GKGopal V. Krishnan

Gopal V. Krishnan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Gopal V. Krishnan has a total of 73 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Wei Yu

    Hunter College–CUNY

    5 shared publications
  • Changjiang Wang

    University of Cincinnati

    3 shared publications
  • Gerald J. Lobo

    University of Houston

    3 shared publications
  • Gnanakumar Visvanathan

    Gopal V. Krishnan is a Professor at American University, Gnanakumar Visvanathan is an Associate Professor at George Mason University, and Wei Yu is an Assistant Professor at The University of Tennessee

    3 shared publications
  • Kiridaran Kanagaretnam

    Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, Canada

    3 shared publications
  • Mikhail Pevzner

    W. Robert Knechel is a Professor at the University of Florida, Gopal V. Krishnan is a Professor at American University, Mikhail Pevzner is an Assistant Professor at George Mason University, Lori B. Shefchik is a Ph.D. candidate at the Georgia Institute of Technology, and Uma K. Velury is a Professor at the University of Delaware

    3 shared publications

Latest Publications

  • Discretionary Impairments of Finite and Indefinite Intangible Assets

    by Gopal V. Krishnan, Alexander Liss, Ulf Mohrmann, Jan Riepe

    SYNOPSIS: Motivated by the debate on how post-acquisition accounting should treat different types of intangibles, particularly the choice between amortization and impairment versus impairment-only approaches, we use hand-collected data on acquired intangible assets and their impairments to examine the determinants of impairments of finite and indefinite intangible assets and goodwill. Impairments of indefinite-lived intangibles and goodwill are more strongly associated with reporting-related conditions than are impairments of finite-lived intangibles, which also exhibit modest associations with economic impairment indicators. Moreover, internal governance mechanisms moderate the relation between impairment pressure and recognized impairments for indefinite-lived intangibles and goodwill, but much less so for finite-lived intangibles, consistent with greater scope for discretion under the impairment-only regime. Our results are relevant for policymakers considering proposals to subsume intangible assets into goodwill and modify impairment test procedures. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

  • The Relation Between Audit Committee Accounting and Industry Expertise and Non-GAAP-Related Risk

    by Radhika Majeji, Gopal V. Krishnan, Wei Shi, Jiancheng Liu

    SUMMARY: We examine whether the audit committee’s (AC’s) combined accounting and industry expertise is associated with oversight of non-GAAP-related risk, a dimension of AC oversight distinct from financial reporting quality. We find that such combined expertise is negatively associated with the likelihood of non-GAAP-related securities class action lawsuits. Conditional on litigation, settlement amounts are lower when ACs possess combined accounting and industry expertise. We further show that this expertise is associated with reduced scrutiny of plaintiffs’ lawyers, fewer ESG incidents, and lower ROA volatility—related domains in which non-GAAP-type disclosures and exposures often arise. Finally, firms are more likely to appoint AC members with combined accounting and industry expertise, rather than other types of expertise, following non-GAAP-related lawsuits. Overall, the evidence suggests that ACs with combined accounting and industry expertise provide effective oversight of non-GAAP-related risk, complementing rather than substituting for their traditional role in financial reporting oversight. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; G34; K41.

  • Do Nonaudit Services Attract Regulatory Scrutiny?

    by Gopal V. Krishnan, Yinqi Zhang, Ling Zhou

    SUMMARY: We examine whether the SEC and PCAOB scrutiny of audit clients and their auditors is associated with nonaudit services (NAS) to those clients. We find that NAS fees paid by audit clients are positively associated with the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter, the number of accounting-related comments, and the volume of client filings downloaded by the SEC from EDGAR. Furthermore, NAS fees are positively associated with the number of days to resolve the comments raised, consistent with higher remediation costs. Similarly, the PCAOB inspects more clients and downloads more from EDGAR filings of clients of large auditors who receive a higher proportion of NAS fees than total fees, suggesting increased regulatory scrutiny. Overall, our results suggest that NAS draw scrutiny from regulators and highlight the potential hidden costs of purchasing NAS from external auditors. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M42.


