Sebastien Martin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Sebastien Martin has a total of 51 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Arthur Delarue
Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
5 shared publications - Dimitris Bertsimas
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA
4 shared publications Daniel Freund
2 shared publicationsFrancisco Castro
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management
2 shared publicationsGarrett van Ryzin
Lyft, San Francisco, California 94107
2 shared publications- Garrett van Ryzin
Amazon, New York, NY, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Navigating the Educational Video Game Paradox
Educational video games face a fundamental tension: learning in this context is valuable, yet that same educational content may also reduce the engagement needed to retain users. Using second-by-second gameplay data from PowerZ, a children's educational video game, we conduct two field experiments with more than 15,000 users to study how design choices shape this tension. We examine incentives for optional educational content and mechanisms that require such content for progression. Requiring content is a risky but potentially powerful design lever, as it can broaden exposure to learning, but based on prior literature on video game difficulty and motivation, together with previous experiments in PowerZ, we expected it to decrease time spent in-game. However, both optional and required approaches increase learning time without reducing retention. Requiring content additionally increases time spent on other, non-required educational material by 51%. This difference reflects who each mechanism reaches. Optional content is taken up by a narrow, self-selected group, whereas required content induces broader educational exploration, including among users who would not otherwise engage. Together, these results challenge the assumption that educational game designers must accommodate fixed player preferences. Requiring learning can instead expand the material that users voluntarily seek out, suggesting that design can cultivate educational curiosity rather than defer to existing patterns of play.
- 19 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessNavigating the Educational Video Game Paradox
Educational video games face a fundamental tension: learning in this context is valuable, yet that same educational content may also reduce the engagement needed to retain users. Using second-by-second gameplay data from PowerZ, a children's educational video game, we conduct two field experiments with more than 15,000 users to study how design choices shape this tension. We examine incentives for optional educational content and mechanisms that require such content for progression. Requiring content is a risky but potentially powerful design lever, as it can broaden exposure to learning, but based on prior literature on video game difficulty and motivation, together with previous experiments in PowerZ, we expected it to decrease time spent in-game. However, both optional and required approaches increase learning time without reducing retention. Requiring content additionally increases time spent on other, non-required educational material by 51%. This difference reflects who each mechanism reaches. Optional content is taken up by a narrow, self-selected group, whereas required content induces broader educational exploration, including among users who would not otherwise engage. Together, these results challenge the assumption that educational game designers must accommodate fixed player preferences. Requiring learning can instead expand the material that users voluntarily seek out, suggesting that design can cultivate educational curiosity rather than defer to existing patterns of play.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Value of a Little Flexibility in Stable Matching
This paper investigates the value of introducing a little flexibility into the classical n × n student-optimal stable matching (SOSM) problem. We define flexibility as the ability to relax stability constraints, and we aim to characterize the value of flexibility-the reduction in total rank across all students when a single flexible match is permitted. We find that this minimal intervention-affecting just one match out of n-can nevertheless generate system-wide efficiency gains. We first establish tight upper and lower bounds: in the best case, a single flexible match yields an aggregate rank reduction of more than n(n-3), more than if every student moved from their second-to-worst to their second-to-best choice; in the worst case, flexibility yields no improvement. We then explore how preference structure affects the value of flexibility. With mild randomness in preferences, the value of flexibility already scales as Θ̃(n) in expectation, though only Θ(log n) students strictly benefit from flexibility. In fully random markets, we show that flexibility continues to generate Ω(n) improvement in rank in expectation, with Θ̃(n) students strictly better off. This suggests that allowing even a single flexible match can improve the average rank across all students by a constant. Our theoretical findings are supported by simulations using both random and empirical preference profiles; the latter are based on data from the dating platform OkCupid. Across these environments, we find that the gains from flexibility remain significant under various practical constraints, showing that even greater improvements are possible when the flexible pair is chosen optimally and when a small number of flexible matches (rather than just one) are permitted. Overall, our results demonstrate that a little flexibility goes a long way in stable matching.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Value of a Little Flexibility in Stable Matching
