Chris Tausanovitch
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Chris Tausanovitch has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christopher Warshaw
Department of Political Science, George Washington University, Washington, USA
3 shared publications - Christopher Warshaw
Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
2 shared publications - Lynn Vavreck
Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
2 shared publications - Anthony Fowler
University of Chicago
1 shared publication - Boris Shor
University of Chicago
1 shared publication Christopher Warshaw
George Washington University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 14 (1) , 177-189
Income, education, and policy priorities
Are people's priorities associated with their income and education levels? There is a long history in political science of claims that priorities are driven by economic interests, but also that low-income and low-education people fail to prioritize their economic interests. In this paper we use measures of revealed importance from [Sides J, Tausanovitch C and Vavreck L (2023) The Bitter End: The 2020 Presidential Campaign and the hallenge to American Democracy. Princeton University Press.] to evaluate the priorities of high- and low-income/education voters with respect to 44 different policies. It is well known that there are substantial differences in the preferences of people with lower incomes or education levels and people with higher incomes or education levels, but conditional on preferences we find very small differences among education and income groups in terms of priorities . Like high-income and high-education voters, lower-income and education voters care most about the major issues of the day. They do not care systematically more or less than other voters about policies that expand social welfare, redistribution, or labor rights.
- 14 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 14 (1) , 177-189
Open AccessIncome, education, and policy priorities
Are people's priorities associated with their income and education levels? There is a long history in political science of claims that priorities are driven by economic interests, but also that low-income and low-education people fail to prioritize their economic interests. In this paper we use measures of revealed importance from [Sides J, Tausanovitch C and Vavreck L (2023) The Bitter End: The 2020 Presidential Campaign and the hallenge to American Democracy. Princeton University Press.] to evaluate the priorities of high- and low-income/education voters with respect to 44 different policies. It is well known that there are substantial differences in the preferences of people with lower incomes or education levels and people with higher incomes or education levels, but conditional on preferences we find very small differences among education and income groups in terms of priorities . Like high-income and high-education voters, lower-income and education voters care most about the major issues of the day. They do not care systematically more or less than other voters about policies that expand social welfare, redistribution, or labor rights.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Are There Minorities Intense Enough to Overcome Majority Preferences?
The literature on democratic representation is permeated by the claim that voters who care more about particular policies have disproportionate influence. One mechanism for this influence is that these voters are more likely to vote on the basis of candidate positions. In a simple extension of spatial voting, candidates hew towards the preferences of these more intense voters rather than simply taking the position of the median. This paper tests this mechanism empirically. I measure intensity of preferences in the United States using conjoint analysis, drawing from Sides, Vavreck, and Tausanovitch (2022). Using 4,941,690 experiments from Nationscape, I show that there is a very strong relationship between conjoint effects, which allow for the impact of intensity, and survey marginals, which do not. Among 44 issues, there are no cases in which the vote-maximizing policy position disagrees with the majority position. This strong relationship between marginals and intensity-weighted effects holds true across the nation as a whole and within all 50 states. However, within the Republican party there are some important counter examples. Most notably, Republicans in primary elections may benefit from supporting abortion bans and bans on immigration from predominantly Muslim countries even though these policies are opposed by large majorities of Republicans. In rare but important cases, taking account of preference intensity changes the standard expectation that candidates should hew to the preferences of the median voter.
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessAre There Minorities Intense Enough to Overcome Majority Preferences?
The literature on democratic representation is permeated by the claim that voters who care more about particular policies have disproportionate influence. One mechanism for this influence is that these voters are more likely to vote on the basis of candidate positions. In a simple extension of spatial voting, candidates hew towards the preferences of these more intense voters rather than simply taking the position of the median. This paper tests this mechanism empirically. I measure intensity of preferences in the United States using conjoint analysis, drawing from Sides, Vavreck, and Tausanovitch (2022). Using 4,941,690 experiments from Nationscape, I show that there is a very strong relationship between conjoint effects, which allow for the impact of intensity, and survey marginals, which do not. Among 44 issues, there are no cases in which the vote-maximizing policy position disagrees with the majority position. This strong relationship between marginals and intensity-weighted effects holds true across the nation as a whole and within all 50 states. However, within the Republican party there are some important counter examples. Most notably, Republicans in primary elections may benefit from supporting abortion bans and bans on immigration from predominantly Muslim countries even though these policies are opposed by large majorities of Republicans. In rare but important cases, taking account of preference intensity changes the standard expectation that candidates should hew to the preferences of the median voter.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 5 September 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 117 (2) , 643-660
Moderates
Moderates are often overlooked in contemporary research on American voters. Many scholars who have examined moderates argue that these individuals are only classified as such due to a lack of political sophistication or conflicted views across issues. We develop a method to distinguish three ways an individual might be classified as moderate: having genuinely moderate views across issues, being inattentive to politics or political surveys, or holding views poorly summarized by a single liberal–conservative dimension. We find that a single ideological dimension accurately describes most, but not all, Americans’ policy views. Using the classifications from our model, we demonstrate that moderates and those whose views are not well explained by a single dimension are especially consequential for electoral selection and accountability. These results suggest a need for renewed attention to the middle of the American political spectrum.
