Govert Den Hartogh
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- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 275-294
Death wishes of the very old 1
Death wishes have always been common among very old people, even when they do not suffer from a lethal disease and have no history of mental illness. Such death wishes are usually a response to suffering from an accumulation of losses of functional capacities, caused by the characteristic ailments of old age: loss of hearing, of sight, of mobility, of energy and concentration. If people in those conditions actually intend to end their lives, should it be permissible for doctors to help them? It has often been argued that it is a mistake to burden the doctor with such a request because the problems that the patient wants to address basically are not medical but existential ones. Even if these existential concerns result from the loss of functional abilities, that loss could perhaps substantially be compensated for by social interventions. These arguments can be criticized but it remains a proper question why it should be a medical task to participate in a joint action of ending the patient's life in these cases. Why could it not be left to him to end his own life, by stopping eating and drinking or by acquiring access to lethal drugs?
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 275-294
Death wishes of the very old 1
Death wishes have always been common among very old people, even when they do not suffer from a lethal disease and have no history of mental illness. Such death wishes are usually a response to suffering from an accumulation of losses of functional capacities, caused by the characteristic ailments of old age: loss of hearing, of sight, of mobility, of energy and concentration. If people in those conditions actually intend to end their lives, should it be permissible for doctors to help them? It has often been argued that it is a mistake to burden the doctor with such a request because the problems that the patient wants to address basically are not medical but existential ones. Even if these existential concerns result from the loss of functional abilities, that loss could perhaps substantially be compensated for by social interventions. These arguments can be criticized but it remains a proper question why it should be a medical task to participate in a joint action of ending the patient's life in these cases. Why could it not be left to him to end his own life, by stopping eating and drinking or by acquiring access to lethal drugs?
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 320-342
Designing a regulatory system
Drawing on an extended comparison between the legal systems in place in the Netherlands (since 1984) and Oregon (since 1997), this chapter argues for a two-tiered system. The first compartment concerns patients with a limited life expectancy. Doctors should be permitted to participate in the joint act of ending the life of such a patient, if they are satisfied that this is both in accordance with the will of that patient and in his best interests. The second compartment consists of people with a longer life expectancy. These patients have a claim of getting access to lethal drugs, if their decisions to end their lives are voluntary, well-considered and stable. In the second compartment, but not in the first, there should be a mandatory waiting time. A regrettable trend that can be observed in all systems that presently permit doctors to take final responsibility for a quick and humane death of the patient is the erosion of legal requirements that are supposed to guarantee that the ending of the patient's life does not only conform with his will but also with his interests, as defined by his own basic values. As a result the distinction between the two compartments also wears down.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 320-342
Designing a regulatory system
Drawing on an extended comparison between the legal systems in place in the Netherlands (since 1984) and Oregon (since 1997), this chapter argues for a two-tiered system. The first compartment concerns patients with a limited life expectancy. Doctors should be permitted to participate in the joint act of ending the life of such a patient, if they are satisfied that this is both in accordance with the will of that patient and in his best interests. The second compartment consists of people with a longer life expectancy. These patients have a claim of getting access to lethal drugs, if their decisions to end their lives are voluntary, well-considered and stable. In the second compartment, but not in the first, there should be a mandatory waiting time. A regrettable trend that can be observed in all systems that presently permit doctors to take final responsibility for a quick and humane death of the patient is the erosion of legal requirements that are supposed to guarantee that the ending of the patient's life does not only conform with his will but also with his interests, as defined by his own basic values. As a result the distinction between the two compartments also wears down.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 177-198
Ending lives with and without request
One of the most common arguments of opponents of the legalization of euthanasia has always been that permitting the ending of a patient's life at his explicit request will necessarily lead to permitting it without request. For the only reason that can justify euthanasia is that it ends a patient's unbearable suffering by ending her life. But if two patients are in exactly the same physical condition, and if euthanasia is in the best interests of the first, competent, patient, it must be in the interests of the second, incompetent, patient as well. Drawing on my analysis of suffering in the sixth chapter I reject that argument. The argument has seemed too many to receive empirical confirmation because of the number of cases of termination of life without request in the Netherlands. It turns out, however, that in almost all cases of the ending of life without request morphine has been used, usually in dosages that do not exceed what is necessary for the alleviation of symptoms. In that case it is improbable that the patient has actually died as a result of the administration of those drugs. Moreover, such actions count as medically appropriate ones anyway, not as killings.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 177-198
