Ingo Brigandt
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ingo Brigandt has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alan C. Love
University of Minnesota
5 shared publications - Maureen. A. O'MAlley
UMR5164, University of Bordeaux, 146 Rue Léo Saignat, Bordeaux 33076, France
2 shared publications - Sara Green
Section for History and Philosophy of Science, Department of Science Education, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
2 shared publications Alexander Rosenber
Duke University
1 shared publicationB. Rosemary Grant
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Princeton University Princeton New Jersey
1 shared publicationDaniel Schweitzer
University of Queensland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
- Vol. 48 (1) , 8
Charles Pence, Integrative promise: explanatory virtues in biology, Springer (Synthese Library), 2025
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
- Vol. 48 (1) , 8
Charles Pence, Integrative promise: explanatory virtues in biology, Springer (Synthese Library), 2025
- 21 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 601-620
Evolutionstheorie und Naturalismus
- 14 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Metascience
- p. 1-2
Understanding why we are confused
- Open Access
- 24 May 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Morphology
- Vol. 284 (7) , e21599
Against unifying homology concepts: Redirecting the debate
The term “homology” is persistently polysemous, defying the expectation that extensive scientific research should yield semantic stability. A common response has been to seek a unification of various prominent definitions. This paper proposes an alternative strategy, based on the insight that scientific concepts function as tools for research: When analyzing various conceptualizations of homology, we should preserve those distinguishing features that support particular research goals. We illustrate the fruitfulness of our strategy by application to two cases. First, we revisit Lankester's celebrated evolutionary reappraisal of homology and argue that his analysis has been distorted by assimilation to modern agendas. His “homogeny” does not mean the same thing as modern evolutionary “homology,” and his “homoplasy” is no mere antonym. Instead, Lankester uses both new terms to pose a question that remains strikingly relevant—how do mechanistic and historical causes of morphological resemblance interact? Second, we examine the puzzle of avian digit homology, which exemplifies disciplinary differences in homology conceptualization and assessment. Recent progress has been fueled by the development of new tools within the relevant disciplines (paleontology and developmental biology) and especially by increasing interdisciplinary cooperation. Conceptual unification has played very little role in this work, which instead seeks concrete evolutionary scenarios that integrate all the available evidence. Together these cases indicate the complex relationship between concepts and other tools in homology research.
- 24 May 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Morphology
- Vol. 284 (7) , e21599
Open AccessAgainst unifying homology concepts: Redirecting the debate
The term “homology” is persistently polysemous, defying the expectation that extensive scientific research should yield semantic stability. A common response has been to seek a unification of various prominent definitions. This paper proposes an alternative strategy, based on the insight that scientific concepts function as tools for research: When analyzing various conceptualizations of homology, we should preserve those distinguishing features that support particular research goals. We illustrate the fruitfulness of our strategy by application to two cases. First, we revisit Lankester's celebrated evolutionary reappraisal of homology and argue that his analysis has been distorted by assimilation to modern agendas. His “homogeny” does not mean the same thing as modern evolutionary “homology,” and his “homoplasy” is no mere antonym. Instead, Lankester uses both new terms to pose a question that remains strikingly relevant—how do mechanistic and historical causes of morphological resemblance interact? Second, we examine the puzzle of avian digit homology, which exemplifies disciplinary differences in homology conceptualization and assessment. Recent progress has been fueled by the development of new tools within the relevant disciplines (paleontology and developmental biology) and especially by increasing interdisciplinary cooperation. Conceptual unification has played very little role in this work, which instead seeks concrete evolutionary scenarios that integrate all the available evidence. Together these cases indicate the complex relationship between concepts and other tools in homology research.
- 26 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 54 (2) , 353-356
Daniel S. Brooks, James DiFrisco, and William C. Wimsatt (Eds.): Levels of Organization in the Biological Sciences
- 26 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 54 (2) , 353-356
Daniel S. Brooks, James DiFrisco, and William C. Wimsatt (Eds.): Levels of Organization in the Biological Sciences
- Open Access
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 52 (3) , 223-226
Engaging with Science, Values, and Society: Introduction
Philosophical work on science and values has come to engage with the concerns of society and of stakeholders affected by science and policy, leading to socially relevant philosophy of science and socially engaged philosophy of science. This special issue showcases instances of socially relevant philosophy of science, featuring contributions on a diversity of topics by Janet Kourany, Andrew Schroeder, Alison Wylie, Kristen Intemann, Joyce Havstad, Justin Biddle, Kevin Elliott, and Ingo Brigandt.
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 52 (3) , 223-226
Open AccessEngaging with Science, Values, and Society: Introduction
Philosophical work on science and values has come to engage with the concerns of society and of stakeholders affected by science and policy, leading to socially relevant philosophy of science and socially engaged philosophy of science. This special issue showcases instances of socially relevant philosophy of science, featuring contributions on a diversity of topics by Janet Kourany, Andrew Schroeder, Alison Wylie, Kristen Intemann, Joyce Havstad, Justin Biddle, Kevin Elliott, and Ingo Brigandt.
- 15 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-20
Menschenbildkonflikte: Evolutionstheorie und Naturalismus
- 15 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-20
Menschenbildkonflikte: Evolutionstheorie und Naturalismus
- 22 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 52 (3) , 356-379
How to Philosophically Tackle Kinds without Talking about “Natural Kinds”
Recent rival attempts in the philosophy of science to put forward a general theory of the properties that all (and only) natural kinds across the sciences possess may have proven to be futile. Instead, I develop a general methodological framework for how to philosophically study kinds. Any kind has to be investigated and articulated together with the human aims that motivate referring to this kind, where different kinds in the same scientific domain can answer to different concrete aims. My core contention is that nonepistemic aims, including environmental, ethical, and political aims, matter as well. This is defended and illustrated based on several examples of kinds, with particular attention to the role of social-political aims: species, race, gender, as well as personality disorders and oppositional defiant disorder as psychiatric kinds. Such nonepistemic aims and values need not always be those personally favoured by scientists but may have to reflect values that matter to relevant societal stakeholders. Despite the general agenda to study “kinds,” I argue that philosophers should stop using the term “natural kinds,” as this label obscures the relevance of human interests and the way in which many kinds are based on contingent social processes subject to human responsibility.
- 22 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 52 (3) , 356-379
How to Philosophically Tackle Kinds without Talking about “Natural Kinds”
Recent rival attempts in the philosophy of science to put forward a general theory of the properties that all (and only) natural kinds across the sciences possess may have proven to be futile. Instead, I develop a general methodological framework for how to philosophically study kinds. Any kind has to be investigated and articulated together with the human aims that motivate referring to this kind, where different kinds in the same scientific domain can answer to different concrete aims. My core contention is that nonepistemic aims, including environmental, ethical, and political aims, matter as well. This is defended and illustrated based on several examples of kinds, with particular attention to the role of social-political aims: species, race, gender, as well as personality disorders and oppositional defiant disorder as psychiatric kinds. Such nonepistemic aims and values need not always be those personally favoured by scientists but may have to reflect values that matter to relevant societal stakeholders. Despite the general agenda to study “kinds,” I argue that philosophers should stop using the term “natural kinds,” as this label obscures the relevance of human interests and the way in which many kinds are based on contingent social processes subject to human responsibility.
- 20 November 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution
- Vol. 332 (8) , 299-300
A special issue on The Evolution of Evolution
- 20 November 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution
- Vol. 332 (8) , 299-300
A special issue on The Evolution of Evolution