Luitgard Anna Maria Veraart
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Luitgard Anna Maria Veraart has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Axel Gandy
Imperial College London
5 shared publications L. C. G. Rogers
Statistical Laboratory, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 0WB, United Kingdom
2 shared publicationsMichael Kusnetsov
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Mathematics
2 shared publications- Nicole Bäuerle
Department of Mathematics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany
2 shared publications - Almut E. D. Veraart
Aarhus University
1 shared publication - Almut E. D. Veraart
Department of Mathematics Imperial College London 180 Queen's Gate SW7 2AZ London UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) in SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics
- Vol. 17 (2) , 545-564
Collateralized Networks with Two Interacting Channels of Fire Sales
We develop a model for financial contagion in collateralized networks in which two channels of fire sales interact. We consider a financial market with multiple assets that can be used for both investment purposes and to satisfy collateral requirements. In our model, a fire sale can be triggered both before default, when illiquid assets are sold to satisfy payment obligations, and after default, when collateral of defaulted institutions is sold. We investigate contagion that arises from the overlap in assets used for investment purposes and as collateral. In particular, we illustrate how fire sales triggered prior to default can reduce the effectiveness of collateralization after a default. Our results highlight the importance of using high-quality assets as collateral to improve financial stability.
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) in SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics
- Vol. 17 (2) , 545-564
Collateralized Networks with Two Interacting Channels of Fire Sales
We develop a model for financial contagion in collateralized networks in which two channels of fire sales interact. We consider a financial market with multiple assets that can be used for both investment purposes and to satisfy collateral requirements. In our model, a fire sale can be triggered both before default, when illiquid assets are sold to satisfy payment obligations, and after default, when collateral of defaulted institutions is sold. We investigate contagion that arises from the overlap in assets used for investment purposes and as collateral. In particular, we illustrate how fire sales triggered prior to default can reduce the effectiveness of collateralization after a default. Our results highlight the importance of using high-quality assets as collateral to improve financial stability.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 74 (2) , 667-681
Post-trade Netting and Contagion
The paper analyses how post-trade netting in over-the-counter derivatives markets affects systemic risk. It defines the notion of a post-trade netting (PTN) exercise and shows that two post-trade netting services that rely on multilateral netting techniques, namely, portfolio rebalancing and portfolio compression, are special cases of a PTN exercise. It formally characterises the relationship between portfolio rebalancing and portfolio compression. The paper then analyses the effects of post-trade netting from a network perspective by considering contagion arising from defaults on variation margin payments. It provides sufficient conditions for post-trade netting to reduce systemic risk and shows that post-trade netting can be harmful. It also explores the implications of post-trade netting when institutions strategically react to liquidity stress by delaying their payments.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 74 (2) , 667-681
Post-trade Netting and Contagion
The paper analyses how post-trade netting in over-the-counter derivatives markets affects systemic risk. It defines the notion of a post-trade netting (PTN) exercise and shows that two post-trade netting services that rely on multilateral netting techniques, namely, portfolio rebalancing and portfolio compression, are special cases of a PTN exercise. It formally characterises the relationship between portfolio rebalancing and portfolio compression. The paper then analyses the effects of post-trade netting from a network perspective by considering contagion arising from defaults on variation margin payments. It provides sufficient conditions for post-trade netting to reduce systemic risk and shows that post-trade netting can be harmful. It also explores the implications of post-trade netting when institutions strategically react to liquidity stress by delaying their payments.
- Open Access
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 35 (1) , 214-262
Systemic risk in markets with multiple central counterparties
We provide a framework for modeling risk and quantifying payment shortfalls in cleared markets with multiple central counterparties (CCPs). Building on the stylized fact that clearing membership is shared among CCPs, we develop a modeling framework that captures the interconnectedness of CCPs and clearing members. We illustrate stress transmission mechanisms using simple examples as well as empirical evidence based on calibrated data. Furthermore, we show how stress mitigation tools such as variation margin gains haircutting by one CCP can have spillover effects on other CCPs. The framework can be used to enhance CCP stress‐testing, which currently relies on the “Cover 2” standard requiring CCPs to be able to withstand the default of their two largest clearing members. We show that who these two clearing members are can be significantly affected if one considers higher‐order effects arising from interconnectedness through shared clearing membership. Looking at the full network of CCPs and shared clearing members is, therefore, important from a financial stability perspective.
