Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Edward L. Glaeser
Harvard University - Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
11 shared publications- Amedeo Piolatto
Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History; Barcelona Economics Institute (IEB); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
3 shared publications - Edward L. Glaeser
Department of Economics 315A Littauer Center Harvard University Cambridge 02138 MA
3 shared publications Patricio A. Fernandez
Harvard University
3 shared publicationsAndrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
2 shared publicationsFederico Boffa
Università degli Studi di Macerata
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 24 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 23 (2) , 632-681
Social Capital, Government Expenditures, and Growth
This paper shows that social capital increases economic growth by raising government investment in human capital through better political incentives and selection. We provide empirical evidence that a greater share of output is spent on public education where social capital is higher, both across countries and across U.S. states. We develop a theoretical model of stochastic endogenous growth with imperfect political agency. Only some people correctly anticipate the future returns to current spending on public education. Greater social diffusion of information makes this knowledge more widespread among voters. As a result, social capital alleviates myopic political incentives to underinvest in human capital. It also helps voters select politicians who ensure high productivity in public education. Through this mechanism, we show that social capital raises the equilibrium growth rate of output and reduces its volatility.
- 24 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 23 (2) , 632-681
Social Capital, Government Expenditures, and Growth
This paper shows that social capital increases economic growth by raising government investment in human capital through better political incentives and selection. We provide empirical evidence that a greater share of output is spent on public education where social capital is higher, both across countries and across U.S. states. We develop a theoretical model of stochastic endogenous growth with imperfect political agency. Only some people correctly anticipate the future returns to current spending on public education. Greater social diffusion of information makes this knowledge more widespread among voters. As a result, social capital alleviates myopic political incentives to underinvest in human capital. It also helps voters select politicians who ensure high productivity in public education. Through this mechanism, we show that social capital raises the equilibrium growth rate of output and reduces its volatility.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation
We document a Kuznets curve for construction productivity in 20th-century America. Homes built per construction worker remained stagnant between 1900 and 1940, boomed after World War II, and then plummeted after 1970. The productivity boom from 1940 to 1970 shows that nothing makes technological progress inherently impossible in construction. What stopped it? We present a model in which local land-use controls limit the size of building projects. This constraint reduces the equilibrium size of construction companies, reducing both scale economies and incentives to invest in innovation. Our model shows that, in a competitive industry, such inefficient reductions in firm size and technology investment are a distinctive consequence of restrictive project regulation, while classic regulatory barriers to entry increase firm size. The model is consistent with an extensive series of key facts about the nature of the construction sector. The post-1970 productivity decline coincides with increases in our best proxies for land-use regulation. The size of development projects is small today and has declined over time. The size of construction firms is also quite small, especially relative to other goods-producing firms, and smaller builders are less productive. Areas with stricter land use regulation have particularly small and unproductive construction establishments. Patenting activity in construction stagnated and diverged from other sectors. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that, if half of the observed link between establishment size and productivity is causal, America’s residential construction firms would be approximately 60 percent more productive if their size distribution matched that of manufacturing. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhy Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation
We document a Kuznets curve for construction productivity in 20th-century America. Homes built per construction worker remained stagnant between 1900 and 1940, boomed after World War II, and then plummeted after 1970. The productivity boom from 1940 to 1970 shows that nothing makes technological progress inherently impossible in construction. What stopped it? We present a model in which local land-use controls limit the size of building projects. This constraint reduces the equilibrium size of construction companies, reducing both scale economies and incentives to invest in innovation. Our model shows that, in a competitive industry, such inefficient reductions in firm size and technology investment are a distinctive consequence of restrictive project regulation, while classic regulatory barriers to entry increase firm size. The model is consistent with an extensive series of key facts about the nature of the construction sector. The post-1970 productivity decline coincides with increases in our best proxies for land-use regulation. The size of development projects is small today and has declined over time. The size of construction firms is also quite small, especially relative to other goods-producing firms, and smaller builders are less productive. Areas with stricter land use regulation have particularly small and unproductive construction establishments. Patenting activity in construction stagnated and diverged from other sectors. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that, if half of the observed link between establishment size and productivity is causal, America’s residential construction firms would be approximately 60 percent more productive if their size distribution matched that of manufacturing. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- Open Access
- 10 May 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 20 (3) , 1276-1310
Globalization and Political Structure
This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between globalization and political structure. We show that political structure adapts in a non-monotonic way to declining transport costs. Borders hamper trade. At an earlier stage, the political response to expanding trade opportunities consists of removing borders by increasing country size. At a later stage, instead, it consists of removing the cost of borders by creating international unions. This leads to a reduction in country size. Moreover, diplomacy replaces conquest as a tool to ensure market access. These predictions are consistent with historical evidence on trade, territorial changes, and membership of international unions.
