Mikolaj Jan Piskorski
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mikolaj Jan Piskorski has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Tiziana Casciaro
Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA
3 shared publications- Andreea Gorbatai
Department of Entrepreneurship, Vlerick Business School, 3000 Leuven, Belgium
1 shared publication - Gillian Brooks
King’s Business School, King’s College London, London, UK
1 shared publication - Hanna Halaburda
New York University
1 shared publication - Jenna Drenten
Loyola University Chicago
1 shared publication - Pinar Yildirim
Marketing Department, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 20 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Advertising
- Vol. 50 (5) , 528-547
Influencer Celebrification: How Social Media Influencers Acquire Celebrity Capital
The digital age has given rise to new pathways for everyday individuals to accrue media attention, which can be translated into promotional endeavors. Such sociocultural currency is referred to as celebrity capital, which can be exchanged within the field of advertising through celebrity endorsements. Traditional celebrities acquire celebrity capital through institutional intermediaries such as sport, television, music, and movies. Research is needed to understand the unique process by which social media influencers (SMIs) acquire celebrity capital. We draw on interviews with 40 global advertising industry practitioners and influencers to better understand how influencers acquire celebrity capital in a saturated media landscape. Extending previous work on celebrity capital and influencer advertising, this study conceptualizes a process which we term influencer celebrification. Influencer celebrification is the process by which SMIs acquire celebrity capital within an interconnected advertising ecosystem. Empirical findings identify three types of practices in the influencer celebrification process: generative practices; collaborative practices; and evaluative practices. This study identifies the role of advertising practitioners in the influencer celebrification process and offers implications for advertising theory and practice.
- 20 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Advertising
- Vol. 50 (5) , 528-547
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessInfluencer Celebrification: How Social Media Influencers Acquire Celebrity Capital
The digital age has given rise to new pathways for everyday individuals to accrue media attention, which can be translated into promotional endeavors. Such sociocultural currency is referred to as celebrity capital, which can be exchanged within the field of advertising through celebrity endorsements. Traditional celebrities acquire celebrity capital through institutional intermediaries such as sport, television, music, and movies. Research is needed to understand the unique process by which social media influencers (SMIs) acquire celebrity capital. We draw on interviews with 40 global advertising industry practitioners and influencers to better understand how influencers acquire celebrity capital in a saturated media landscape. Extending previous work on celebrity capital and influencer advertising, this study conceptualizes a process which we term influencer celebrification. Influencer celebrification is the process by which SMIs acquire celebrity capital within an interconnected advertising ecosystem. Empirical findings identify three types of practices in the influencer celebrification process: generative practices; collaborative practices; and evaluative practices. This study identifies the role of advertising practitioners in the influencer celebrification process and offers implications for advertising theory and practice.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (8) , 3574-3594
Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Matching Platforms
We show that a two-sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the number of choices it offers to its customers, while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice. We develop a stylized model of online dating where agents with different outside options match based on how much they like each other. Starting from these microfoundations, we derive the strength and direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side. Agents resolve the trade-off between these competing effects differently, depending on their outside options. For agents with high outside options, the choice effect is stronger than the competition effect, leading them to prefer an unrestricted-choice platform. The opposite is the case for agents with low outside options, who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice, as it also restricts the choice set of their potential matches. Moreover, since only agents with low outside options self-select into the restricted choice platform, the competition effect is mitigated further. This allows multiple platforms offering different number of choices to coexist without the market tipping. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (8) , 3574-3594
Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Matching Platforms
We show that a two-sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the number of choices it offers to its customers, while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice. We develop a stylized model of online dating where agents with different outside options match based on how much they like each other. Starting from these microfoundations, we derive the strength and direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side. Agents resolve the trade-off between these competing effects differently, depending on their outside options. For agents with high outside options, the choice effect is stronger than the competition effect, leading them to prefer an unrestricted-choice platform. The opposite is the case for agents with low outside options, who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice, as it also restricts the choice set of their potential matches. Moreover, since only agents with low outside options self-select into the restricted choice platform, the competition effect is mitigated further. This allows multiple platforms offering different number of choices to coexist without the market tipping. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by University of Chicago Press in American Journal of Sociology
- Vol. 122 (4) , 1183-1222
Testing Coleman’s Social-Norm Enforcement Mechanism: Evidence from Wikipedia
Since Durkheim, sociologists have believed that actors in dense network structures experience fewer norm violations. Coleman proposed one explanatory mechanism, arguing that dense networks provide an opportunity structure to reward those who punish norm violators, leading to more frequent punishment and in turn fewer norm violations. Despite ubiquitous scholarly references to Coleman’s theory, little empirical work has directly tested it in large-scale natural settings with longitudinal data. The authors undertake such a test using records of norm violations during the editing process on Wikipedia, the largest user-generated online encyclopedia. These data allow them to track all three elements required to test Coleman’s mechanism: norm violations, punishments for such violations, and rewards for those who punish violations. The results support Coleman’s mechanism.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by University of Chicago Press in American Journal of Sociology
- Vol. 122 (4) , 1183-1222
Testing Coleman’s Social-Norm Enforcement Mechanism: Evidence from Wikipedia
Since Durkheim, sociologists have believed that actors in dense network structures experience fewer norm violations. Coleman proposed one explanatory mechanism, arguing that dense networks provide an opportunity structure to reward those who punish norm violators, leading to more frequent punishment and in turn fewer norm violations. Despite ubiquitous scholarly references to Coleman’s theory, little empirical work has directly tested it in large-scale natural settings with longitudinal data. The authors undertake such a test using records of norm violations during the editing process on Wikipedia, the largest user-generated online encyclopedia. These data allow them to track all three elements required to test Coleman’s mechanism: norm violations, punishments for such violations, and rewards for those who punish violations. The results support Coleman’s mechanism.
