Lwin Khin Shar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Lwin Khin Shar has a total of 150 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Lo
Singapore Management University
21 shared publications Hee Beng Kuan Tan
14 shared publications- Ting Zhang
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
12 shared publications - Lingxiao Jiang
Singapore Management University
7 shared publications - Eng Lieh Ouh
Singapore Management University, Singapore
6 shared publications - Domenico Bianculli
Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT), University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2856-2868
To Think or Not to Think: Evaluating LLM Reasoning and Agents in Vulnerability Detection
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2856-2868
Open AccessTo Think or Not to Think: Evaluating LLM Reasoning and Agents in Vulnerability Detection
- Open Access
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1780-1792
AgentChaos: Chaos Engineering for Agent Systems via Programmatic Fault Injection
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1780-1792
Open AccessAgentChaos: Chaos Engineering for Agent Systems via Programmatic Fault Injection
- Open Access
- 23 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Mapping NVD Records to Their Vulnerability-fixing Commits: How Hard is It?
Mapping National Vulnerability Database (NVD) records to vulnerability-fixing commits (VFCs) is crucial for vulnerability analysis but challenging due to sparse explicit links in NVD references. This study explores this mapping's feasibility through an empirical approach. Manual analysis of NVD references showed Git references enable over 86% success, while non-Git references achieve under 14%. Using these findings, we built an automated pipeline extracting 31,942 VFCs from 20,360 NVD records (8.7% of 235,341) with 87% precision, mainly from Git references. To fill gaps, we mined six external security databases, yielding 29,254 VFCs for 18,985 records (8.1%) at 88.4% precision, and GitHub repositories, adding 3,686 VFCs for 2,795 records (1.2%) at 73% precision. Combining these, we mapped 26,710 unique records (11.3% coverage) from 7,634 projects, with overlap between NVD and external databases, plus unique GitHub contributions. Despite success with Git references, 88.7% of records remain unmapped, highlighting the difficulty without Git links. This study offers insights for enhancing vulnerability datasets and guiding future automated security research.
- 23 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Open AccessMapping NVD Records to Their Vulnerability-fixing Commits: How Hard is It?
Mapping National Vulnerability Database (NVD) records to vulnerability-fixing commits (VFCs) is crucial for vulnerability analysis but challenging due to sparse explicit links in NVD references. This study explores this mapping's feasibility through an empirical approach. Manual analysis of NVD references showed Git references enable over 86% success, while non-Git references achieve under 14%. Using these findings, we built an automated pipeline extracting 31,942 VFCs from 20,360 NVD records (8.7% of 235,341) with 87% precision, mainly from Git references. To fill gaps, we mined six external security databases, yielding 29,254 VFCs for 18,985 records (8.1%) at 88.4% precision, and GitHub repositories, adding 3,686 VFCs for 2,795 records (1.2%) at 73% precision. Combining these, we mapped 26,710 unique records (11.3% coverage) from 7,634 projects, with overlap between NVD and external databases, plus unique GitHub contributions. Despite success with Git references, 88.7% of records remain unmapped, highlighting the difficulty without Git links. This study offers insights for enhancing vulnerability datasets and guiding future automated security research.
- Open Access
- 27 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Fixseeker : An Empirical Driven Graph-based Approach for Detecting Silent Vulnerability Fixes in Open Source Software
Open source software (OSS) vulnerabilities pose significant security risks to downstream applications. While vulnerability databases provide valuable information for mitigation, many security patches are released silently in new commits of OSS repositories without explicit indications of their security impact. This makes it challenging for software maintainers and users to detect and address these vulnerabilities. There are a few approaches for detecting vulnerability-fixing commits (VFCs), but most of these approaches leverage commit messages, which would miss silent VFCs. On the other hand, there are some approaches for detecting silent VFCs based on code change patterns, but they often fail to characterize vulnerability fix patterns, thereby lacking effectiveness. For example, some approaches analyze each hunk in known VFCs, in isolation, to learn vulnerability fix patterns; but vulnerability fixes are often associated with multiple hunks, in which cases correlations of code changes across those hunks are essential for characterizing the vulnerability fixes. To address these problems, we first conduct a large-scale empirical study on 11,900 VFCs across six programming languages, in which we found that over 70% of VFCs involve multiple hunks with various types of correlations. Based on our findings, we propose Fixseeker , a graph-based approach that extracts the various correlations between code changes at the hunk level to detect silent vulnerability fixes. Our evaluation demonstrates that Fixseeker outperforms state-of-the-art approaches across multiple programming languages, achieving a high F1 score of 0.818 on average in balanced datasets and consistently improving F2 score, AUC-ROC, and AUC-PR scores by 10.64%, 5.34%, and 10.34% on imbalanced datasets compared to the best baseline methods. Our evaluation also indicates the generality of Fixseeker across different vulnerability types and repository sizes.