This paper investigates the value of introducing a little flexibility into the classical n × n student-optimal stable matching (SOSM) problem. We define flexibility as the ability to relax stability constraints, and we aim to characterize the value of flexibility-the reduction in total rank across all students when a single flexible match is permitted. We find that this minimal intervention-affecting just one match out of n-can nevertheless generate system-wide efficiency gains. We first establish tight upper and lower bounds: in the best case, a single flexible match yields an aggregate rank reduction of more than n(n-3), more than if every student moved from their second-to-worst to their second-to-best choice; in the worst case, flexibility yields no improvement. We then explore how preference structure affects the value of flexibility. With mild randomness in preferences, the value of flexibility already scales as Θ̃(n) in expectation, though only Θ(log n) students strictly benefit from flexibility. In fully random markets, we show that flexibility continues to generate Ω(n) improvement in rank in expectation, with Θ̃(n) students strictly better off. This suggests that allowing even a single flexible match can improve the average rank across all students by a constant. Our theoretical findings are supported by simulations using both random and empirical preference profiles; the latter are based on data from the dating platform OkCupid. Across these environments, we find that the gains from flexibility remain significant under various practical constraints, showing that even greater improvements are possible when the flexible pair is chosen optimally and when a small number of flexible matches (rather than just one) are permitted. Overall, our results demonstrate that a little flexibility goes a long way in stable matching.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (1) , 148-166
Algorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School Schedules
In collaboration with the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD), this paper introduces an interactive optimization framework to tackle complex school scheduling challenges. The choice of school start and end times is an optimization challenge, as schedules influence the district’s transportation system, and limiting the associated costs is a computationally difficult combinatorial problem. However, it is also a policy challenge, as transportation costs are far from the only consequence of school schedule changes. Policymakers need time and knowledge to balance these considerations and reach a consensus carefully; past implementations have failed because of policy issues, despite state-of-the-art optimization approaches. We first motivate our approach with a microfoundation model of the interplay between policymakers and researchers, arguing that limiting their dependency is key. Building on these insights, we propose a framework that includes (1) a fast algorithm capable of solving the school schedule problem that compares favorably to the literature and (2) an interactive optimization approach that leverages this speed to allow policymakers to explore a variety of solutions in a transparent and efficient way, facilitating the policy decision-making process. The framework led to the first optimization-driven school start time changes in the United States, updating the schedule of all 133 schools in SFUSD in 2021, with annual transportation savings exceeding $5 million. A comprehensive survey of approximately 27,000 parents and staff in 2022 provides evidence of the approach’s effectiveness. This paper was accepted by Felipe Caro, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05834 .
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (1) , 148-166
Algorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School Schedules
In collaboration with the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD), this paper introduces an interactive optimization framework to tackle complex school scheduling challenges. The choice of school start and end times is an optimization challenge, as schedules influence the district’s transportation system, and limiting the associated costs is a computationally difficult combinatorial problem. However, it is also a policy challenge, as transportation costs are far from the only consequence of school schedule changes. Policymakers need time and knowledge to balance these considerations and reach a consensus carefully; past implementations have failed because of policy issues, despite state-of-the-art optimization approaches. We first motivate our approach with a microfoundation model of the interplay between policymakers and researchers, arguing that limiting their dependency is key. Building on these insights, we propose a framework that includes (1) a fast algorithm capable of solving the school schedule problem that compares favorably to the literature and (2) an interactive optimization approach that leverages this speed to allow policymakers to explore a variety of solutions in a transparent and efficient way, facilitating the policy decision-making process. The framework led to the first optimization-driven school start time changes in the United States, updating the schedule of all 133 schools in SFUSD in 2021, with annual transportation savings exceeding $5 million. A comprehensive survey of approximately 27,000 parents and staff in 2022 provides evidence of the approach’s effectiveness. This paper was accepted by Felipe Caro, Special Issue on the Human-Algorithm Connection. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05834 .
