Samuel Castro Bellini-Leite
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Samuel Castro Bellini-Leite has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alfredo Pereira Júnior
Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho, Brasil
1 shared publication - Daniel Márcio Rodrigues Silva
Phonetics Lab, Faculty of Letters, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 March 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Are Generative AIs like Midjourney and Sora creative? The “Generative AI Mary’s room” thought experiment.
This article examines the debate of whether generative AI systems like Midjourney and Sora can be considered truly creative or are merely remixing existing data. It reviews Finke, Ward, and Smith's creative cognition approach which proposed constraints on human creativity. A new thought experiment, the "Generative AI Mary's Room", is proposed to explore whether a person with comprehensive artistic knowledge but no real-world experience could produce original creative works. The argument is that one who believes generative AI is not creative because it works based solely on previous artistic data, should not believe that Mary would be creative either, otherwise, they are inferring mysterious properties to the human mind.
- 30 March 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAre Generative AIs like Midjourney and Sora creative? The “Generative AI Mary’s room” thought experiment.
This article examines the debate of whether generative AI systems like Midjourney and Sora can be considered truly creative or are merely remixing existing data. It reviews Finke, Ward, and Smith's creative cognition approach which proposed constraints on human creativity. A new thought experiment, the "Generative AI Mary's Room", is proposed to explore whether a person with comprehensive artistic knowledge but no real-world experience could produce original creative works. The argument is that one who believes generative AI is not creative because it works based solely on previous artistic data, should not believe that Mary would be creative either, otherwise, they are inferring mysterious properties to the human mind.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 32 (4) , 329-343
Dual Process Theory for Large Language Models: An overview of using Psychology to address hallucination and reliability issues
State-of-the-art Large Language Models have recently exhibited extraordinary linguistic abilities which have surprisingly extended to reasoning. However, responses that are unreliable, false, or invented are still a frequent issue. It has been argued that scaling up strategies, as in increasing model size or hardware power, might not be enough to resolve the issue. Recent research has implemented Type 2 strategies (such as Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought), as strategies that mimic Type 2 reasoning, from Dual Process Theory, to interact with Large Language Models for improved results. The current paper reviews these strategies in light of the Predicting and Reflecting Framework for understanding Dual Process Theory and suggests what Psychology, drawing from research in executive functions, thinking disposition and creativity, can further contribute to possible implementations that address hallucination and reliability issues.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 32 (4) , 329-343
Dual Process Theory for Large Language Models: An overview of using Psychology to address hallucination and reliability issues
State-of-the-art Large Language Models have recently exhibited extraordinary linguistic abilities which have surprisingly extended to reasoning. However, responses that are unreliable, false, or invented are still a frequent issue. It has been argued that scaling up strategies, as in increasing model size or hardware power, might not be enough to resolve the issue. Recent research has implemented Type 2 strategies (such as Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought), as strategies that mimic Type 2 reasoning, from Dual Process Theory, to interact with Large Language Models for improved results. The current paper reviews these strategies in light of the Predicting and Reflecting Framework for understanding Dual Process Theory and suggests what Psychology, drawing from research in executive functions, thinking disposition and creativity, can further contribute to possible implementations that address hallucination and reliability issues.
- Open Access
- 30 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Analytic Thinking (Type 2 or “System 2”) for Large Language Models: using Psychology to address hallucination and reliability issues
State-of-the-art Large Language Models have recently exhibited extraordinary linguistic abilities which have surprisingly extended to reasoning. However, responses that are unreliable, false, or invented are still a frequent issue. It has been argued that scaling up strategies, as in increasing model size or hardware power, might not be enough to resolve the issue. Recent research has implemented Type 2 strategies (such as Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought), as strategies that mimic Type 2 reasoning, from Dual Process Theory, to interact with Large Language Models for improved results. The current paper reviews these strategies in light of the Predicting and Reflecting Framework for understanding Dual Process Theory and suggests what Psychology, drawing from research in executive functions, thinking disposition and creativity, can further contribute to possible implementations that address hallucination and reliability issues.
