Seung Ki Baek
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Seung Ki Baek has a total of 74 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Beom Jun Kim
Department of Physics, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, Republic of Korea
34 shared publications Petter Minnhagen
IceLab and Department of Ecology & Environmental Science, Linnaeus väg 6, 92277, Umeå University, Sweden; and 2IceLab and Department of Physics, Linnaeus väg 24, Umeå University, 90187 Umeå, Sweden
21 shared publicationsSu Do Yi
Department of Physics and Astronomy, Seoul National University, Seoul 08826, Republic of Korea
12 shared publicationsYohsuke Murase
RIKEN Center for Computational Science 650-0047 Kobe Hyogo Japan
10 shared publicationsBeom Jun Kim
BK21 Physics Research Division and Department of Physics, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon 440-746, South Korea
8 shared publicationsMinjae Kim
Department of Physics Pukyong National University 48513 Busan Korea
8 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of the Korean Physical Society
- Vol. 88 (7) , 808-814
Controlling sternness in judging a good person who helps the bad
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of the Korean Physical Society
- Vol. 88 (7) , 808-814
Controlling sternness in judging a good person who helps the bad
- 4 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 617, 112305
Threshold behavior of a social norm in response to error proneness
- 4 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 617, 112305
Threshold behavior of a social norm in response to error proneness
- Open Access
Controlling sternness in judging a good person who helps the bad
Recent studies on indirect reciprocity with private assessment on complete graphs suggest the possibility that one can continuously modulate the degree of segregation by controlling how to judge a good person helping a bad one. A well-known social norm called L6 judges it as bad, which eventually segregates the society into two antagonistic clusters, but if it is judged as good, the system reaches paradise where everyone likes each other. In this work, we numerically study this transition between segregation and paradise in two different settings. Firstly, in a uniform population of size $N$ where everyone regards such a donor as good with probability $p$ and bad with $1-p$, we observe paradise when $Np$ is sufficiently greater than $O(1)$. In contrast, in a heterogeneous setting where only $k$ individuals judge such a donor as good, the size difference of the clusters increases almost linearly as $k$ increases, so paradise can only be reached as $k \to N$ in a large population. Therefore, when an urgent change is needed to overcome the segregation due to L6, a small change in each and every individual's behavior is more efficient than a radical change in a fraction of the population.Open AccessControlling sternness in judging a good person who helps the bad
Recent studies on indirect reciprocity with private assessment on complete graphs suggest the possibility that one can continuously modulate the degree of segregation by controlling how to judge a good person helping a bad one. A well-known social norm called L6 judges it as bad, which eventually segregates the society into two antagonistic clusters, but if it is judged as good, the system reaches paradise where everyone likes each other. In this work, we numerically study this transition between segregation and paradise in two different settings. Firstly, in a uniform population of size $N$ where everyone regards such a donor as good with probability $p$ and bad with $1-p$, we observe paradise when $Np$ is sufficiently greater than $O(1)$. In contrast, in a heterogeneous setting where only $k$ individuals judge such a donor as good, the size difference of the clusters increases almost linearly as $k$ increases, so paradise can only be reached as $k \to N$ in a large population. Therefore, when an urgent change is needed to overcome the segregation due to L6, a small change in each and every individual's behavior is more efficient than a radical change in a fraction of the population. - 16 September 2025
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 112 (3) , L032304
Indirect reciprocity as a dynamics for weak balance
A social network is often divided into many factions. People are friends within each faction, while they are enemies of the other factions, and even my enemy's enemy is not necessarily my friend. This configuration can be described in terms of a weak form of structural balance. Although weak balance explains a number of real social networks, which dynamical rule achieves it has remained relatively unexplored. In this work, we show that the answer can be found in the field of indirect reciprocity, which assumes that people assess each other's behavior and choose how to behave to others based on the assessment according to a social norm. We begin by showing that weak structural balance is equivalent to stationarity when the rule is given by a norm called 'judging'. By analyzing its cluster dynamics of merging, fission, and migration induced by assessment error in complete graphs, we obtain the cluster size distribution in a steady state, which shows the coexistence of a giant cluster and smaller ones. This study suggests that indirect reciprocity can provide insight into the interplay between a norm that individuals abide by and the macroscopic group structure in society.
- 16 September 2025
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 112 (3) , L032304
Indirect reciprocity as a dynamics for weak balance
A social network is often divided into many factions. People are friends within each faction, while they are enemies of the other factions, and even my enemy's enemy is not necessarily my friend. This configuration can be described in terms of a weak form of structural balance. Although weak balance explains a number of real social networks, which dynamical rule achieves it has remained relatively unexplored. In this work, we show that the answer can be found in the field of indirect reciprocity, which assumes that people assess each other's behavior and choose how to behave to others based on the assessment according to a social norm. We begin by showing that weak structural balance is equivalent to stationarity when the rule is given by a norm called 'judging'. By analyzing its cluster dynamics of merging, fission, and migration induced by assessment error in complete graphs, we obtain the cluster size distribution in a steady state, which shows the coexistence of a giant cluster and smaller ones. This study suggests that indirect reciprocity can provide insight into the interplay between a norm that individuals abide by and the macroscopic group structure in society.