  • Audit outcomes of non‐financial misconduct

    by Bidisha Chakrabarty, Michael Hyman, Gopal V. Krishnan

    We examine how non‐financial misconduct by corporations impacts audit outcomes. We use a novel database of penalties received by firms from federal, state and local agencies for legal violations not directly related to their financial reports and find that auditors raise fees following these violations. The magnitudes are economically significant: violating firms pay about $162,000 or 6% more in audit fees than comparable firms without violations. Additionally, auditors charge more when the penalty amounts are higher and infractions are more egregious. Companies fined for non‐financial misconduct are also more likely to receive going concern opinions. Our results are robust to propensity score matching, falsification tests and firm‐fixed effects and are not attributable to lax firm culture or “tone at the top”. These results highlight that firms' unethical conduct, even those that do not directly lead to financial reporting infractions, has consequences beyond just the penalties imposed by enforcement agencies.


  • Open Access

    Component Auditor Use and Lenders’ Perception of Audit Quality

    by Gopal V. Krishnan, Juan Mao, Jing Zhang

    SUMMARY: While component auditors audit a significant proportion of public companies, lenders may not be aware of their involvement before Form AP disclosure. We study whether the disclosure of component auditor use and the extent of their involvement is useful to lenders. We find that the loan spread is higher when firms’ lead auditors use component auditors relative to engagements without component auditor participation. Further, for firms whose lead auditors use component auditors, we find a positive association between the extent of such participation and the loan spread. However, the positive effect of component auditor use on the loan spread is mitigated for firms with a high level of foreign operations, consistent with the notion that the use of component auditors is more beneficial for firms with significant foreign operations. Overall, our findings suggest that the disclosure of information on component auditor participation in global group audits is useful to lenders. Data Availability: All data used in this paper are publicly available. JEL Classifications: M42; G32.


  • Are abnormal audit fees informative about audit quality? The moderating role of office resource availability

    by Gopal V. Krishnan, Paul Tanyi

    We contribute to the literature on the relation between client‐level abnormal (excess) audit fees and audit quality by offering a novel perspective. We posit that audit office‐level resource availability moderates the relation between client‐level audit fees and audit quality. This is because office‐level resources (audit partners, staff, technology and administrative support) are generally shared across engagements and can augment those engagements that are resource constrained. We first provide evidence that office‐level resource availability is informative about audit quality incremental to client‐level abnormal fees and several other client and auditor characteristics, including office size. More importantly, we find that client‐level abnormal fees are informative about audit quality only for audit offices that are resource‐constrained but not for offices that are not resource‐constrained.


  • Can We Trust the Trust Words in 10-Ks?

    by Myojung Cho, Gopal V. Krishnan, Hyunkwon Cho


  • Do Big 4 Auditors Enhance Audit Quality in China? A “Behind the Scenes Look”

    by Songsheng Chen, Gopal V. Krishnan, Wenying Li, Yinqi Zhang

    We contribute to the debate on whether the “Big N effect” on audit quality is due to client self-selection by controlling for pre-audit earnings quality. Using data from the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, we find that pre-audit earnings quality is higher for Big 4 clients. Controlling for pre-audit earnings quality, restatement frequency is lower for Big 4 clients than for non-Big 4 clients, but there is no significant difference in discretionary accruals between Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients. Our findings indicate that Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors in China pursue different strategies to enhance audit quality. The Big 4 enhance audit quality by recruiting and retaining clients with higher earnings quality and acting more conservatively toward clients with a higher risk for earnings restatement. In contrast, non-Big 4 auditors enhance audit quality by requiring more downward audit adjustments.


  • Does Regulating Audit Pricing Enhance Audit Quality and the Timeliness of Audit Reporting? The Texas Experience

    by Gopal V. Krishnan, Paul Tanyi

    The Texas State Board of Public Accountancy has imposed a statewide ban on lowballing of audit fees. We exploit this unique opportunity to study whether audit quality can be enhanced through regulating audit pricing. We find that audit fees are significantly higher for new clients of Texas-based auditors while audit fees are lower for new clients of auditors outside of Texas. However, we do not find a difference in the actual or perceived audit quality or timeliness of audit reports between new clients of Texas-based auditors and clients in control groups. We also find that clients of Texas-based auditors are less likely to switch auditors than clients of out-of-state auditors, consistent with higher switching costs. Thus, while the statewide ban imposes additional cost on new clients of Texas-based auditors, we do not find any corresponding economic benefits. Our findings have implications for regulators, investors and academics.