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 342
Relative Monte Carlo for Reinforcement Learning
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 342
Open AccessRelative Monte Carlo for Reinforcement Learning
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (7) , 5875-5892
Trading Flexibility for Adoption: From Dynamic to Static Walking in Ride-Sharing
On-demand ride-sharing aims to fulfill riders’ transportation needs whenever and wherever they want. Although this service level appeals to riders, overall system efficiency can improve substantially if riders are willing to be flexible. Here, we explore riders’ flexibility in space via walking to more accessible pickup locations. Ride-sharing platforms have traditionally implemented dynamic walking to optimize rider pickup locations and rider-driver assignment jointly. We propose an alternative that we call static walking, which presents a predetermined pickup location to the rider before optimizing rider-driver assignment. Although dynamic walking enables more efficient matching of riders and drivers, we hypothesize that riders prefer static walking because of the certainty of the pickup location before booking the ride. Using simulations on Lyft data, we show that static walking can capture up to 96% of the value of dynamic walking in congested urban networks at a fixed adoption rate. Furthermore, experimentation on Lyft’s user interface suggests that providing riders with information on pickup location before an opt-in decision can increase walking adoption—to the extent that static walking may outperform dynamic walking overall. More broadly, this study highlights the importance of carefully designing flexibility mechanisms on platforms: a little flexibility goes a long way, especially when flexibility presents a barrier to adoption. This paper was accepted by J. George Shanthikumar, data science. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03201 .
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (7) , 5875-5892
Trading Flexibility for Adoption: From Dynamic to Static Walking in Ride-Sharing
On-demand ride-sharing aims to fulfill riders’ transportation needs whenever and wherever they want. Although this service level appeals to riders, overall system efficiency can improve substantially if riders are willing to be flexible. Here, we explore riders’ flexibility in space via walking to more accessible pickup locations. Ride-sharing platforms have traditionally implemented dynamic walking to optimize rider pickup locations and rider-driver assignment jointly. We propose an alternative that we call static walking, which presents a predetermined pickup location to the rider before optimizing rider-driver assignment. Although dynamic walking enables more efficient matching of riders and drivers, we hypothesize that riders prefer static walking because of the certainty of the pickup location before booking the ride. Using simulations on Lyft data, we show that static walking can capture up to 96% of the value of dynamic walking in congested urban networks at a fixed adoption rate. Furthermore, experimentation on Lyft’s user interface suggests that providing riders with information on pickup location before an opt-in decision can increase walking adoption—to the extent that static walking may outperform dynamic walking overall. More broadly, this study highlights the importance of carefully designing flexibility mechanisms on platforms: a little flexibility goes a long way, especially when flexibility presents a barrier to adoption. This paper was accepted by J. George Shanthikumar, data science. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03201 .
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (2) , 1716-1736
Detours in Shared Rides
Detours are considered key for the efficient operation of a shared rides service, but they are also a major pain point for consumers of such services. This paper studies the relationship between the value generated by shared rides and the detours they create for riders. We establish a limit on the sum of value and detour, and we prove that this leads to a tight bound on the Pareto frontier of values and detours in a general setting with an arbitrary number of requests. We explicitly compute the Pareto frontier for one family of city topologies and construct it via simulation for several more networks, including one based on ride-sharing data from commute hours in Manhattan. We find that average detours are usually small, even in low-demand-density settings. We also find that by carefully choosing the match objective, detours can be reduced with a relatively small impact on values and that the density of ride requests is far more important than detours for the effective operations of a shared rides service. In response, we propose that platforms implement a two-product version of shared rides and limit the worst-case detours of its users. This paper was accepted by Hamid Nazerzadeh, data science. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03125 .
