, we estimate the effects of a positive shock to political giving: advertisements for political campaigns. Exploiting geographic discontinuities in advertising markets, we find that political advertisements increase political giving, whereas they decrease charitable donations to ARC. Our estimates imply that each 1% increase in the political giving is accompanied by a 0.59% drop in charitable donations to ARC. At the average county-week–level donations, the implied effect of a $1 increase in political giving is a $0.33 decline in charitable donations. The crowding-out elasticities suggest that political giving and charitable giving are relatively close substitutes. We provide a number of robustness checks, and we discuss potential causal mechanisms. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing. Funding: P. Yildirim thanks the Dean’s Research Fund and the Mack Institute at the Wharton School as well as the Wharton Behavioral Laboratory for their financial support. M. Petrova thanks financial support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.00845 .
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (11) , 8030-8043
Are Political and Charitable Giving Substitutes? Evidence from the United States
Using microdata from the American Red Cross (ARC) and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in two natural experiments, we provide evidence that political giving and charitable giving are substitutes. In the first natural experiment, we estimate the effects of a positive shock to charitable donations to the ARC: foreign natural disaster events. We find that although charitable donations to ARC increase by 34.9% in the six weeks following a disaster, political donations decline by 18.8% in the same period. Put differently, each 1% increase in the charitable giving to ARC is accompanied by a 0.53% drop in political donations. At the average county-week–level donations, the implied effect of a $1 increase in charitable giving is a $0.42 decline in political donations. In the second natural experiment, we estimate the effects of a positive shock to political giving: advertisements for political campaigns. Exploiting geographic discontinuities in advertising markets, we find that political advertisements increase political giving, whereas they decrease charitable donations to ARC. Our estimates imply that each 1% increase in the political giving is accompanied by a 0.59% drop in charitable donations to ARC. At the average county-week–level donations, the implied effect of a $1 increase in political giving is a $0.33 decline in charitable donations. The crowding-out elasticities suggest that political giving and charitable giving are relatively close substitutes. We provide a number of robustness checks, and we discuss potential causal mechanisms. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing. Funding: P. Yildirim thanks the Dean’s Research Fund and the Mack Institute at the Wharton School as well as the Wharton Behavioral Laboratory for their financial support. M. Petrova thanks financial support from the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.00845 .
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 46, 72-84
Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 46, 72-84
Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 July 2014
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- Vol. 6 (3) , 103-132
Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia
How do nationalistic media affect animosity between ethnic groups? We consider one of Europe's deadliest conflicts since WWII, the Serbo-Croatian conflict. We show that, after a decade of peace, cross-border nationalistic Serbian radio triggers ethnic hatred toward Serbs in Croatia. Mostly attracted by nonpolitical content, many Croats listen to Serbian public radio (intended for Serbs in Serbia) whenever signal is available. As a result, the vote for extreme nationalist parties is higher and ethnically offensive graffiti are more common in Croatian villages with Serbian radio reception. A laboratory experiment confirms that Serbian radio exposure causes anti-Serbian sentiment among Croats. (JEL D72, D74, J15, L82, N34, N44)
- 1 July 2014
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- Vol. 6 (3) , 103-132
Top Cited PapersCross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia
How do nationalistic media affect animosity between ethnic groups? We consider one of Europe's deadliest conflicts since WWII, the Serbo-Croatian conflict. We show that, after a decade of peace, cross-border nationalistic Serbian radio triggers ethnic hatred toward Serbs in Croatia. Mostly attracted by nonpolitical content, many Croats listen to Serbian public radio (intended for Serbs in Serbia) whenever signal is available. As a result, the vote for extreme nationalist parties is higher and ethnically offensive graffiti are more common in Croatian villages with Serbian radio reception. A laboratory experiment confirms that Serbian radio exposure causes anti-Serbian sentiment among Croats. (JEL D72, D74, J15, L82, N34, N44)
- Open Access
Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany
How far can the media protect or undermine democratic institutions in unconsolidated democracies, and how persuasive can they be in ensuring public support for dictator's policies? We study this question in the context of Germany between 1929 and 1939. Using geographical and temporal variation in radio availability, we show that radio had a significant negative effect on the Nazi electoral support between 1929 and 1932, when political news were slanted against Nazi party. This effect was reversed in just 5 weeks following Hitler's appointment as chancellor and the transfer of control of the radio to the Nazis. Pro-Nazi radio propaganda caused higher vote for the Nazis in March 1933 election. After full consolidation of power, radio propaganda helped the Nazis to enroll new party members and encouraged denunciations of Jews and other open expressions of anti-Semitism. The effect of Nazi propaganda was not uniform. Depending on listeners' priors about the message, propaganda could be very effective or could backfire. Nazi radio was most effective in places where anti-Semitism was historically high and had a negative effect on the support for anti-Semitic policies in places with historically low anti-Semitism.
Open AccessRadio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany
How far can the media protect or undermine democratic institutions in unconsolidated democracies, and how persuasive can they be in ensuring public support for dictator's policies? We study this question in the context of Germany between 1929 and 1939. Using geographical and temporal variation in radio availability, we show that radio had a significant negative effect on the Nazi electoral support between 1929 and 1932, when political news were slanted against Nazi party. This effect was reversed in just 5 weeks following Hitler's appointment as chancellor and the transfer of control of the radio to the Nazis. Pro-Nazi radio propaganda caused higher vote for the Nazis in March 1933 election. After full consolidation of power, radio propaganda helped the Nazis to enroll new party members and encouraged denunciations of Jews and other open expressions of anti-Semitism. The effect of Nazi propaganda was not uniform. Depending on listeners' priors about the message, propaganda could be very effective or could backfire. Nazi radio was most effective in places where anti-Semitism was historically high and had a negative effect on the support for anti-Semitic policies in places with historically low anti-Semitism.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Radio and the Rise of Nazis in Pre-War Germany
How far can the media protect or undermine democratic institutions in unconsolidated democracies, and how persuasive can they be in ensuring public support for dictator's policies? We study this question in the context of Germany between 1929 and 1939. Using geographical and temporal variation in radio availability, we show that radio had a significant negative effect on the Nazi electoral support between 1929 and 1932, when political news were slanted against Nazi party. This effect was reversed in just 5 weeks following Hitler's appointment as chancellor and the transfer of control of the radio to the Nazis. Pro-Nazi radio propaganda caused higher vote for the Nazis in March 1933 election. After full consolidation of power, radio propaganda helped the Nazis to enroll new party members and encouraged denunciations of Jews and other open expressions of anti-Semitism. The effect of Nazi propaganda was not uniform. Depending on listeners' priors about the message, propaganda could be very effective or could backfire. Nazi radio was most effective in places where anti-Semitism was historically high and had a negative effect on the support for anti-Semitic policies in places with historically low anti-Semitism
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Radio and the Rise of Nazis in Pre-War Germany
How far can the media protect or undermine democratic institutions in unconsolidated democracies, and how persuasive can they be in ensuring public support for dictator's policies? We study this question in the context of Germany between 1929 and 1939. Using geographical and temporal variation in radio availability, we show that radio had a significant negative effect on the Nazi electoral support between 1929 and 1932, when political news were slanted against Nazi party. This effect was reversed in just 5 weeks following Hitler's appointment as chancellor and the transfer of control of the radio to the Nazis. Pro-Nazi radio propaganda caused higher vote for the Nazis in March 1933 election. After full consolidation of power, radio propaganda helped the Nazis to enroll new party members and encouraged denunciations of Jews and other open expressions of anti-Semitism. The effect of Nazi propaganda was not uniform. Depending on listeners' priors about the message, propaganda could be very effective or could backfire. Nazi radio was most effective in places where anti-Semitism was historically high and had a negative effect on the support for anti-Semitic policies in places with historically low anti-Semitism
- Open Access
- 24 December 2012
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 110 (2) , 448-452
Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections
Electoral fraud is a widespread phenomenon, especially outside the developed world. Despite abundant qualitative and anecdotal evidence on its existence from around the world, there is very limited quantitative evidence on the extent of electoral fraud. We exploit random assignment of independent observers to 156 of 3,164 polling stations in the city of Moscow to estimate the effect of electoral fraud on the outcome of the Russian parliamentary elections held on December 4, 2011. We estimate the actual share of votes for the incumbent United Russia party to be at least 11 percentage points lower than the official count (36% instead of 47%). Our results suggest that the extent of the fraud was sufficient to have had a substantial impact on the outcome of the elections; they also confirm that the presence of observers is an important factor in ensuring the integrity of the procedure.
- 24 December 2012
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 110 (2) , 448-452
Open AccessField experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections
Electoral fraud is a widespread phenomenon, especially outside the developed world. Despite abundant qualitative and anecdotal evidence on its existence from around the world, there is very limited quantitative evidence on the extent of electoral fraud. We exploit random assignment of independent observers to 156 of 3,164 polling stations in the city of Moscow to estimate the effect of electoral fraud on the outcome of the Russian parliamentary elections held on December 4, 2011. We estimate the actual share of votes for the incumbent United Russia party to be at least 11 percentage points lower than the official count (36% instead of 47%). Our results suggest that the extent of the fraud was sufficient to have had a substantial impact on the outcome of the elections; they also confirm that the presence of observers is an important factor in ensuring the integrity of the procedure.