- 10 May 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 20 (3) , 1276-1310
Open AccessGlobalization and Political Structure
This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between globalization and political structure. We show that political structure adapts in a non-monotonic way to declining transport costs. Borders hamper trade. At an earlier stage, the political response to expanding trade opportunities consists of removing borders by increasing country size. At a later stage, instead, it consists of removing the cost of borders by creating international unions. This leads to a reduction in country size. Moreover, diplomacy replaces conquest as a tool to ensure market access. These predictions are consistent with historical evidence on trade, territorial changes, and membership of international unions.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 109, 107-127
A theory of economic unions
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 109, 107-127
Open AccessA theory of economic unions
- Open Access
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics of Transportation
- Vol. 13, 4-26
The political economy of transportation investment
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics of Transportation
- Vol. 13, 4-26
Open AccessThe political economy of transportation investment
- Open Access
- 1 August 2017
- Published by National Bureau of Economic Research
Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth
- 1 August 2017
- Published by National Bureau of Economic Research
Open AccessFundamental Errors in the Voting Booth
- Open Access
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Securing Property Rights
A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong — the state or its powerful citizens — against the weak. We present evidence that the less educated and poorer citizens in many countries feel their property rights are least secure. We then present a model of a farmer and a mine which can pollute his farm in a jurisdiction where the mine can subvert law enforcement. We show that, in this model, injunctions or other forms of property rules work better than compensation for damage or liability rules. The equivalences of the Coase Theorem break down in realistic ways. The case for injunctions is even stronger when parties can invest in power. Our approach sheds light on several controversies in law and economics, but also applies to practical problems in developing countries, such as low demand for formality, law enforcement under uncertain property rights, and unresolved conflicts between environmental damage and development.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSecuring Property Rights
A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong — the state or its powerful citizens — against the weak. We present evidence that the less educated and poorer citizens in many countries feel their property rights are least secure. We then present a model of a farmer and a mine which can pollute his farm in a jurisdiction where the mine can subvert law enforcement. We show that, in this model, injunctions or other forms of property rules work better than compensation for damage or liability rules. The equivalences of the Coase Theorem break down in realistic ways. The case for injunctions is even stronger when parties can invest in power. Our approach sheds light on several controversies in law and economics, but also applies to practical problems in developing countries, such as low demand for formality, law enforcement under uncertain property rights, and unresolved conflicts between environmental damage and development.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2016
- Published by National Bureau of Economic Research
Securing Property Rights
A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong-the state or its powerful citizens-against the weak. We present evidence that undue influence on courts is a common concern in many countries, especially among the poor. We then present a model of a water polluter whose discharges contaminate riparian properties belonging to multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation from the efficiency viewpoint. When the polluter can subvert the assessment of damages, property rules are preferred to liability rules when there are few parties and bargaining is feasible, but they excessively deter efficient pollution when bargaining between many parties fails. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. Our model helps explain the evolution of the legal treatment of water pollution from property rules to liability rules to regulation. An empirical analysis of water quality in the U.S. before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by National Bureau of Economic Research
Open AccessSecuring Property Rights
A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong-the state or its powerful citizens-against the weak. We present evidence that undue influence on courts is a common concern in many countries, especially among the poor. We then present a model of a water polluter whose discharges contaminate riparian properties belonging to multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation from the efficiency viewpoint. When the polluter can subvert the assessment of damages, property rules are preferred to liability rules when there are few parties and bargaining is feasible, but they excessively deter efficient pollution when bargaining between many parties fails. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. Our model helps explain the evolution of the legal treatment of water pollution from property rules to liability rules to regulation. An empirical analysis of water quality in the U.S. before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model.
- 1 May 2016
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 106 (5) , 77-82
Infrastructure, Incentives, and Institutions
Expensive infrastructure is ineffective if it doesn't travel the last mile. In nineteenth-century New York and modern Africa, disease has spread when urbanites chose not to use newly built sanitation infrastructure to save money. Either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can internalize the externalities that occur when people don't use sanitation infrastructure, but with weak institutions subsidies generate waste and fines lead to extortion. Our model illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and shows how institutional weaknesses determine whether fines, subsidies, both or neither are optimal. Contrary to Becker (1968), the optimal fine is often mild to reduce extortion.
- 1 May 2016
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 106 (5) , 77-82
Infrastructure, Incentives, and Institutions
Expensive infrastructure is ineffective if it doesn't travel the last mile. In nineteenth-century New York and modern Africa, disease has spread when urbanites chose not to use newly built sanitation infrastructure to save money. Either subsidies or Pigouvian fines can internalize the externalities that occur when people don't use sanitation infrastructure, but with weak institutions subsidies generate waste and fines lead to extortion. Our model illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and shows how institutional weaknesses determine whether fines, subsidies, both or neither are optimal. Contrary to Becker (1968), the optimal fine is often mild to reduce extortion.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Papers in Regional Science
- Vol. 95 (1) , 17-60
Urban networks: Connecting markets, people, and ideas
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Papers in Regional Science
- Vol. 95 (1) , 17-60
Open AccessUrban networks: Connecting markets, people, and ideas