S. Matthew Liao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
S. Matthew Liao has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby
Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine
3 shared publications - Anders Sandberg
University of Oxford
2 shared publications Rebecca Roache
2 shared publications- Alex John London
Philosophy Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
1 shared publication - Alex Wiegmann
University of Granada
1 shared publication - Anne Barnhill
Johns Hopkins University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Responsible Technology
- Vol. 26
Understanding privacy: The personal agential realm theory and its implications
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Responsible Technology
- Vol. 26
Open AccessUnderstanding privacy: The personal agential realm theory and its implications
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 26 (7) , 4-6
AI Ethics 2.0: Why Frontier AI Demands a New Governance Agenda for Healthcare
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 26 (7) , 4-6
AI Ethics 2.0: Why Frontier AI Demands a New Governance Agenda for Healthcare
- Open Access
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Responsible Technology
- Vol. 23
Navigating the complexities of AI and digital governance: the 5W1H framework
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Responsible Technology
- Vol. 23
Open AccessNavigating the complexities of AI and digital governance: the 5W1H framework
- 24 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Empirical Bioethics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 127-139
‘Why Do You Ask?’ Revisiting the Purpose of Eliciting the Public’s Moral Judgments About Emerging Technologies
It is increasingly common for bioethicists to consult with the public to solicit their judgments and attitudes about ethical questions and issues, especially ones that arise with new and emerging technologies. However, it is not always clear what the purpose of this engagement is or ought to be: do bioethicists seek the input of the public to help them arrive at a morally correct justified policy position, or do they seek this input to help them shape and frame their already-established moral position, or something else entirely? In this essay, we discuss four distinct possible functions of collecting moral judgments from the public: issue spotting, messaging for adherence and social stability, substantive moral guidance, and procedural fairness. For each function, we offer core examples from the literature before discussing the strengths and weaknesses attendant to each. We conclude with several preliminary questions bioethicists can ask themselves to clarify their own purpose for soliciting moral judgments from the public.
- 24 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Empirical Bioethics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 127-139
‘Why Do You Ask?’ Revisiting the Purpose of Eliciting the Public’s Moral Judgments About Emerging Technologies
It is increasingly common for bioethicists to consult with the public to solicit their judgments and attitudes about ethical questions and issues, especially ones that arise with new and emerging technologies. However, it is not always clear what the purpose of this engagement is or ought to be: do bioethicists seek the input of the public to help them arrive at a morally correct justified policy position, or do they seek this input to help them shape and frame their already-established moral position, or something else entirely? In this essay, we discuss four distinct possible functions of collecting moral judgments from the public: issue spotting, messaging for adherence and social stability, substantive moral guidance, and procedural fairness. For each function, we offer core examples from the literature before discussing the strengths and weaknesses attendant to each. We conclude with several preliminary questions bioethicists can ask themselves to clarify their own purpose for soliciting moral judgments from the public.
- Open Access
- 18 March 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 36 (2) , 1-20
Lives, Limbs, and Liver Spots: The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation
Limited Aggregation is the view that when there are competing moral claims that demand our attention, we should sometimes satisfy the largest aggregate of claims, depending on the strength of the claims in question. In recent years, philosophers such as Patrick Tomlin and Alastair Norcross have argued that Limited Aggregation violates a number of rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency. Current versions of Limited Aggregation are what may be called Comparative Approaches because they involve assessing the relative strengths of various claims. In this paper, we offer a non-comparative version of Limited Aggregation, what we call the Threshold Approach. It states that there is a non-relative threshold that separates various claims. We demonstrate that the Threshold Approach does not violate rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency, and we show that potential concerns regarding such a view are surmountable.
- 18 March 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 36 (2) , 1-20
Open AccessLives, Limbs, and Liver Spots: The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation
Limited Aggregation is the view that when there are competing moral claims that demand our attention, we should sometimes satisfy the largest aggregate of claims, depending on the strength of the claims in question. In recent years, philosophers such as Patrick Tomlin and Alastair Norcross have argued that Limited Aggregation violates a number of rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency. Current versions of Limited Aggregation are what may be called Comparative Approaches because they involve assessing the relative strengths of various claims. In this paper, we offer a non-comparative version of Limited Aggregation, what we call the Threshold Approach. It states that there is a non-relative threshold that separates various claims. We demonstrate that the Threshold Approach does not violate rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency, and we show that potential concerns regarding such a view are surmountable.
- Open Access
- 2 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 42 (3) , 903
Correction: Ethics of AI and Health Care: Towards a Substantive Human Rights Framework
- 2 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 42 (3) , 903
Open AccessCorrection: Ethics of AI and Health Care: Towards a Substantive Human Rights Framework
- Open Access
- 12 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 42 (3) , 857-866
Ethics of AI and Health Care: Towards a Substantive Human Rights Framework
There is enormous interest in using artificial intelligence (AI) in health care contexts. But before AI can be used in such settings, we need to make sure that AI researchers and organizations follow appropriate ethical frameworks and guidelines when developing these technologies. In recent years, a great number of ethical frameworks for AI have been proposed. However, these frameworks have tended to be abstract and not explain what grounds and justifies their recommendations and how one should use these recommendations in practice. In this paper, I propose an AI ethics framework that is grounded in substantive, human rights theory and one that can help us address these questions.
- 12 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 42 (3) , 857-866
Open AccessEthics of AI and Health Care: Towards a Substantive Human Rights Framework
There is enormous interest in using artificial intelligence (AI) in health care contexts. But before AI can be used in such settings, we need to make sure that AI researchers and organizations follow appropriate ethical frameworks and guidelines when developing these technologies. In recent years, a great number of ethical frameworks for AI have been proposed. However, these frameworks have tended to be abstract and not explain what grounds and justifies their recommendations and how one should use these recommendations in practice. In this paper, I propose an AI ethics framework that is grounded in substantive, human rights theory and one that can help us address these questions.
- 30 June 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 22 (12) , 10-21
The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today
In some views, philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the “simple” application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help.
- 30 June 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 22 (12) , 10-21
The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today
In some views, philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the “simple” application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help.
- 26 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 39 (5) , 503-526
A critique of some recent victim-centered theories of nonconsequentialism
- 26 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 39 (5) , 503-526
A critique of some recent victim-centered theories of nonconsequentialism
Designing humans: A human rights approach
Advances in genomic technologies such as CRISPR‐Cas9, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and in vitro gametogenesis may soon give us more precise and efficient tools to have children with certain traits such as beauty, intelligence, and athleticism. In this paper, I propose a new approach to the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering, a human rights approach. This approach relies on two claims that have certain, independent plausibility: (a) human beings have equal moral status, and (b) human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. I first argue that the human rights approach gives us a lower bound of when reproductive genetic engineering would be permissible. I then compare this approach with other approaches such as the libertarian, perfectionist, and life worth living approaches. Against these approaches, I argue that the human rights approach offers a novel, and more plausible, way of assessing the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering.
Designing humans: A human rights approach
Advances in genomic technologies such as CRISPR‐Cas9, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and in vitro gametogenesis may soon give us more precise and efficient tools to have children with certain traits such as beauty, intelligence, and athleticism. In this paper, I propose a new approach to the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering, a human rights approach. This approach relies on two claims that have certain, independent plausibility: (a) human beings have equal moral status, and (b) human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. I first argue that the human rights approach gives us a lower bound of when reproductive genetic engineering would be permissible. I then compare this approach with other approaches such as the libertarian, perfectionist, and life worth living approaches. Against these approaches, I argue that the human rights approach offers a novel, and more plausible, way of assessing the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering.