Ivan P. L. Png
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ivan P. L. Png has a total of 49 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yun Hou
IPE, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou), Guangzhou, Guangdong, China
6 shared publications - Junhong Chu
HKU Business School, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
5 shared publications Junhong Chu
University of Hong Kong, Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong
4 shared publications- Kai-Lung Hui
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology - School of Business and Management
4 shared publications Jie Gong
National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Business Policy
3 shared publicationsKai-Lung Hui
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Stronger patent law increases the allocation of resources to external relative to internal R&D: Empirical evidence
How should a technology firm adjust resource allocation between external and internal R&D in response to stronger patent protection? External R&D provides the firm with another channel of earnings to mitigate diminishing returns to internal R&D, but yields the firm only a fraction of the additional profit generated. Theoretically, if the marginal return to external R&D diminishes more slowly than the marginal return to internal R&D, the firm should increase external R&D proportionately more than internal R&D. Exploiting regional differences in the strengthening of patent protection due to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), we find that the CAFC was associated with 35 percent more external R&D vis-à-vis 20 percent more internal R&D. The difference was more pronounced among firms more specialized in technology and in industries where patents were less effective.
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStronger patent law increases the allocation of resources to external relative to internal R&D: Empirical evidence
How should a technology firm adjust resource allocation between external and internal R&D in response to stronger patent protection? External R&D provides the firm with another channel of earnings to mitigate diminishing returns to internal R&D, but yields the firm only a fraction of the additional profit generated. Theoretically, if the marginal return to external R&D diminishes more slowly than the marginal return to internal R&D, the firm should increase external R&D proportionately more than internal R&D. Exploiting regional differences in the strengthening of patent protection due to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), we find that the CAFC was associated with 35 percent more external R&D vis-à-vis 20 percent more internal R&D. The difference was more pronounced among firms more specialized in technology and in industries where patents were less effective.
- 10 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Research Policy
- Vol. 55 (10)
Stronger patent law increases the allocation of resources to external relative to internal R&D: Empirical evidence
- 10 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Research Policy
- Vol. 55 (10)
Stronger patent law increases the allocation of resources to external relative to internal R&D: Empirical evidence
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 325-347
Regulation
Chapter 14 considers how to regulate market power, asymmetric information, and externalities. A market is a natural monopoly if the
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 325-347
Regulation
Chapter 14 considers how to regulate market power, asymmetric information, and externalities. A market is a natural monopoly if the
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 225-254
Oligopoly
Chapter 10 explains how sellers with market power should compete to maximize profit. In the short run, they compete on price and should
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 225-254
Oligopoly
Chapter 10 explains how sellers with market power should compete to maximize profit. In the short run, they compete on price and should
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 257-279
Externalities
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 69-96
Supply
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 25-47
Demand
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 149-173
Monopoly
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 123-148
Costs
- 17 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 303-324
Incentives and Organization