- 27 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Open AccessFixseeker : An Empirical Driven Graph-based Approach for Detecting Silent Vulnerability Fixes in Open Source Software
Open source software (OSS) vulnerabilities pose significant security risks to downstream applications. While vulnerability databases provide valuable information for mitigation, many security patches are released silently in new commits of OSS repositories without explicit indications of their security impact. This makes it challenging for software maintainers and users to detect and address these vulnerabilities. There are a few approaches for detecting vulnerability-fixing commits (VFCs), but most of these approaches leverage commit messages, which would miss silent VFCs. On the other hand, there are some approaches for detecting silent VFCs based on code change patterns, but they often fail to characterize vulnerability fix patterns, thereby lacking effectiveness. For example, some approaches analyze each hunk in known VFCs, in isolation, to learn vulnerability fix patterns; but vulnerability fixes are often associated with multiple hunks, in which cases correlations of code changes across those hunks are essential for characterizing the vulnerability fixes. To address these problems, we first conduct a large-scale empirical study on 11,900 VFCs across six programming languages, in which we found that over 70% of VFCs involve multiple hunks with various types of correlations. Based on our findings, we propose Fixseeker , a graph-based approach that extracts the various correlations between code changes at the hunk level to detect silent vulnerability fixes. Our evaluation demonstrates that Fixseeker outperforms state-of-the-art approaches across multiple programming languages, achieving a high F1 score of 0.818 on average in balanced datasets and consistently improving F2 score, AUC-ROC, and AUC-PR scores by 10.64%, 5.34%, and 10.34% on imbalanced datasets compared to the best baseline methods. Our evaluation also indicates the generality of Fixseeker across different vulnerability types and repository sizes.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
- Vol. 10 (2) , 1-29
Security Modelling for Cyber-Physical Systems: A Systematic Literature Review
Cyber-physical systems are at the intersection of digital technology and engineering domains, rendering them high-value targets of sophisticated and well-funded cybersecurity threat actors. Prominent cybersecurity attacks on cyber-physical systems have brought attention to the vulnerability of these systems and the inherent weaknesses of critical infrastructure reliant on them. Security modelling for cyber-physical systems is an important mechanism to systematically identify and assess vulnerabilities, threats and risks throughout system lifecycles, and to ultimately ensure system resilience, safety and reliability. This survey delves into state-of-the-art research on security modelling for cyber-physical systems, encompassing both threat and attack modelling. While these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, they are different concepts. This article elaborates on the differences between threat and attack modelling, examining their implications for cyber-physical system security. We conducted a systematic search that yielded 449 papers, from which 32 were selected and categorised into 3 clusters: those focused on threat modelling methods, attack modelling methods and literature reviews. Specifically, we sought to examine what security modelling methods exist today, and how they address real-world cybersecurity threats and attacker capabilities throughout the lifecycle of cyber-physical systems, which typically span longer durations compared to traditional IT systems. This article also highlights several limitations in existing research, wherein security models adopt simplistic approaches that do not adequately consider the dynamic, multi-layer, multi-path and multi-agent characteristics of real-world cyber-physical attacks.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
- Vol. 10 (2) , 1-29
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessSecurity Modelling for Cyber-Physical Systems: A Systematic Literature Review
Cyber-physical systems are at the intersection of digital technology and engineering domains, rendering them high-value targets of sophisticated and well-funded cybersecurity threat actors. Prominent cybersecurity attacks on cyber-physical systems have brought attention to the vulnerability of these systems and the inherent weaknesses of critical infrastructure reliant on them. Security modelling for cyber-physical systems is an important mechanism to systematically identify and assess vulnerabilities, threats and risks throughout system lifecycles, and to ultimately ensure system resilience, safety and reliability. This survey delves into state-of-the-art research on security modelling for cyber-physical systems, encompassing both threat and attack modelling. While these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, they are different concepts. This article elaborates on the differences between threat and attack modelling, examining their implications for cyber-physical system security. We conducted a systematic search that yielded 449 papers, from which 32 were selected and categorised into 3 clusters: those focused on threat modelling methods, attack modelling methods and literature reviews. Specifically, we sought to examine what security modelling methods exist today, and how they address real-world cybersecurity threats and attacker capabilities throughout the lifecycle of cyber-physical systems, which typically span longer durations compared to traditional IT systems. This article also highlights several limitations in existing research, wherein security models adopt simplistic approaches that do not adequately consider the dynamic, multi-layer, multi-path and multi-agent characteristics of real-world cyber-physical attacks.