- 5 September 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 117 (2) , 643-660
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessModerates
Moderates are often overlooked in contemporary research on American voters. Many scholars who have examined moderates argue that these individuals are only classified as such due to a lack of political sophistication or conflicted views across issues. We develop a method to distinguish three ways an individual might be classified as moderate: having genuinely moderate views across issues, being inattentive to politics or political surveys, or holding views poorly summarized by a single liberal–conservative dimension. We find that a single ideological dimension accurately describes most, but not all, Americans’ policy views. Using the classifications from our model, we demonstrate that moderates and those whose views are not well explained by a single dimension are especially consequential for electoral selection and accountability. These results suggest a need for renewed attention to the middle of the American political spectrum.
- Open Access
- 21 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 7 (04) , 775-794
Geography, Uncertainty, and Polarization
Using new data on roll-call voting of US state legislators and public opinion in their districts, we explain how ideological polarization of voters within districts can lead to legislative polarization. In so-called “moderate” districts that switch hands between parties, legislative behavior is shaped by the fact that voters are often quite heterogeneous: the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans within these districts is often greater than the distance between liberal cities and conservative rural areas. We root this intuition in a formal model that associates intradistrict ideological heterogeneity with uncertainty about the ideological location of the median voter. We then demonstrate that among districts with similar median voter ideologies, the difference in legislative behavior between Democratic and Republican state legislators is greater in more ideologically heterogeneous districts. Our findings suggest that accounting for the subtleties of political geography can help explain the coexistence of polarized legislators and a mass public that appears to contain many moderates.
- 21 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 7 (04) , 775-794
Open AccessGeography, Uncertainty, and Polarization
Using new data on roll-call voting of US state legislators and public opinion in their districts, we explain how ideological polarization of voters within districts can lead to legislative polarization. In so-called “moderate” districts that switch hands between parties, legislative behavior is shaped by the fact that voters are often quite heterogeneous: the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans within these districts is often greater than the distance between liberal cities and conservative rural areas. We root this intuition in a formal model that associates intradistrict ideological heterogeneity with uncertainty about the ideological location of the median voter. We then demonstrate that among districts with similar median voter ideologies, the difference in legislative behavior between Democratic and Republican state legislators is greater in more ideologically heterogeneous districts. Our findings suggest that accounting for the subtleties of political geography can help explain the coexistence of polarized legislators and a mass public that appears to contain many moderates.
- 13 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 50 (2) , 677-685
On the Representativeness of Primary Electorates
Primary voters are frequently characterized as an ideologically extreme subset of their party, and thus partially responsible for party polarization in government. This study uses a combination of administrative records on primary turnout and five recent surveys from 2008–14 to show that primary voters have similar demographic attributes and policy attitudes as rank-and-file voters in their party. These similarities do not vary according to the openness of the primary. These results suggest that the composition of primary electorates does not exert a polarizing effect above what might arise from voters in the party as a whole.
- 13 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 50 (2) , 677-685
On the Representativeness of Primary Electorates
Primary voters are frequently characterized as an ideologically extreme subset of their party, and thus partially responsible for party polarization in government. This study uses a combination of administrative records on primary turnout and five recent surveys from 2008–14 to show that primary voters have similar demographic attributes and policy attitudes as rank-and-file voters in their party. These similarities do not vary according to the openness of the primary. These results suggest that the composition of primary electorates does not exert a polarizing effect above what might arise from voters in the party as a whole.
- 2 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 40 (1) , 223-245
Does the Ideological Proximity Between Candidates and Voters Affect Voting in U.S. House Elections?