Ending lives with and without request
One of the most common arguments of opponents of the legalization of euthanasia has always been that permitting the ending of a patient's life at his explicit request will necessarily lead to permitting it without request. For the only reason that can justify euthanasia is that it ends a patient's unbearable suffering by ending her life. But if two patients are in exactly the same physical condition, and if euthanasia is in the best interests of the first, competent, patient, it must be in the interests of the second, incompetent, patient as well. Drawing on my analysis of suffering in the sixth chapter I reject that argument. The argument has seemed too many to receive empirical confirmation because of the number of cases of termination of life without request in the Netherlands. It turns out, however, that in almost all cases of the ending of life without request morphine has been used, usually in dosages that do not exceed what is necessary for the alleviation of symptoms. In that case it is improbable that the patient has actually died as a result of the administration of those drugs. Moreover, such actions count as medically appropriate ones anyway, not as killings.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 95-118
Suffering and dying well
One way of exercising one's right to determine the manner and time of one's own death is by requesting palliative care or palliative sedation, in particular deep sedation that is meant to continue until the end of one's life. The chapters in this part discuss the proper aims of these practices and the conditions of their legitimacy. The alleviation of suffering is traditionally considered one of the main aims of medicine. According to Eric Cassell, suffering is “a specific state of severe distress related to the imminent, perceived or actual, threat to the integrity or existential continuity of the person”. This means that suffering has a cognitive element: it implies the belief that one's personhood is fundamentally threatened. Suffering is a complex whole of negative emotions that similarly have cognitive elements of their own. By now there exists an extensive empirical literature listing the elements of suffering at the end of life. In this literature, all the elements of suffering besides pain and other physical symptoms are understood as ‘non-physiological symptoms’. The lists are instruments for diagnosis, ideally to be followed by therapy. This purely functional approach fails to recognize the cognitive aspect of all emotions, including the negative ones: they are all more or less adequate responses to the situation the person finds herself in. The same is true of suffering as an overall response to that situation. These responses should be the object of reflection and of dialogue rather than of diagnosis and therapy. We should normally want to improve their quality, not to get rid of them.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 95-118
Suffering and dying well
One way of exercising one's right to determine the manner and time of one's own death is by requesting palliative care or palliative sedation, in particular deep sedation that is meant to continue until the end of one's life. The chapters in this part discuss the proper aims of these practices and the conditions of their legitimacy. The alleviation of suffering is traditionally considered one of the main aims of medicine. According to Eric Cassell, suffering is “a specific state of severe distress related to the imminent, perceived or actual, threat to the integrity or existential continuity of the person”. This means that suffering has a cognitive element: it implies the belief that one's personhood is fundamentally threatened. Suffering is a complex whole of negative emotions that similarly have cognitive elements of their own. By now there exists an extensive empirical literature listing the elements of suffering at the end of life. In this literature, all the elements of suffering besides pain and other physical symptoms are understood as ‘non-physiological symptoms’. The lists are instruments for diagnosis, ideally to be followed by therapy. This purely functional approach fails to recognize the cognitive aspect of all emotions, including the negative ones: they are all more or less adequate responses to the situation the person finds herself in. The same is true of suffering as an overall response to that situation. These responses should be the object of reflection and of dialogue rather than of diagnosis and therapy. We should normally want to improve their quality, not to get rid of them.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 13-34
Determining the manner and time of your own death
In this part it is argued that the right to self-determination implies a right to suicide and it is explained what the latter right contains. The chapter starts with a summary of what is known about people's conceptions of a good death. Of course, we find a lot of cultural and individual variation but also a remarkable amount of consensus. If we then consider motives why people ask for physician assistance in ending their lives, we again find much convergence. Moreover, there is a clear correspondence between common ideals of a good death and the most common motives for pursuing death. Some fairly common preferences as regards one's death may, nevertheless, be rationally criticizable. But even in that case the choice for death can be protected by your right to self-determination. That right determines a personal domain of self-regarding decisions that you are authorized to make. And having an authority means that your decision stands, whether it is the right one or not. That personal domain consists of concentrical circles around one's identity as a person. One's existence belongs to the core of that domain. Therefore, if one has a right to self-determination, it implies a right to determine the manner and time of one's own death. This right has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights in 2011 (Haas v Switzerland).