- 21 January 2015
- Published by Wiley
- p. 1-2
Resource Dependence
- 31 December 2014
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
A Social Strategy
Almost no one had heard of social media a decade ago, but today websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn have more than 1 billion users and account for almost 25 percent of Internet use. Practically overnight, social media seems indispensable to our lives--from friendship and dating to news and business. What makes social media so different from traditional media? Answering that question is the key to making social media work for any business, argues Miko?aj Piskorski, one of the world's leading experts on the business of social media. In A Social Strategy , he provides the most convincing answer yet, one backed by original research, data, and case studies from companies such as Nike and American Express. Drawing on his analysis of proprietary data from social media sites, Piskorski argues that the secret of successful ones is that they allow people to fulfill social needs that either can’t be met offline or can be met only at much greater cost. This insight provides the key to how companies can leverage social platforms to create a sustainable competitive advantage. Companies need to help people interact with each other before they will promote products to their friends or help companies in other ways. Done right, a company’s social media should benefit customers and the firm. Piskorski calls this "a social strategy," and he describes how companies such as Yelp and Zynga have done it. Groundbreaking and important, A Social Strategy provides not only a story- and data-driven explanation for the explosion of social media but also an invaluable, concrete road map for any company that wants to tap the marketing potential of this remarkable phenomenon.
- 31 December 2014
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
A Social Strategy
Almost no one had heard of social media a decade ago, but today websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn have more than 1 billion users and account for almost 25 percent of Internet use. Practically overnight, social media seems indispensable to our lives--from friendship and dating to news and business. What makes social media so different from traditional media? Answering that question is the key to making social media work for any business, argues Miko?aj Piskorski, one of the world's leading experts on the business of social media. In A Social Strategy , he provides the most convincing answer yet, one backed by original research, data, and case studies from companies such as Nike and American Express. Drawing on his analysis of proprietary data from social media sites, Piskorski argues that the secret of successful ones is that they allow people to fulfill social needs that either can’t be met offline or can be met only at much greater cost. This insight provides the key to how companies can leverage social platforms to create a sustainable competitive advantage. Companies need to help people interact with each other before they will promote products to their friends or help companies in other ways. Done right, a company’s social media should benefit customers and the firm. Piskorski calls this "a social strategy," and he describes how companies such as Yelp and Zynga have done it. Groundbreaking and important, A Social Strategy provides not only a story- and data-driven explanation for the explosion of social media but also an invaluable, concrete road map for any company that wants to tap the marketing potential of this remarkable phenomenon.
- 18 December 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Administrative Science Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (3) , NP29-NP30
Finn Brunton: Spam: A Shadow History of the Internet
- 18 December 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Administrative Science Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (3) , NP29-NP30
Finn Brunton: Spam: A Shadow History of the Internet
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Forces
- Vol. 85 (2) , 1011-1036
When More Power Makes Actors Worse Off: Turning a Profit in the American Economy
We propose a theory which predicts that an increase in an actor's relative power reduces the actor's rewards in high mutual dependence dyads. Our argu
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Forces
- Vol. 85 (2) , 1011-1036
When More Power Makes Actors Worse Off: Turning a Profit in the American Economy
We propose a theory which predicts that an increase in an actor's relative power reduces the actor's rewards in high mutual dependence dyads. Our argu
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 June 2005
- Published by SAGE Publications in Administrative Science Quarterly
- Vol. 50 (2) , 167-199
Power Imbalance, Mutual Dependence, and Constraint Absorption: A Closer Look at Resource Dependence Theory
Despite ubiquitous references to Pfeffer and Salancik's classic volume, The External Control of Organizations, resource dependence theory is more of an appealing metaphor than a foundation for testable empirical research. We argue that several ambiguities in the resource dependence model account in part for this and propose a reformulation of resource dependence theory that addresses these ambiguities, yields novel predictions and findings, and reconciles them with seemingly contradictory empirical evidence from past studies. We identify two distinct theoretical dimensions of resource dependence, power imbalance and mutual dependence, which in the original theory were combined in the construct of interdependence and yet have opposite effects on an organization's ability to reduce dependencies by absorbing sources of external constraint. Results from a study of interindustry mergers and acquisitions among U.S. public companies in the period 1985–2000 indicate that, while mutual dependence is a key driver of mergers and acquisitions, power imbalance acts as an obstacle to their formation. We conclude that our reformulation of the resource dependence model contributes to realizing the potential of resource dependency as a powerful explanation of interorganizational action.
- 1 June 2005
- Published by SAGE Publications in Administrative Science Quarterly
- Vol. 50 (2) , 167-199
Top Cited PapersPower Imbalance, Mutual Dependence, and Constraint Absorption: A Closer Look at Resource Dependence Theory
Despite ubiquitous references to Pfeffer and Salancik's classic volume, The External Control of Organizations, resource dependence theory is more of an appealing metaphor than a foundation for testable empirical research. We argue that several ambiguities in the resource dependence model account in part for this and propose a reformulation of resource dependence theory that addresses these ambiguities, yields novel predictions and findings, and reconciles them with seemingly contradictory empirical evidence from past studies. We identify two distinct theoretical dimensions of resource dependence, power imbalance and mutual dependence, which in the original theory were combined in the construct of interdependence and yet have opposite effects on an organization's ability to reduce dependencies by absorbing sources of external constraint. Results from a study of interindustry mergers and acquisitions among U.S. public companies in the period 1985–2000 indicate that, while mutual dependence is a key driver of mergers and acquisitions, power imbalance acts as an obstacle to their formation. We conclude that our reformulation of the resource dependence model contributes to realizing the potential of resource dependency as a powerful explanation of interorganizational action.