Scott Williamson

Ageing populations are reshaping the political landscape in many democracies, raising concerns about intergenerational inequalities in power and representation. Do these political factors contribute to ageism toward older people? While ageism is a well-documented form of prejudice, its political roots remain underexplored. This paper examines whether perceptions of political exclusion based on age are linked to negative attitudes toward older people. Using original survey data from Italy, South Korea, and the United States, we study how both general concerns about older generations dominating political life and more personal feelings of age-based exclusion are associated with ageism. The results from all three countries reveal strong and consistent links between perceived political grievances and explicit expressions of ageism, whereas implicit ageism appears largely unrelated to political perceptions. Our findings suggest that age-based prejudice is not merely a cultural or psychological artefact, but is also connected to perceived injustices in democratic representation.

International aid is a key resource for local development, and project implementation is influenced by local political elites. However, we know little about how these elites view aid and whether they are more likely to prefer some funding sources over others. We explore elite attitudes toward aid in Tunisia, arguing that local politicians are less likely to prefer development programs funded by the United States compared to other domestic or foreign sources. Through a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey of local Tunisian politicians, we find a strong aversion to local development projects funded by USAID. Analysis of subgroup effects and comparisons to other international donors suggests the negative reaction is driven by ideological rather than material concerns. This research provides insights into elite perceptions of foreign aid in recipient countries and contributes to our understanding of how anti-Americanism can affect policymaking in the Middle East.

To what extent do people prioritize living in a democracy over other indicators of good governance or personal well-being? This question has become contested as democracies come under pressure worldwide. We provide an answer through cross-national conjoint experiments in which survey respondents choose between hypothetical countries that differ in terms of societal-level attributes (e.g., elections, health care) and individual-level outcomes that the respondent would experience (e.g., wealth, minority status). People across Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Thailand, and the United States consistently prioritize living in a safe country with free and fair elections over other factors, including other components of democracy like civil liberties and checks and balances. Regarding tradeoffs, many people would forfeit democratic elections to avoid living in a dangerous society but not to obtain wealth and other goods. Electoral democracy is attractive globally but can be undermined by concerns about crime and safety.

The United States gives substantial aid to the militaries of autocratic governments that abuse human rights. US officials claim this aid is necessary to manage security threats, but others argue the United States should prioritize aid for governments that reflect democratic values. How do these competing concerns shape Americans’ attitudes toward military aid? Through an experiment implemented on four surveys, I document a strong preference for aiding democracies that respect human rights, and this preference is robust to the presence of terrorism threats. However, internationalist Americans become especially less likely to prioritize democratic values when terrorist threats exist. Descriptive survey questions reinforce this pattern by showing how internationalists who support military aid the most are conflicted proponents of prioritizing democratic values in US foreign policy. The article extends research on attitudes toward foreign aid and illustrates an important limitation to the influence of democratic values on Americans’ foreign policy preferences.

To what extent do people prioritize living in a democracy over other indicators of good governance or personal well-being? This question has become contested as democracies come under pressure worldwide. We address this gap through cross-national conjoint experiments in which survey respondents choose between hypothetical countries that differ in terms of societal-level attributes (e.g., elections, health care) and individual-level outcomes that the respondent would experience (e.g., wealth, minority status). People across Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Thailand, and the United States consistently prioritize living in a safe country with free and fair elections over other factors, including other components of democracy like civil liberties and checks and balances. Regarding tradeoffs, many people would forfeit democratic elections to avoid living in a dangerous society but not to obtain wealth and other goods. Electoral democracy is attractive globally but can be undermined by concerns about crime and safety.

How do people around the world define democracy? Answering this question is critical as countries face democratic backsliding and authoritarian governments promote alternative notions of democracy. Indeed, some scholars argue that people from different backgrounds understand democracy differently. By contrast, we discovered very consistent views about what constitutes a “democratic” country from conjoint survey experiments conducted in Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Thailand, and the United States. Across countries ( N = 6150) and diverse subgroups within countries, people similarly emphasized free and fair elections and civil liberties as being the key determinants of democracy. Countries that produce desirable social and economic outcomes are also considered more democratic, but these and other factors exert a smaller and less consistent effect than elections and civil liberties.

A large literature on authoritarian elections suggests they allow autocrats to signal strength while also acting as focal points for opposition. These theories rest on the assumption that authoritarian elections attract the public's attention, but we know little about how attention shifts in these elections and toward whom. We expect that elections should increase the salience of both autocrats and their opponents, and we argue that opponents may gain nearly as much attention as autocrats despite restrictions inherent to these political systems. We confirm these patterns using Google Trends search data, which shows that opponents experience average boosts almost as large as those for autocrats. These increases are substantively large enough to indicate that opponents, who are typically starved of attention, attract similar public interest during election periods as autocrats do in non-electoral periods. The findings contribute to understanding how elections create opportunities but also risks for autocrats.

A purported advantage of secrecy in international politics is its ability to reduce pressures for conflict escalation by obscuring responsibility for hostile actions. Delegating these actions to proxies is one strategy states use to retain plausible deniability and limit escalation risks. Yet, proxies often have strong ties to sponsoring states, raising questions about their ability to influence blame and demands for retaliation. This paper tests these effects by analyzing American responses to hypothetical attacks by Chinese, Russian, and Iranian actors through experiments administered on three surveys. The results show that using proxies for these attacks modestly reduced how much Americans blamed the respective foreign governments, while also limiting demands that their senior leadership be sanctioned. However, the use of proxies did not affect Americans’ attitudes toward more forceful responses by the US government. These findings contribute to understanding of how proxies shape plausible deniability and escalation risks in international conflicts.

Executives often bypass legislatures to make policies by decree. How does public opinion react to this unilateral decision-making? Building from research on executive orders and theories of legislative politics, we argue that executives in both democratic and authoritarian political systems will face public disapproval for making policy decisions unilaterally. Through survey experiments implemented in the United States and Egypt, we show that executives consistently receive lower approval for unilateral action in both domestic and foreign policymaking, even among co-partisans. We find evidence that this effect is driven by the belief that excluding the legislature violates appropriate democratic procedure, but also that the effect weakens when unilateral action is used to advance policies known to represent the majority's preference. Observational survey data from dozens of countries corroborate the experimental results. The paper sheds new light on the contexts in which popular commitment to democratic principles may constrain unilateral decision-making.

How does funding from foreign aid shape public opinion toward development programs? Existing research suggests that citizens of recipient countries prefer aid-funded programs, particularly if they view the domestic government as corrupt and ineffective. However, these studies have been implemented in contexts where major donors are relatively popular. We extend this literature by analyzing attitudes toward foreign aid in the Arab world, where Western donors are often polarizing and disliked. A survey experiment conducted in Egypt provides some evidence that respondents approve less of public health programs when they are funded by the US or French development agencies instead of the Egyptian government. We find that this effect is driven by distrust of Western donors’ motives. Descriptive survey data from the Arab Barometer reinforce the experimental findings by illustrating the importance of anti-Americanism and perceptions of donor motives in heightening opposition to aid. This research note contributes to a growing literature on public opinion toward foreign aid in recipient countries.