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 35 (1) , 214-262
Open AccessSystemic risk in markets with multiple central counterparties
We provide a framework for modeling risk and quantifying payment shortfalls in cleared markets with multiple central counterparties (CCPs). Building on the stylized fact that clearing membership is shared among CCPs, we develop a modeling framework that captures the interconnectedness of CCPs and clearing members. We illustrate stress transmission mechanisms using simple examples as well as empirical evidence based on calibrated data. Furthermore, we show how stress mitigation tools such as variation margin gains haircutting by one CCP can have spillover effects on other CCPs. The framework can be used to enhance CCP stress‐testing, which currently relies on the “Cover 2” standard requiring CCPs to be able to withstand the default of their two largest clearing members. We show that who these two clearing members are can be significantly affected if one considers higher‐order effects arising from interconnectedness through shared clearing membership. Looking at the full network of CCPs and shared clearing members is, therefore, important from a financial stability perspective.
- Open Access
- 6 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Stability
- Vol. 70
How does the repo market behave under stress? Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis
- 6 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Stability
- Vol. 70
Open AccessHow does the repo market behave under stress? Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis
- Open Access
- 13 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 155
Assessing and mitigating fire sales risk under partial information
- 13 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 155
Open AccessAssessing and mitigating fire sales risk under partial information
- Open Access
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 32 (3) , 727-778
When does portfolio compression reduce systemic risk?
We analyze the consequences of portfolio compression for systemic risk. Portfolio compression is a post‐trade netting mechanism that reduces gross positions while keeping net positions unchanged and it is part of the financial legislation in the United States (Dodd–Frank Act) and in Europe (European Market Infrastructure Regulation). We derive necessary structural conditions for portfolio compression to be harmful and discuss policy implications. We show that any potential harmfulness of portfolio compression arises from contagion effects. We show how portfolio compression affects systemic risk depends on the resilience of nodes taking part in compression, on the proportion of debt that they can repay, and on the recovery rates in case of default. In particular, the potential danger of portfolio compression comes from defaults of firms that conduct portfolio compression. If no defaults occur among the firms that engage in compression, then portfolio compression always reduces systemic risk.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 32 (3) , 727-778
Open AccessWhen does portfolio compression reduce systemic risk?
We analyze the consequences of portfolio compression for systemic risk. Portfolio compression is a post‐trade netting mechanism that reduces gross positions while keeping net positions unchanged and it is part of the financial legislation in the United States (Dodd–Frank Act) and in Europe (European Market Infrastructure Regulation). We derive necessary structural conditions for portfolio compression to be harmful and discuss policy implications. We show that any potential harmfulness of portfolio compression arises from contagion effects. We show how portfolio compression affects systemic risk depends on the resilience of nodes taking part in compression, on the proportion of debt that they can repay, and on the recovery rates in case of default. In particular, the potential danger of portfolio compression comes from defaults of firms that conduct portfolio compression. If no defaults occur among the firms that engage in compression, then portfolio compression always reduces systemic risk.
- Open Access
- 7 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
When Does Portfolio Compression Reduce Systemic Risk?
We analyse the consequences of portfolio compression on systemic risk. Portfolio compression is a post-trading netting mechanism that reduces gross positions while keeping net positions unchanged and it is part of the financial legislation in the US (Dodd-Frank Act) and in Europe (European Market Infrastructure Regulation). We derive necessary structural conditions for portfolio compression to be harmful and discuss policy implications. In particular, we show that the potential danger of portfolio compression comes from defaults of firms that conduct portfolio compression. If no defaults occur among those firms that engage in compression, then portfolio compression always reduces systemic risk.
- 7 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhen Does Portfolio Compression Reduce Systemic Risk?
We analyse the consequences of portfolio compression on systemic risk. Portfolio compression is a post-trading netting mechanism that reduces gross positions while keeping net positions unchanged and it is part of the financial legislation in the US (Dodd-Frank Act) and in Europe (European Market Infrastructure Regulation). We derive necessary structural conditions for portfolio compression to be harmful and discuss policy implications. In particular, we show that the potential danger of portfolio compression comes from defaults of firms that conduct portfolio compression. If no defaults occur among those firms that engage in compression, then portfolio compression always reduces systemic risk.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematics and Financial Economics
- Vol. 15 (1) , 131-153
Compound Poisson models for weighted networks with applications in finance
We develop a modelling framework for estimating and predicting weighted network data. The edge weights in weighted networks often arise from aggregating some individual relationships between the nodes. Motivated by this, we introduce a modelling framework for weighted networks based on the compound Poisson distribution. To allow for heterogeneity between the nodes, we use a regression approach for the model parameters. We test the new modelling framework on two types of financial networks: a network of financial institutions in which the edge weights represent exposures from trading Credit Default Swaps and a network of countries in which the edge weights represent cross-border lending. The compound Poisson Gamma distributions with regression fit the data well in both situations. We illustrate how this modelling framework can be used for predicting unobserved edges and their weights in an only partially observed network. This is for example relevant for assessing systemic risk in financial networks.