- 30 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAnalytic Thinking (Type 2 or “System 2”) for Large Language Models: using Psychology to address hallucination and reliability issues
State-of-the-art Large Language Models have recently exhibited extraordinary linguistic abilities which have surprisingly extended to reasoning. However, responses that are unreliable, false, or invented are still a frequent issue. It has been argued that scaling up strategies, as in increasing model size or hardware power, might not be enough to resolve the issue. Recent research has implemented Type 2 strategies (such as Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought), as strategies that mimic Type 2 reasoning, from Dual Process Theory, to interact with Large Language Models for improved results. The current paper reviews these strategies in light of the Predicting and Reflecting Framework for understanding Dual Process Theory and suggests what Psychology, drawing from research in executive functions, thinking disposition and creativity, can further contribute to possible implementations that address hallucination and reliability issues.
- Open Access
- 6 April 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Predicting and Reflecting: A Dual Framework for Dual Process Theory
Dual Process Theory has increasingly gained fame as a framework for explaining evidence in reasoning and decision making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow andreflective one (Type 2), (see Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). However, as Samuels (2009) has noted, there is a problem of determining why these group of features form clusters, more than what the labels Type (or system) 1 and 2 can capture, the unity problem. We understand there might be differences in the processingarchitecture that grounds each type of process, thus requiring distinct cognitive frameworks for each. We argue that the predictive processing approach (as held by Hohwy, 2013 and Clark, 2016) is a more suitable framework for Type 1 processing. Such an approach proposes cognition is in the job of attempting to predict what will perturb sensory inputs next. These are not personal predictions but rather multiple sub-personalpredictions that even the visual system makes at various layers at each millisecond that passes. Rather than being based on a symbolic representation of each aspect of the world, these predictions are made on the basis of statistical information updated moment by moment. This statistical content tracks previous sensory states and the causes of theseprevious sensory states. Kahneman (2011) has been arguing that there is a link between perception and Type 1 processing. What we hold is that such link obtains because Type 1 judgments actually are predictions stemming from higher layers of perceptual systems which work by means of predictive processing. On the other hand, we propose sucharchitecture does not handle Type 2 processes. Rather, these seem to be based on classical symbol systems executing heuristic search as explained by Newell (1980). In conclusion, we propose a dual framework is necessary for explaining why there are two clusters of features. Such a framework would include predictive processing for explaining Type 1processing and computations on symbolic representations for Type 2 processing.
- 6 April 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessPredicting and Reflecting: A Dual Framework for Dual Process Theory
Dual Process Theory has increasingly gained fame as a framework for explaining evidence in reasoning and decision making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process (Type 1), while the other describes a slow andreflective one (Type 2), (see Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). However, as Samuels (2009) has noted, there is a problem of determining why these group of features form clusters, more than what the labels Type (or system) 1 and 2 can capture, the unity problem. We understand there might be differences in the processingarchitecture that grounds each type of process, thus requiring distinct cognitive frameworks for each. We argue that the predictive processing approach (as held by Hohwy, 2013 and Clark, 2016) is a more suitable framework for Type 1 processing. Such an approach proposes cognition is in the job of attempting to predict what will perturb sensory inputs next. These are not personal predictions but rather multiple sub-personalpredictions that even the visual system makes at various layers at each millisecond that passes. Rather than being based on a symbolic representation of each aspect of the world, these predictions are made on the basis of statistical information updated moment by moment. This statistical content tracks previous sensory states and the causes of theseprevious sensory states. Kahneman (2011) has been arguing that there is a link between perception and Type 1 processing. What we hold is that such link obtains because Type 1 judgments actually are predictions stemming from higher layers of perceptual systems which work by means of predictive processing. On the other hand, we propose sucharchitecture does not handle Type 2 processes. Rather, these seem to be based on classical symbol systems executing heuristic search as explained by Newell (1980). In conclusion, we propose a dual framework is necessary for explaining why there are two clusters of features. Such a framework would include predictive processing for explaining Type 1processing and computations on symbolic representations for Type 2 processing.