- 2 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Political Behavior
- Vol. 40 (1) , 223-245
Does the Ideological Proximity Between Candidates and Voters Affect Voting in U.S. House Elections?
- 16 October 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 176 (1-2) , 107-132
Southern realignment, party sorting, and the polarization of American primary electorates, 1958–2012
- 16 October 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 176 (1-2) , 107-132
Southern realignment, party sorting, and the polarization of American primary electorates, 1958–2012
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 25 (2) , 167-187
Estimating Candidates’ Political Orientation in a Polarized Congress
Over the past decade, a number of new measures have been developed that attempt to capture the political orientation of both incumbent and nonincumbent candidates for Congress, as well as other offices, on the same scale. These measures pose the possibility of being able to answer a host of fundamental questions about political accountability and representation. In this paper, we examine the properties of six recent measures of candidates’ political orientations in different domains. While these measures are commonly viewed as proxies for ideology, each involves very different choices, incentives, and contexts. Indeed, we show that there is only a weak relationship between these measures within party. This suggests that these measures are capturing domain-specific factors rather than just candidates’ ideology. Moreover, these measures do poorly at distinguishing between moderate and extreme roll call voting records within each party. As a result, they fall short when it comes to facilitating empirical analysis of theories of accountability and representation in Congress. Overall, our findings suggest that future research should leverage the conceptual and empirical variation across these measures and avoid assuming they are synonymous with candidates’ ideology.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 25 (2) , 167-187
Estimating Candidates’ Political Orientation in a Polarized Congress
Over the past decade, a number of new measures have been developed that attempt to capture the political orientation of both incumbent and nonincumbent candidates for Congress, as well as other offices, on the same scale. These measures pose the possibility of being able to answer a host of fundamental questions about political accountability and representation. In this paper, we examine the properties of six recent measures of candidates’ political orientations in different domains. While these measures are commonly viewed as proxies for ideology, each involves very different choices, incentives, and contexts. Indeed, we show that there is only a weak relationship between these measures within party. This suggests that these measures are capturing domain-specific factors rather than just candidates’ ideology. Moreover, these measures do poorly at distinguishing between moderate and extreme roll call voting records within each party. As a result, they fall short when it comes to facilitating empirical analysis of theories of accountability and representation in Congress. Overall, our findings suggest that future research should leverage the conceptual and empirical variation across these measures and avoid assuming they are synonymous with candidates’ ideology.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 22 August 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 108 (3) , 605-641
Representation in Municipal Government
Municipal governments play a vital role in American democracy, as well as in governments around the world. Despite this, little is known about the degree to which cities are responsive to the views of their citizens. In the past, the unavailability of data on the policy preferences of citizens at the municipal level has limited scholars’ ability to study the responsiveness of municipal government. We overcome this problem by using recent advances in opinion estimation to measure the mean policy conservatism in every U.S. city and town with a population above 20,000 people. Despite the supposition in the literature that municipal politics are non-ideological, we find that the policies enacted by cities across a range of policy areas correspond with the liberal-conservative positions of their citizens on national policy issues. In addition, we consider the influence of institutions, such as the presence of an elected mayor, the popular initiative, partisan elections, term limits, and at-large elections. Our results show that these institutions have little consistent impact on policy responsiveness in municipal government. These results demonstrate a robust role for citizen policy preferences in determining municipal policy outcomes, but cast doubt on the hypothesis that simple institutional reforms enhance responsiveness in municipal governments.
- 22 August 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 108 (3) , 605-641
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessRepresentation in Municipal Government
Municipal governments play a vital role in American democracy, as well as in governments around the world. Despite this, little is known about the degree to which cities are responsive to the views of their citizens. In the past, the unavailability of data on the policy preferences of citizens at the municipal level has limited scholars’ ability to study the responsiveness of municipal government. We overcome this problem by using recent advances in opinion estimation to measure the mean policy conservatism in every U.S. city and town with a population above 20,000 people. Despite the supposition in the literature that municipal politics are non-ideological, we find that the policies enacted by cities across a range of policy areas correspond with the liberal-conservative positions of their citizens on national policy issues. In addition, we consider the influence of institutions, such as the presence of an elected mayor, the popular initiative, partisan elections, term limits, and at-large elections. Our results show that these institutions have little consistent impact on policy responsiveness in municipal government. These results demonstrate a robust role for citizen policy preferences in determining municipal policy outcomes, but cast doubt on the hypothesis that simple institutional reforms enhance responsiveness in municipal governments.