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 13-34
Determining the manner and time of your own death
In this part it is argued that the right to self-determination implies a right to suicide and it is explained what the latter right contains. The chapter starts with a summary of what is known about people's conceptions of a good death. Of course, we find a lot of cultural and individual variation but also a remarkable amount of consensus. If we then consider motives why people ask for physician assistance in ending their lives, we again find much convergence. Moreover, there is a clear correspondence between common ideals of a good death and the most common motives for pursuing death. Some fairly common preferences as regards one's death may, nevertheless, be rationally criticizable. But even in that case the choice for death can be protected by your right to self-determination. That right determines a personal domain of self-regarding decisions that you are authorized to make. And having an authority means that your decision stands, whether it is the right one or not. That personal domain consists of concentrical circles around one's identity as a person. One's existence belongs to the core of that domain. Therefore, if one has a right to self-determination, it implies a right to determine the manner and time of one's own death. This right has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights in 2011 (Haas v Switzerland).
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 155-176
Euthanasia and the right to self-determination
This part discusses the justifiability of the legalization of euthanasia (understood as participation of a doctor in the joint action of ending a patient's life). Chapter 9 reconsiders the principled arguments for and against, Chapters 10–12 consider the question whether it is possible to design a regulatory framework that effectively minimizes the dangers of abuse and error. It might seem that it is only a short step from the recognition of a general right to end one's own life to the recognition of a right to permit someone else to end it. But it is a structural element of the law everywhere that consent isn't accepted as a defence in any case of homicide. The right to life is an inalienable, even unwaivable right. One possible reason could be that violating such rights is wrong even when it wrongs nobody. I discuss some variants of this idea, in particular the view that killing a person is always a violation of her dignity, just as enslaving her always is. But perhaps the right to life cannot be waived because it does not only protect a person's freedom to dispose of her life, but also her interest in survival. This is a paternalistic rationale, but the paternalism is of a special kind: indirect paternalism. I argue that indirect paternalism is not open to the standard moral objections to its direct counterpart: it doesn't necessarily compromise the value of self-governance, and it doesn't necessarily show disrespect of a person's moral status as a free and equal being.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 155-176
Euthanasia and the right to self-determination
This part discusses the justifiability of the legalization of euthanasia (understood as participation of a doctor in the joint action of ending a patient's life). Chapter 9 reconsiders the principled arguments for and against, Chapters 10–12 consider the question whether it is possible to design a regulatory framework that effectively minimizes the dangers of abuse and error. It might seem that it is only a short step from the recognition of a general right to end one's own life to the recognition of a right to permit someone else to end it. But it is a structural element of the law everywhere that consent isn't accepted as a defence in any case of homicide. The right to life is an inalienable, even unwaivable right. One possible reason could be that violating such rights is wrong even when it wrongs nobody. I discuss some variants of this idea, in particular the view that killing a person is always a violation of her dignity, just as enslaving her always is. But perhaps the right to life cannot be waived because it does not only protect a person's freedom to dispose of her life, but also her interest in survival. This is a paternalistic rationale, but the paternalism is of a special kind: indirect paternalism. I argue that indirect paternalism is not open to the standard moral objections to its direct counterpart: it doesn't necessarily compromise the value of self-governance, and it doesn't necessarily show disrespect of a person's moral status as a free and equal being.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-10
Introduction
The chapter gives an overview of the issues to be addressed and an outline of the main argumentative structure of the book. It also explains that the arguments are supposed to be minimally revisionist: they don't appeal to any of the revisions of commonsense morality that people who defend the justifiability of ‘physician-assisted suicide’ and ‘euthanasia’ usually appeal to. On the whole my method is the usual one in bioethics. It starts from convictions that I suppose to be shared by almost everyone and argue for principles that are best suited to accommodate those shared convictions. But to this corpus of the ‘considered judgements of competent moral judges’ I add a number of views that are structural elements of all legal systems. Hence in my approach not only does ethics instruct the law, the law also informs ethics.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-10