- 14 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics
- Vol. 82 (3) , 944-953
Cross-modal correspondences in sine wave: Speech versus non-speech modes
The present study aimed to investigate whether or not the so-called "bouba-kiki" effect is mediated by speech-specific representations. Sine-wave versions of naturally produced pseudowords were used as auditory stimuli in an implicit association task (IAT) and an explicit cross-modal matching (CMM) task to examine cross-modal shape-sound correspondences. A group of participants trained to hear the sine-wave stimuli as speech was compared to a group that heard them as non-speech sounds. Sound-shape correspondence effects were observed in both groups and tasks, indicating that speech-specific processing is not fundamental to the "bouba-kiki" phenomenon. Effects were similar across groups in the IAT, while in the CMM task the speech-mode group showed a stronger effect compared with the non-speech group. This indicates that, while both tasks reflect auditory-visual associations, only the CMM task is additionally sensitive to associations involving speech-specific representations.
- 14 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics
- Vol. 82 (3) , 944-953
Cross-modal correspondences in sine wave: Speech versus non-speech modes
The present study aimed to investigate whether or not the so-called "bouba-kiki" effect is mediated by speech-specific representations. Sine-wave versions of naturally produced pseudowords were used as auditory stimuli in an implicit association task (IAT) and an explicit cross-modal matching (CMM) task to examine cross-modal shape-sound correspondences. A group of participants trained to hear the sine-wave stimuli as speech was compared to a group that heard them as non-speech sounds. Sound-shape correspondence effects were observed in both groups and tasks, indicating that speech-specific processing is not fundamental to the "bouba-kiki" phenomenon. Effects were similar across groups in the IAT, while in the CMM task the speech-mode group showed a stronger effect compared with the non-speech group. This indicates that, while both tasks reflect auditory-visual associations, only the CMM task is additionally sensitive to associations involving speech-specific representations.
- 5 December 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 9 (2) , 213-225
Dual Process Theory: Systems, Types, Minds, Modes, Kinds or Metaphors? A Critical Review
- 5 December 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 9 (2) , 213-225
Dual Process Theory: Systems, Types, Minds, Modes, Kinds or Metaphors? A Critical Review
- Open Access
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Institute for Cognitive Science in Journal of Cognitive Science
- Vol. 14 (4) , 335-360
Is Global Workspace a Cartesian Theater? How the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model Solves Conceptual Issues
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Institute for Cognitive Science in Journal of Cognitive Science
- Vol. 14 (4) , 335-360
Open AccessIs Global Workspace a Cartesian Theater? How the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model Solves Conceptual Issues
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Medknow in Mens Sana Monographs
- Vol. 11 (1) , 239-52
The embodied embedded character of system 1 processing
In the last thirty years, a relatively large group of cognitive scientists have begun characterising the mind in terms of two distinct, relatively autonomous systems. To account for paradoxes in empirical results of studies mainly on reasoning, Dual Process Theories were developed. Such Dual Process Theories generally agree that System 1 is rapid, automatic, parallel, and heuristic-based and System 2 is slow, capacity-demanding, sequential, and related to consciousness. While System 2 can still be decently understood from a traditional cognitivist approach, I will argue that it is essential for System 1 processing to be comprehended in an Embodied Embedded approach to Cognition.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Medknow in Mens Sana Monographs
- Vol. 11 (1) , 239-52
Open AccessThe embodied embedded character of system 1 processing
In the last thirty years, a relatively large group of cognitive scientists have begun characterising the mind in terms of two distinct, relatively autonomous systems. To account for paradoxes in empirical results of studies mainly on reasoning, Dual Process Theories were developed. Such Dual Process Theories generally agree that System 1 is rapid, automatic, parallel, and heuristic-based and System 2 is slow, capacity-demanding, sequential, and related to consciousness. While System 2 can still be decently understood from a traditional cognitivist approach, I will argue that it is essential for System 1 processing to be comprehended in an Embodied Embedded approach to Cognition.