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (2) , 1716-1736
Detours in Shared Rides
Detours are considered key for the efficient operation of a shared rides service, but they are also a major pain point for consumers of such services. This paper studies the relationship between the value generated by shared rides and the detours they create for riders. We establish a limit on the sum of value and detour, and we prove that this leads to a tight bound on the Pareto frontier of values and detours in a general setting with an arbitrary number of requests. We explicitly compute the Pareto frontier for one family of city topologies and construct it via simulation for several more networks, including one based on ride-sharing data from commute hours in Manhattan. We find that average detours are usually small, even in low-demand-density settings. We also find that by carefully choosing the match objective, detours can be reduced with a relatively small impact on values and that the density of ride requests is far more important than detours for the effective operations of a shared rides service. In response, we propose that platforms implement a two-product version of shared rides and limit the worst-case detours of its users. This paper was accepted by Hamid Nazerzadeh, data science. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03125 .
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 205
Human-AI Interactions and Societal Pitfalls
When working with generative artificial intelligence (AI), users may see productivity gains, but content generated with the help of AI may not match their preferences exactly. The boost in productivity may come at the expense of users' idiosyncrasies, such as personal style and tastes, preferences we would naturally express without AI. To let users express their preferences, many AI systems let users edit their prompt (e.g., Midjourney) or allow more natural interactions (e.g., ChatGPT), and users can always review and edit the AI-generated output themselves. However, aligning a user's intentions with an AI's output can take time and may not always be worth it if the AI's first or default output "does the job." In short, users face a trade-off between AI output fidelity and communication cost. The purpose of this work is to examine the impact of this human-AI interaction on the AI-generated content we produce as a society. We propose a Bayesian model to study the societal consequences of human-AI interactions. For a given task, rational users can exchange information with the AI to align its output with their heterogeneous preferences. The AI has a knowledge of the distribution of preferences in the population and uses a Bayesian update to create the optimal output with maximal expected fidelity given the information shared by the user. Users choose the amount of information they share to maximize their utility, balancing the cost of communication with the fidelity of the output. We show that the interplay between individual users and AI may lead to societal challenges. Outputs may become more homogenized. The AI-generated output distribution has a lower variance than the users' preference distribution. And this phenomenon is exacerbated when AI-generated content is used to train the next generation of AI: we show numerically that the users' rational decisions and the AI's training process can mutually reinforce each other, leading to a homogenization "death spiral." We also study the effects of AI bias, identifying who benefits or loses when using an AI model that does not accurately reflect the population preference distribution. At the population level, the censoring type of bias (e.g., biasing against the more unique preferences) negatively impacts the population utility as a whole, especially users with uncommon preferences who rely on AI interactivity the most. On the other hand, directional biases (e.g., a slightly left-leaning AI) will influence the users' chosen output, leading to a societal bias. Nonetheless, our research also demonstrates that creating models that facilitate human-AI interactions can limit these risks and preserve the population preference diversity. A full version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.10448.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 205
Open AccessHuman-AI Interactions and Societal Pitfalls
When working with generative artificial intelligence (AI), users may see productivity gains, but content generated with the help of AI may not match their preferences exactly. The boost in productivity may come at the expense of users' idiosyncrasies, such as personal style and tastes, preferences we would naturally express without AI. To let users express their preferences, many AI systems let users edit their prompt (e.g., Midjourney) or allow more natural interactions (e.g., ChatGPT), and users can always review and edit the AI-generated output themselves. However, aligning a user's intentions with an AI's output can take time and may not always be worth it if the AI's first or default output "does the job." In short, users face a trade-off between AI output fidelity and communication cost. The purpose of this work is to examine the impact of this human-AI interaction on the AI-generated content we produce as a society. We propose a Bayesian model to study the societal consequences of human-AI interactions. For a given task, rational users can exchange information with the AI to align its output with their heterogeneous preferences. The AI has a knowledge of the distribution of preferences in the population and uses a Bayesian update to create the optimal output with maximal expected fidelity given the information shared by the user. Users choose the amount of information they share to maximize their utility, balancing the cost of communication with the fidelity of the output. We show that the interplay between individual users and AI may lead to societal challenges. Outputs may become more homogenized. The AI-generated output distribution has a lower variance than the users' preference distribution. And this phenomenon is exacerbated when AI-generated content is used to train the next generation of AI: we show numerically that the users' rational decisions and the AI's training process can mutually reinforce each other, leading to a homogenization "death spiral." We also study the effects of AI bias, identifying who benefits or loses when using an AI model that does not accurately reflect the population preference distribution. At the population level, the censoring type of bias (e.g., biasing against the more unique preferences) negatively impacts the population utility as a whole, especially users with uncommon preferences who rely on AI interactivity the most. On the other hand, directional biases (e.g., a slightly left-leaning AI) will influence the users' chosen output, leading to a societal bias. Nonetheless, our research also demonstrates that creating models that facilitate human-AI interactions can limit these risks and preserve the population preference diversity. A full version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.10448.