Introduction
The chapter gives an overview of the issues to be addressed and an outline of the main argumentative structure of the book. It also explains that the arguments are supposed to be minimally revisionist: they don't appeal to any of the revisions of commonsense morality that people who defend the justifiability of ‘physician-assisted suicide’ and ‘euthanasia’ usually appeal to. On the whole my method is the usual one in bioethics. It starts from convictions that I suppose to be shared by almost everyone and argue for principles that are best suited to accommodate those shared convictions. But to this corpus of the ‘considered judgements of competent moral judges’ I add a number of views that are structural elements of all legal systems. Hence in my approach not only does ethics instruct the law, the law also informs ethics.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 199-220
The risks of legalization
To what extent would legalization of euthanasia involve risks of harm to patients and third parties and to what extent can these risks be minimized by legal safeguards? I consider the following risks: ‘Doctors who want to get rid of the costs of treatment and care for an uninsured patient will be tempted to get rid of the patient, if they can present their action as being done on the patient's request’. ‘Legalization threatens certain vulnerable groups of people’. ‘Death wishes are for the most part not determined by pain and similar physical symptoms but by the effects of the loss of functional abilities. Such death wishes send the message to all people who are similarly disabled that their lives are of lesser value’. ‘Many requests will not be sufficiently voluntary; people will be manipulated by overburdened caregivers and others to request euthanasia’. ‘Any request can be the product of depression. Most doctors have little expertise in recognizing depression and in the case of a euthanasia request the opinions of experts diverge. We can therefore never be sufficiently certain that the request is well-considered’.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 199-220
The risks of legalization
To what extent would legalization of euthanasia involve risks of harm to patients and third parties and to what extent can these risks be minimized by legal safeguards? I consider the following risks: ‘Doctors who want to get rid of the costs of treatment and care for an uninsured patient will be tempted to get rid of the patient, if they can present their action as being done on the patient's request’. ‘Legalization threatens certain vulnerable groups of people’. ‘Death wishes are for the most part not determined by pain and similar physical symptoms but by the effects of the loss of functional abilities. Such death wishes send the message to all people who are similarly disabled that their lives are of lesser value’. ‘Many requests will not be sufficiently voluntary; people will be manipulated by overburdened caregivers and others to request euthanasia’. ‘Any request can be the product of depression. Most doctors have little expertise in recognizing depression and in the case of a euthanasia request the opinions of experts diverge. We can therefore never be sufficiently certain that the request is well-considered’.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 72-92
What is implied by the right to suicide?
Lethal drugs can, for good reasons, normally only be acquired on a doctor's prescription. Writing it is commonly seen as ‘assisting a suicide’ and in most jurisdictions legally forbidden as such. But compare two legal systems that allow a doctor to provide such assistance. In the Benelux countries she is supposed to supervise the process and to make sure that it goes well. In Oregon she leaves that executive responsibility fully to the patient. In that case she is not really ‘assisting’ someone to end his life but only lifting a blockade in a case in which the ratio for the blockade doesn't apply. She stands out of the way. If, on the other hand, the Benelux procedure is followed, one cannot properly say either that the physician is (merely) providing ‘assistance’. Rather she is participating in a joint action of ending the person's life. An action of the first kind can be justified by an appeal to the person's right to self-determination; it follows that access should only be provided to people whose decisions to end their lives have been voluntary and well-considered. But a blanket prohibition of providing access to lethal drugs cannot be justified. A blanket prohibition of helping a close relative or friend to end her life cannot be justified either. It disregards the social dimension of autonomous decision-making.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 72-92
What is implied by the right to suicide?