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 612, 112199
Response of social norms to individual differences in error-proneness
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 612, 112199
Response of social norms to individual differences in error-proneness
- Open Access
Response of social norms to individual differences in error-proneness
Indirect reciprocity explains the evolution of cooperation by considering how our cooperative behavior toward someone is reciprocated by someone else who has observed us. A cohesive society has a shared norm that prescribes how to assess observed behavior as well as how to behave toward others based on the assessments, and the eight social norms that are evolutionarily stable against the invasion of mutants with different behavioral rules are referred to as the leading eight, whose member norms are called L1 to L8, respectively. Among the leading eight, L8 (also known as `Judging') has been deemed mostly irrelevant due to its poor performance in maintaining cooperation when each person may have a different opinion about someone instead of forming a public consensus. In this work, we propose that L8 can nevertheless be best protected from assessment errors among the leading eight if we take into account the intrinsic heterogeneity of error proneness among individuals because this norm heavily punishes those who are prone to errors in following its assessment rule. This finding suggests that individual differences should be explicitly taken into account as quenched randomness to obtain a thorough understanding of a social norm working in a heterogeneous environment.
Open AccessResponse of social norms to individual differences in error-proneness
Indirect reciprocity explains the evolution of cooperation by considering how our cooperative behavior toward someone is reciprocated by someone else who has observed us. A cohesive society has a shared norm that prescribes how to assess observed behavior as well as how to behave toward others based on the assessments, and the eight social norms that are evolutionarily stable against the invasion of mutants with different behavioral rules are referred to as the leading eight, whose member norms are called L1 to L8, respectively. Among the leading eight, L8 (also known as `Judging') has been deemed mostly irrelevant due to its poor performance in maintaining cooperation when each person may have a different opinion about someone instead of forming a public consensus. In this work, we propose that L8 can nevertheless be best protected from assessment errors among the leading eight if we take into account the intrinsic heterogeneity of error proneness among individuals because this norm heavily punishes those who are prone to errors in following its assessment rule. This finding suggests that individual differences should be explicitly taken into account as quenched randomness to obtain a thorough understanding of a social norm working in a heterogeneous environment.
- 8 November 2024
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 110 (5) , L052301
Exact cluster dynamics of indirect reciprocity in complete graphs
Heider's balance theory emphasizes cognitive consistency in assessing others, as expressed by the phrase "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." At the same time, the theory of indirect reciprocity provides us with a dynamical framework to study how to assess others based on their actions as well as how to act toward them based on the assessments. Well known are the "leading eight" from L1 to L8, the eight norms for assessment and action to foster cooperation in social dilemmas while resisting the invasion of mutant norms prescribing alternative actions. In this work, we begin by showing that balance is equivalent to stationarity of dynamics only for L4 and L6 (stern judging) among the leading eight. Stern judging reflects an intuitive idea that good merits reward, whereas evil warrants punishment. By analyzing the dynamics of stern judging in complete graphs, we prove that this norm almost always segregates the graph into two mutually hostile groups as the graph size grows. We then compare L4 with stern judging: The only difference of L4 is that a good player's cooperative action toward a bad one is regarded as good. This subtle difference transforms large populations governed by L4 to a "paradise" where cooperation prevails and positive assessments abound. Our study thus helps us understand the relationship between individual norms and their emergent consequences at a population level, shedding light on the nuanced interplay between cognitive consistency and segregation dynamics.
- 8 November 2024
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 110 (5) , L052301
Exact cluster dynamics of indirect reciprocity in complete graphs
Heider's balance theory emphasizes cognitive consistency in assessing others, as expressed by the phrase "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." At the same time, the theory of indirect reciprocity provides us with a dynamical framework to study how to assess others based on their actions as well as how to act toward them based on the assessments. Well known are the "leading eight" from L1 to L8, the eight norms for assessment and action to foster cooperation in social dilemmas while resisting the invasion of mutant norms prescribing alternative actions. In this work, we begin by showing that balance is equivalent to stationarity of dynamics only for L4 and L6 (stern judging) among the leading eight. Stern judging reflects an intuitive idea that good merits reward, whereas evil warrants punishment. By analyzing the dynamics of stern judging in complete graphs, we prove that this norm almost always segregates the graph into two mutually hostile groups as the graph size grows. We then compare L4 with stern judging: The only difference of L4 is that a good player's cooperative action toward a bad one is regarded as good. This subtle difference transforms large populations governed by L4 to a "paradise" where cooperation prevails and positive assessments abound. Our study thus helps us understand the relationship between individual norms and their emergent consequences at a population level, shedding light on the nuanced interplay between cognitive consistency and segregation dynamics.