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 84 (1) , 17-38
Mass media and special interest groups
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 84 (1) , 17-38
Mass media and special interest groups
- 18 June 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 24 (2) , 200-225
Evolution of Risk and Political Regimes
The risk of political predation impedes the achievement of economic prosperity. In this study, we analyze how the risk of predation evolves in different political regimes. Formally, we look at the interaction between a government and citizens in which, in each period, the government has an option to predate. Citizens prefer governments that are competent and non‐predatory and strive to replace ones that are not. Regimes differ in the degree to which citizens can succeed in doing so. In pure democracies, citizens can displace incumbent governments; in pure autocracies, they cannot; and in intermediate cases, they can do so in probability. After economic downturns, the posterior probability that the government is competent and benevolent declines. According to the model, in intermediate regimes, but not in others, governments can separate by type. One implication, then, is that these regimes are politically and economically more volatile, with higher levels of variation in assessments of political risk and in economic performance. Another is that in such regimes, political leadership can make an economic difference. Empirically, we test our argument by measuring the impact of economic downturns on the perceived risk of political expropriation in different regime types, using as instruments the incidence of natural disasters and unexpected terms of trade shocks.
- 18 June 2012
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 24 (2) , 200-225
Evolution of Risk and Political Regimes
The risk of political predation impedes the achievement of economic prosperity. In this study, we analyze how the risk of predation evolves in different political regimes. Formally, we look at the interaction between a government and citizens in which, in each period, the government has an option to predate. Citizens prefer governments that are competent and non‐predatory and strive to replace ones that are not. Regimes differ in the degree to which citizens can succeed in doing so. In pure democracies, citizens can displace incumbent governments; in pure autocracies, they cannot; and in intermediate cases, they can do so in probability. After economic downturns, the posterior probability that the government is competent and benevolent declines. According to the model, in intermediate regimes, but not in others, governments can separate by type. One implication, then, is that these regimes are politically and economically more volatile, with higher levels of variation in assessments of political risk and in economic performance. Another is that in such regimes, political leadership can make an economic difference. Empirically, we test our argument by measuring the impact of economic downturns on the perceived risk of political expropriation in different regime types, using as instruments the incidence of natural disasters and unexpected terms of trade shocks.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2011
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 101 (7) , 3253-3285
Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia
This paper compares electoral outcomes of 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia among geographical areas with differential access to the only national TV channel independent from the government. It was available to three-quarters of Russia's population and its signal availability was idiosyncratic, conditional on observables. Independent TV decreased aggregate vote for the government party by 8.9 percentage points, increased the combined vote for major opposition parties by 6.3 percentage points, and decreased turnout by 3.8 percentage points. The probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals who watched independent TV even controlling for voting intentions measured one month before elections. (JEL D72, L82, P26)
- 1 December 2011
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 101 (7) , 3253-3285
Top Cited PapersMedia and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia
This paper compares electoral outcomes of 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia among geographical areas with differential access to the only national TV channel independent from the government. It was available to three-quarters of Russia's population and its signal availability was idiosyncratic, conditional on observables. Independent TV decreased aggregate vote for the government party by 8.9 percentage points, increased the combined vote for major opposition parties by 6.3 percentage points, and decreased turnout by 3.8 percentage points. The probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals who watched independent TV even controlling for voting intentions measured one month before elections. (JEL D72, L82, P26)
- 26 October 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 105 (4) , 790-808
Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press
Media freedom strongly inhibits corruption and promotes good governance, but what leads to media freedom? Do economic development and higher advertising revenues tend to make media outlets independent of political groups' influence? Using data on nineteenth-century American newspapers, I show that places with higher advertising revenues were likelier to have newspapers that were independent of political parties. Similar results hold when local advertising rates are instrumented by regulations on outdoor advertising and newspaper distribution. In addition, newly created newspapers were more likely to enter the market as independents in places with higher advertising rates. I also exploit the precise timing of major changes in advertising rates to identify how advertising revenues affected the entry of new newspapers. Finally, I demonstrate that economic development, and concomitant higher advertising revenue, is not the only reason that an independent press expands; political factors also played a role.
- 26 October 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 105 (4) , 790-808
Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press
Media freedom strongly inhibits corruption and promotes good governance, but what leads to media freedom? Do economic development and higher advertising revenues tend to make media outlets independent of political groups' influence? Using data on nineteenth-century American newspapers, I show that places with higher advertising revenues were likelier to have newspapers that were independent of political parties. Similar results hold when local advertising rates are instrumented by regulations on outdoor advertising and newspaper distribution. In addition, newly created newspapers were more likely to enter the market as independents in places with higher advertising rates. I also exploit the precise timing of major changes in advertising rates to identify how advertising revenues affected the entry of new newspapers. Finally, I demonstrate that economic development, and concomitant higher advertising revenue, is not the only reason that an independent press expands; political factors also played a role.