BVBruce K. Vaughen

Bruce K. Vaughen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Bruce K. Vaughen has a total of 56 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Process Safety News

    by Bruce K. Vaughen

  • Analysis of the Use of SAChE Modules in Undergraduate Programs and Summary of Process Safety

    by Laura Ford, Gary Aurand, Chris Barr, Frank Bowman, Hema Ramsurn, Janie Brennan, Tracy Carter, Kevin Dahm, Luke Landherr, David Silverstein, et al.

  • How We Teach: Capstone Design

    by Laura P. Ford, Jennifer Cole, Kevin D. Dahm, Bruce K. Vaughen, Marnie V. Jamieson, Luke Landherr, David L. Silverstein, Troy J. Vogel, Christy Wheeler West, Stephen W. Thiel


  • How We Teach: Chemical Engineering in the First Year

    by Laura P Ford, Janie Brennan, Jennifer Cole, Kevin D. Dahm, Marnie V Jamieson, Lucas James Landherr, David L. Silverstein, Bruce K Vaughen, Margot Vigeant, Stephen Ward Thiel


  • Understanding and managing the risk during transient operations

    by Bruce K. Vaughen

    This paper presents the results from more than 50 incidents attributed in part to the process safety risks associated with abnormal, transient operations during start‐ups and shut‐downs. A transient operation is defined in this paper as the time when the process is in transition between one operating state and another. In particular, the transient operations‐related focus is on the time when equipment is taken from its safe, idle state to its safe operating conditions (a start‐up) and vice versa, when the equipment is then taken back to its safe, idle state (a shut‐down). There are 10 different start‐up and shut‐down operating modes during normal operations, abnormal operations, and emergency operations. The incidents in this review were attributed to weaknesses in administrative controls that did not work as planned and engineering controls that did not perform as expected. Due to these weaknesses, unexpected events occurred, resulting in quick decisions made without adequately understanding the hazards, evaluating the risks, or managing the changes. In many cases, had the asset integrity and reliability program been in place or effective operational readiness review performed before attempting the process restarts, the risks associated with the transient operating mode could have been reduced.


  • The Risk Analysis Screening Tool: Part I, overview

    by Bruce K. Vaughen, David A. Hurban, Kenneth First, Al Ness

    The Dow Chemical Company has provided for international use a set of tools to help other companies effectively understand and manage their process safety hazards and risks, helping the global process safety community improve their process safety performance. The tools described in this paper were generously donated to the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC). What makes this donation special is that small and large companies can use the Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) and the Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) tools to help validate, screen, and prioritize between their process risks. Each company can download and configure RAST to assess for and ensure compliance with their company‐specific risk matrix: their risk tolerance criteria. RAST can be applied to existing and proposed installations. In addition, RAST is versatile: helping reduce process safety risk when used during Management of Change (MOC) reviews for comparing different inherently safer design options. As is detailed in the paper, RAST follows the basic steps in performing a Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) study. The tool allows Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) Teams to validate process‐specific scenarios, and provides guidance on potential causes of incident scenarios. The scenario‐specific risks—a function of the consequence and the frequency—can be determined in RAST through a quantified consequence impact through leak rate and dispersion modeling and estimated scenario frequencies through equipment integrity and reliability information.


  • The Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST): Part II, using RAST to evaluate the release of ammonia

    by Feng Luo, Bruce K. Vaughen

    This is the second article on the Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST). Part I provides an overview of the RAST software and how it can be used when performing a Hazards Identification and Risk Analysis. This article will focus on one piece of equipment: an ammonia storage tank located within a densely populated university campus. For the storage tank, the relief valve vents outdoors at the height of a two‐story building with its release modeled as an outdoor release. The potential failure scenarios proposed by the RAST software confirmed the scenarios generated by the Process Hazards Analysis team. RAST can be used using minimum required inputs and general assumptions and default values within the software. The results are presented in this article along with an additional, similar case study on chlorine. The risk matrix and risk summary tabs give a visual presentation of whether the failure scenarios found by RAST are within an acceptable, tolerable risk. The user or company running the study may change the desired target frequency factor then work to achieve those figures through implementation of protective layers.


  • Our Process Safety Journey Continues: Operational Discipline Today

    by Bruce K. Vaughen, James A. Klein, John W. Champion

    In the late 1980s, DuPont defined Operational Discipline (OD) as the deeply rooted dedication and commitment by each member of an organization to carry out each task, the right way, each time. Many other companies have similar “operational discipline” definitions, and this emphasis has not changed. Furthermore, the dedication and commitment to OD has grown stronger. Operational discipline continues to reflect the strength of an organization's safety culture in making process safety programs effective and in providing tangible results for preventing injuries and incidents through effective process safety systems. What has changed is how we better apply Operational Discipline as one of the three essential process safety foundations. When combined with both a strong safety culture and leadership and robust process safety systems, the company's strong Operational Discipline foundation helps improve process safety performance. This article describes how collaborative efforts have helped us to better evaluate Operational Discipline in context of the Risk Based Process Safety's element Conduct of Operations, briefly presents how OD programs can be implemented using an example from the Dow Chemical Company, and provides some practical guidance and approaches that a company can use on their process safety journey to improve their OD program. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 37: 478–492, 2018