- 8 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of the Korean Physical Society
- Vol. 85 (12) , 969-976
Making public reputation out of private assessments
- 8 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of the Korean Physical Society
- Vol. 85 (12) , 969-976
Making public reputation out of private assessments
- Open Access
- 11 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-11
Social dilemma in foraging behavior and evolution of cooperation by learning
We consider foraging behaviors in a two-dimensional continuum space and show that a cooperative chasing strategy can emerge in a social dilemma. Predators can use two different chasing strategies: A direct chasing strategy (DCS) and a group chasing strategy (GCS). The DCS is a selfish strategy with which a chaser moves straight toward the nearest prey, and the GCS is a cooperative strategy in the sense that the chaser chooses the chasing direction for the group at a cost of its own speed. A prey flees away from the nearest hazard, either a chaser or the boundary, within its recognition range. We check the capturing activities of each strategy and find a social dilemma between the two strategies because the GCS is more efficient for the group whereas the DCS is better individually. Using a series of numerical simulations, we further show that the cooperative strategy can proliferate when a learning process of nearby successful strategies is introduced.
- 11 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-11
Open AccessSocial dilemma in foraging behavior and evolution of cooperation by learning
We consider foraging behaviors in a two-dimensional continuum space and show that a cooperative chasing strategy can emerge in a social dilemma. Predators can use two different chasing strategies: A direct chasing strategy (DCS) and a group chasing strategy (GCS). The DCS is a selfish strategy with which a chaser moves straight toward the nearest prey, and the GCS is a cooperative strategy in the sense that the chaser chooses the chasing direction for the group at a cost of its own speed. A prey flees away from the nearest hazard, either a chaser or the boundary, within its recognition range. We check the capturing activities of each strategy and find a social dilemma between the two strategies because the GCS is more efficient for the group whereas the DCS is better individually. Using a series of numerical simulations, we further show that the cooperative strategy can proliferate when a learning process of nearby successful strategies is introduced.
- Open Access
Finite-size scaling analysis of the two-dimensional random transverse-field Ising ferromagnet
The random transverse-field Ising ferromagnet (RTFIF) is a highly disordered quantum system which contains randomness in the coupling strengths as well as in the transverse-field strengths. In one dimension, the critical properties are governed by an infinite-randomness fixed point (IRFP), and renormalization-group studies argue that the two-dimensional (2D) model is also governed by an IRFP. However, even the location of the critical point remains unsettled among quantum Monte Carlo (QMC) studies. In this work, we perform extensive QMC simulations to locate the quantum critical point and attempt a finite-size scaling analysis to observe the critical behavior. We estimate the critical field strength of the 2D RTFIF as $Γ_c = 7.52(2)$, together with critical exponents such as $β=1.5(3)$, $ν= 1.6(3)$, and $z=3.3(3)$ or $ψ=0.50(3)$. We have also considered the McCoy-Wu model, which has randomness in the ferromagnetic coupling strengths but not in the transverse-field strength. Our QMC calculation shows that the critical behavior of the 2D McCoy-Wu model is closer to that of the 2D transverse-field Ising spin glass than to that of the 2D RTFIF. These numerical findings enhance our understanding of disordered 2D quantum systems.Open AccessFinite-size scaling analysis of the two-dimensional random transverse-field Ising ferromagnet
The random transverse-field Ising ferromagnet (RTFIF) is a highly disordered quantum system which contains randomness in the coupling strengths as well as in the transverse-field strengths. In one dimension, the critical properties are governed by an infinite-randomness fixed point (IRFP), and renormalization-group studies argue that the two-dimensional (2D) model is also governed by an IRFP. However, even the location of the critical point remains unsettled among quantum Monte Carlo (QMC) studies. In this work, we perform extensive QMC simulations to locate the quantum critical point and attempt a finite-size scaling analysis to observe the critical behavior. We estimate the critical field strength of the 2D RTFIF as $Γ_c = 7.52(2)$, together with critical exponents such as $β=1.5(3)$, $ν= 1.6(3)$, and $z=3.3(3)$ or $ψ=0.50(3)$. We have also considered the McCoy-Wu model, which has randomness in the ferromagnetic coupling strengths but not in the transverse-field strength. Our QMC calculation shows that the critical behavior of the 2D McCoy-Wu model is closer to that of the 2D transverse-field Ising spin glass than to that of the 2D RTFIF. These numerical findings enhance our understanding of disordered 2D quantum systems.