Lethal drugs can, for good reasons, normally only be acquired on a doctor's prescription. Writing it is commonly seen as ‘assisting a suicide’ and in most jurisdictions legally forbidden as such. But compare two legal systems that allow a doctor to provide such assistance. In the Benelux countries she is supposed to supervise the process and to make sure that it goes well. In Oregon she leaves that executive responsibility fully to the patient. In that case she is not really ‘assisting’ someone to end his life but only lifting a blockade in a case in which the ratio for the blockade doesn't apply. She stands out of the way. If, on the other hand, the Benelux procedure is followed, one cannot properly say either that the physician is (merely) providing ‘assistance’. Rather she is participating in a joint action of ending the person's life. An action of the first kind can be justified by an appeal to the person's right to self-determination; it follows that access should only be provided to people whose decisions to end their lives have been voluntary and well-considered. But a blanket prohibition of providing access to lethal drugs cannot be justified. A blanket prohibition of helping a close relative or friend to end her life cannot be justified either. It disregards the social dimension of autonomous decision-making.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 251-274
Mental illness
In most permissive countries and states physicians are only allowed to participate in either the joint action of ending a person's life or providing her access to lethal drugs if she has a limited life expectancy. In these jurisdictions it is a hotly debated question whether the permissibility of these actions should be extended. In this part that question is discussed, focussing on three categories of patients: psychiatric patients, old-aged people whose death wish is related to their age, and patients in an advanced stage of dementia who have requested to have their lives ended in an advance directive. The results of this discussion are taken account of in a final chapter that proposes a two-tiered system of legal regulation. Should people suffering from mental illness be eligible for physician assistance in ending their lives? Almost no-one will dispute that a person's suffering can be equally severe, whether it is caused by mental or physical illness. There are, however, several reasons why it is often particularly difficult to assess whether the request of a psychiatric patient meets essential conditions. (1) The motivation of psychiatric patients for wanting to die is often unclear. (2) Uncertainties about the prognosis and the probability of effective treatment loom larger. (3) It is often difficult to determine to what extent the patient's decisional capacity is compromised by his illness. Each of these complicating factors gives us a reason to require a long-standing therapeutic relationship between doctor and patient. It may help the doctor to better understand the meanings of the patient's death wish, verify its stability, assess his reasons for resisting treatment proposals and make an informed holistic judgement of his decisional capacity. The law should therefore permit a ‘dual track’ approach, a kind of contract in which doctor and patient are committed to explore both, possible ways of recovery and death as a final exit option. In addition a case can be made for opening access to lethal drugs to psychiatric patients, if the voluntary, well-considered and durable nature of their request for access can reliably be established.
- 26 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 251-274
Mental illness
In most permissive countries and states physicians are only allowed to participate in either the joint action of ending a person's life or providing her access to lethal drugs if she has a limited life expectancy. In these jurisdictions it is a hotly debated question whether the permissibility of these actions should be extended. In this part that question is discussed, focussing on three categories of patients: psychiatric patients, old-aged people whose death wish is related to their age, and patients in an advanced stage of dementia who have requested to have their lives ended in an advance directive. The results of this discussion are taken account of in a final chapter that proposes a two-tiered system of legal regulation. Should people suffering from mental illness be eligible for physician assistance in ending their lives? Almost no-one will dispute that a person's suffering can be equally severe, whether it is caused by mental or physical illness. There are, however, several reasons why it is often particularly difficult to assess whether the request of a psychiatric patient meets essential conditions. (1) The motivation of psychiatric patients for wanting to die is often unclear. (2) Uncertainties about the prognosis and the probability of effective treatment loom larger. (3) It is often difficult to determine to what extent the patient's decisional capacity is compromised by his illness. Each of these complicating factors gives us a reason to require a long-standing therapeutic relationship between doctor and patient. It may help the doctor to better understand the meanings of the patient's death wish, verify its stability, assess his reasons for resisting treatment proposals and make an informed holistic judgement of his decisional capacity. The law should therefore permit a ‘dual track’ approach, a kind of contract in which doctor and patient are committed to explore both, possible ways of recovery and death as a final exit option. In addition a case can be made for opening access to lethal drugs to psychiatric patients, if the voluntary, well-considered and durable nature of their request for access can reliably be established.