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1098
Algorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School Schedules
In collaboration with the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD), this paper introduces an interactive optimization framework to tackle complex school scheduling challenges. The choice of school start and end times is an optimization challenge, as schedules influence the district's transportation system, and limiting the associated costs is a computationally difficult combinatorial problem. However, it is also a policy challenge, as transportation costs are far from the only consequence of school schedule changes. Policymakers need time and knowledge to balance these considerations and reach a consensus carefully; past implementations have failed because of policy issues despite state-of-the-art optimization approaches. We first motivate our approach with a micro-foundation model of the interplay between policymakers and researchers, arguing that limiting their dependency is key. Building on these insights, we propose a framework that includes (1) a fast algorithm capable of solving the school schedule problem that compares favorably to the literature and (2) an interactive optimization approach that leverages this speed to allow policymakers to explore a variety of solutions in a transparent and efficient way, facilitating the policy decisionmaking process. The framework led to the first optimization-driven school start time changes in the US, updating the schedule of all 133 schools in SFUSD in 2021 with annual transportation savings exceeding $5 million. A comprehensive survey of approximately 27,000 parents and staff in 2022 provides evidence of the approach's effectiveness. A full version of this paper can be found at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4324076
- 8 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1098
Open AccessAlgorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School Schedules
In collaboration with the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD), this paper introduces an interactive optimization framework to tackle complex school scheduling challenges. The choice of school start and end times is an optimization challenge, as schedules influence the district's transportation system, and limiting the associated costs is a computationally difficult combinatorial problem. However, it is also a policy challenge, as transportation costs are far from the only consequence of school schedule changes. Policymakers need time and knowledge to balance these considerations and reach a consensus carefully; past implementations have failed because of policy issues despite state-of-the-art optimization approaches. We first motivate our approach with a micro-foundation model of the interplay between policymakers and researchers, arguing that limiting their dependency is key. Building on these insights, we propose a framework that includes (1) a fast algorithm capable of solving the school schedule problem that compares favorably to the literature and (2) an interactive optimization approach that leverages this speed to allow policymakers to explore a variety of solutions in a transparent and efficient way, facilitating the policy decisionmaking process. The framework led to the first optimization-driven school start time changes in the US, updating the schedule of all 133 schools in SFUSD in 2021 with annual transportation savings exceeding $5 million. A comprehensive survey of approximately 27,000 parents and staff in 2022 provides evidence of the approach's effectiveness. A full version of this paper can be found at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4324076
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (4) , 1306-1322
Frontiers in Operations: Employees vs. Contractors: An Operational Perspective
Problem definition: We consider a platform’s problem of how to staff its operations given the possibilities of hiring employees and setting up a contractor marketplace. We aim to understand the operational difference between these two work arrangement models. Methodology/results: We consider a model where demand is not only stochastic but also evolving over time, which we capture via a state of the world that determines the demand distribution. In the case of employees, the platform controls the number of employee hours it uses for serving demand, whereas in the case of contractors, it sets the wage paid to them per utilized hour. We show that although the employee problem is equivalent to a standard newsvendor, the contractor one corresponds to an unusual version of the newsvendor model where utilization is the control variable. Managerial implications: This distinction makes the contractor model more flexible, allowing us to prove that it performs significantly better, especially if the order of magnitude of demand is unknown. Meanwhile, hybrid solutions that combine both employees and contractors have complex optimal solutions and offer relatively limited benefits relative to a contractor marketplace. History: This paper has been accepted in the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Frontiers in Operations Initiative. Funding: This research was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 71821002]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0029 .
