Owen J. E. Maroney

Macro-realism is the position that certain macroscopic observables must always possess definite values: e.g. the table is in some definite position, even if we do not know what that is precisely. The traditional understanding is that by assuming macro-realism one can derive the Leggett-Garg inequalities, which constrain the possible statistics from certain experiments. Since quantum experiments can violate the Leggett-Garg inequalities, this is taken to rule out the possibility of macro-realism in a quantum universe. However, recent analyses have exposed loopholes in the Leggett-Garg argument, which allow many types of macro-realism to be compatible with quantum theory and hence violation of the Leggett-Garg inequalities. This paper takes a different approach to ruling out macro-realism and the result is a no-go theorem for macro-realism in quantum theory that is stronger than the Leggett-Garg argument. This approach uses the framework of ontological models: an elegant way to reason about foundational issues in quantum theory which has successfully produced many other recent results, such as the PBR theorem.

The notion of a physical collapse of the wave function is embodied in dynamical collapse models. These involve a modification of the unitary evolution of the wave function so as to give a dynamical account of collapse. The resulting dynamics is at first sight time asymmetric for the simple reason that the wave function depends on those collapse events in the past but not those in the future. Here we show that dynamical wave-function collapse models admit a general description that has no built-in direction of time. Given some simple constraints, we show that there exist empirically equivalent pictures of collapsing wave functions in both time directions, each satisfying the same dynamical rules. A preferred direction is singled out only by the asymmetric initial and final time constraints on the state of the universe.

The notion of a physical collapse of the wave function is embodied in dynamical collapse models. These involve a modification of the unitary evolution of the wave function such as to give a dynamical account of collapse. The resulting dynamics is at first sight time asymmetric for the simple reason that the wave function depends on those collapse events in the past but not those in the future. Here we show that dynamical wave function collapse models admit a general description that has no inbuilt direction of time. Given some simple constraints, we show that there exist empirically equivalent pictures of collapsing wave functions in both time directions, each satisfying the same dynamical rules. A preferred direction is singled out only by the asymmetric initial and final time constraints on the state of the Universe.

The amount of heat generated by computers is rapidly becoming one of the main problems for developing new generations of information technology. The thermodynamics of computation sets the ultimate physical bounds on heat generation. A lower bound is set by the Landauer Limit, at which computation becomes thermodynamically reversible. For classical computation there is no physical principle which prevents this limit being reached, and approaches to it are already being experimentally tested. In this paper we show that for quantum computation there is an unavoidable excess heat generation that renders it inherently thermodynamically irreversible. The Landauer Limit cannot, in general, be reached by quantum computers. We show the existence of a lower bound to the heat generated by quantum computing that exceeds that given by the Landauer Limit, give the special conditions where this excess cost may be avoided, and show how classical computing falls within these special conditions.

Collapse models are modifications of quantum theory where the wave function is treated as physically real and the collapse of the wave function is a physical process. This appears to introduce a time reversal asymmetry into the dynamics of the wave function since the collapses affect only the future state. This paper challenges this conclusion, showing that in three different examples of time asymmetries associated with collapse models, if the physically real part of the model can be reduced to the locations in space and time about which collapses occur, then such a model works both forward and backward in time, in each case satisfying the Born rule. Despite the apparent asymmetry of the collapse process, these models in fact have time reversal symmetry. Any physically observed time asymmetries that arise in such models are due to the asymmetric imposition of initial or final time boundary conditions, rather than from an inherent asymmetry in the dynamical law. This is the standard explanation of time asymmetric behaviour resulting from time symmetric laws.

Macroscopic Realism (MR) says that a macroscopic system is always determinately in one or other of the macroscopically distinguishable states available to it. The Leggett-Garg (LG) inequality was derived to allow experimental test of whether or not this doctrine is true; it is also often thought of as a temporal version of a Bell-inequality. Despite recent interest in the inequality, controversy remains regarding what would be shown by its violation. Here we resolve this controversy, which arises due to an insufficiently general and model-independent approach to the question so far. We argue that LG's initial characterisation of MR does not pick out a particularly natural realist position, so we articulate an operationally well-defined and well-motivated position in its place. We show that much weaker conditions than LG's are sufficient to derive the inequality: in the first instance, its violation only demonstrates that certain measurements fail to be non-disturbing at the operational level. We articulate three distinct species of MR-ist position, and argue that it is only the first of these which can be refuted by LG inequality violation. This first position is an attractive one, so ruling it out remains of interest, however. A crucial role is played in LG's argument by the assumption of noninvasive measurability. We show that this notion is ambiguous between the weaker notion of disturbance at the operational level, and the stronger notion of invasiveness at the ontic level of properties of the system. Ontic noninvasiveness would be required to rule out MR per se but this property is not entailed by MR, and its presence cannot be established in a model-independent way. It follows that despite the formal parallels, Bell's and LG's inequalities are not methodologically on a par. We close with some reflections on the implications of our analysis for the pedagogy of quantum superposition.