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2096-2108
Out of Distribution, Out of Luck: How Well Can LLMs Trained on Vulnerability Datasets Detect Top 25 CWE Weaknesses?
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2096-2108
Open AccessOut of Distribution, Out of Luck: How Well Can LLMs Trained on Vulnerability Datasets Detect Top 25 CWE Weaknesses?
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2161-2173
Back to the Basics: Rethinking Issue-Commit Linking with LLM-Assisted Retrieval
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2161-2173
Open AccessBack to the Basics: Rethinking Issue-Commit Linking with LLM-Assisted Retrieval
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1030-1042
Let the Trial Begin: A Mock-Court Approach to Vulnerability Detection using LLM-Based Agents
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1030-1042
Open AccessLet the Trial Begin: A Mock-Court Approach to Vulnerability Detection using LLM-Based Agents
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 76-80
PenForge: On-the-Fly Expert Agent Construction for Automated Penetration Testing
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 76-80
Open AccessPenForge: On-the-Fly Expert Agent Construction for Automated Penetration Testing
- Open Access
- 7 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Revisiting Vulnerability Patch Identification on Data in the Wild
Attacks can exploit zero-day or one-day vulnerabilities that are not publicly disclosed. To detect these vulnerabilities, security researchers monitor development activities in open-source repositories to identify unreported security patches. The sheer volume of commits makes this task infeasible to accomplish manually. Consequently, security patch detectors commonly trained and evaluated on security patches linked from vulnerability reports in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). In this study, we assess the effectiveness of these detectors when applied in-the-wild. Our results show that models trained on NVD-derived data show substantially decreased performance, with decreases in F1-score of up to 90% when tested on in-the-wild security patches, rendering them impractical for real-world use. An analysis comparing security patches identified in-the-wild and commits linked from NVD reveals that they can be easily distinguished from each other. Security patches associated with NVD have different distribution of commit messages, vulnerability types, and composition of changes. These differences suggest that NVD may be unsuitable as the sole source of data for training models to detect security patches. We find that constructing a dataset that combines security patches from NVD data with a small subset of manually identified security patches can improve model robustness.
- 7 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Open AccessRevisiting Vulnerability Patch Identification on Data in the Wild
Attacks can exploit zero-day or one-day vulnerabilities that are not publicly disclosed. To detect these vulnerabilities, security researchers monitor development activities in open-source repositories to identify unreported security patches. The sheer volume of commits makes this task infeasible to accomplish manually. Consequently, security patch detectors commonly trained and evaluated on security patches linked from vulnerability reports in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). In this study, we assess the effectiveness of these detectors when applied in-the-wild. Our results show that models trained on NVD-derived data show substantially decreased performance, with decreases in F1-score of up to 90% when tested on in-the-wild security patches, rendering them impractical for real-world use. An analysis comparing security patches identified in-the-wild and commits linked from NVD reveals that they can be easily distinguished from each other. Security patches associated with NVD have different distribution of commit messages, vulnerability types, and composition of changes. These differences suggest that NVD may be unsuitable as the sole source of data for training models to detect security patches. We find that constructing a dataset that combines security patches from NVD data with a small subset of manually identified security patches can improve model robustness.