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (4) , 1306-1322
Frontiers in Operations: Employees vs. Contractors: An Operational Perspective
Problem definition: We consider a platform’s problem of how to staff its operations given the possibilities of hiring employees and setting up a contractor marketplace. We aim to understand the operational difference between these two work arrangement models. Methodology/results: We consider a model where demand is not only stochastic but also evolving over time, which we capture via a state of the world that determines the demand distribution. In the case of employees, the platform controls the number of employee hours it uses for serving demand, whereas in the case of contractors, it sets the wage paid to them per utilized hour. We show that although the employee problem is equivalent to a standard newsvendor, the contractor one corresponds to an unusual version of the newsvendor model where utilization is the control variable. Managerial implications: This distinction makes the contractor model more flexible, allowing us to prove that it performs significantly better, especially if the order of magnitude of demand is unknown. Meanwhile, hybrid solutions that combine both employees and contractors have complex optimal solutions and offer relatively limited benefits relative to a contractor marketplace. History: This paper has been accepted in the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Frontiers in Operations Initiative. Funding: This research was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 71821002]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0029 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Two-Sided Flexibility in Platforms
Flexibility is a cornerstone of operations management, crucial to hedge stochasticity in product demands, service requirements, and resource allocation. In two-sided platforms, flexibility is also two-sided and can be viewed as the compatibility of agents on one side with agents on the other side. Platform actions often influence the flexibility on either the demand or the supply side. But how should flexibility be jointly allocated across different sides? Whereas the literature has traditionally focused on only one side at a time, our work initiates the study of two-sided flexibility in matching platforms. We propose a parsimonious matching model in random graphs and identify the flexibility allocation that optimizes the expected size of a maximum matching. Our findings reveal that flexibility allocation is a first-order issue: for a given flexibility budget, the resulting matching size can vary greatly depending on how the budget is allocated. Moreover, even in the simple and symmetric settings we study, the quest for the optimal allocation is complicated. In particular, easy and costly mistakes can be made if the flexibility decisions on the demand and supply side are optimized independently (e.g., by two different teams in the company), rather than jointly. To guide the search for optimal flexibility allocation, we uncover two effects, flexibility cannibalization, and flexibility abundance, that govern when the optimal design places the flexibility budget only on one side or equally on both sides. In doing so we identify the study of two-sided flexibility as a significant aspect of platform efficiency.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTwo-Sided Flexibility in Platforms
Flexibility is a cornerstone of operations management, crucial to hedge stochasticity in product demands, service requirements, and resource allocation. In two-sided platforms, flexibility is also two-sided and can be viewed as the compatibility of agents on one side with agents on the other side. Platform actions often influence the flexibility on either the demand or the supply side. But how should flexibility be jointly allocated across different sides? Whereas the literature has traditionally focused on only one side at a time, our work initiates the study of two-sided flexibility in matching platforms. We propose a parsimonious matching model in random graphs and identify the flexibility allocation that optimizes the expected size of a maximum matching. Our findings reveal that flexibility allocation is a first-order issue: for a given flexibility budget, the resulting matching size can vary greatly depending on how the budget is allocated. Moreover, even in the simple and symmetric settings we study, the quest for the optimal allocation is complicated. In particular, easy and costly mistakes can be made if the flexibility decisions on the demand and supply side are optimized independently (e.g., by two different teams in the company), rather than jointly. To guide the search for optimal flexibility allocation, we uncover two effects, flexibility cannibalization, and flexibility abundance, that govern when the optimal design places the flexibility budget only on one side or equally on both sides. In doing so we identify the study of two-sided flexibility as a significant aspect of platform efficiency.