- 29 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematics and Financial Economics
- Vol. 15 (1) , 131-153
Open AccessCompound Poisson models for weighted networks with applications in finance
We develop a modelling framework for estimating and predicting weighted network data. The edge weights in weighted networks often arise from aggregating some individual relationships between the nodes. Motivated by this, we introduce a modelling framework for weighted networks based on the compound Poisson distribution. To allow for heterogeneity between the nodes, we use a regression approach for the model parameters. We test the new modelling framework on two types of financial networks: a network of financial institutions in which the edge weights represent exposures from trading Credit Default Swaps and a network of countries in which the edge weights represent cross-border lending. The compound Poisson Gamma distributions with regression fit the data well in both situations. We illustrate how this modelling framework can be used for predicting unobserved edges and their weights in an only partially observed network. This is for example relevant for assessing systemic risk in financial networks.
- 12 April 2020
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 30 (3) , 705-737
Distress and default contagion in financial networks
We develop a new model for solvency contagion that can be used to quantify systemic risk in stress tests of financial networks. In contrast to many existing models, it allows for the spread of contagion already before the point of default and hence can account for contagion due to distress and mark‐to‐market losses. We derive general ordering results for outcome measures of stress tests that enable us to compare different contagion mechanisms. We use these results to study the sensitivity of the new contagion mechanism with respect to its model parameters and to compare it to existing models in the literature. When applying the new model to data from the European Banking Authority, we find that the risk from distress contagion is strongly dependent on the anticipated recovery rate. For low recovery rates, the high additional losses caused by bankruptcy dominate the overall stress test results. For high recovery rates, however, we observe a strong sensitivity of the stress test outcomes with respect to the model parameters determining the magnitude of distress contagion.
- 12 April 2020
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 30 (3) , 705-737
Distress and default contagion in financial networks
We develop a new model for solvency contagion that can be used to quantify systemic risk in stress tests of financial networks. In contrast to many existing models, it allows for the spread of contagion already before the point of default and hence can account for contagion due to distress and mark‐to‐market losses. We derive general ordering results for outcome measures of stress tests that enable us to compare different contagion mechanisms. We use these results to study the sensitivity of the new contagion mechanism with respect to its model parameters and to compare it to existing models in the literature. When applying the new model to data from the European Banking Authority, we find that the risk from distress contagion is strongly dependent on the anticipated recovery rate. For low recovery rates, the high additional losses caused by bankruptcy dominate the overall stress test results. For high recovery rates, however, we observe a strong sensitivity of the stress test outcomes with respect to the model parameters determining the magnitude of distress contagion.
- Open Access
- 7 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Compound Poisson Models for Financial Networks
We introduce a modelling framework for financial networks based on the compound Poisson distribution. This is motivated by the fact that financial networks are usually the aggregates of individual trades between institutions and a compound Poisson distribution mimics this. As financial networks are typically heterogeneous, we suggest to use a regression approach to model key characteristics of the compound Poisson distribution and to account for this heterogeneity. We show how the new model class can reproduce stylised facts of financial networks. We test the new modelling framework on two types of empirical network data: First we consider networks that represent exposures based on a special type of financial derivatives, namely Credit Default Swaps. Second we consider data from the locational banking statistics available from the Bank for International Settlements. From these data we can construct networks that represent cross-border liabilities of financial institutions aggregated on the country level and hence represent a global liabilities network. For both types of financial networks we find that compound Poisson distributions with regression fit the data well. As an application of the framework we show how it can be used for predicting unobserved edges (including their weights) in a network in which some parts of the edges are observed and other parts are not observed. This is relevant for assessing systemic risk in financial networks that are not fully observable.
- 7 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCompound Poisson Models for Financial Networks
We introduce a modelling framework for financial networks based on the compound Poisson distribution. This is motivated by the fact that financial networks are usually the aggregates of individual trades between institutions and a compound Poisson distribution mimics this. As financial networks are typically heterogeneous, we suggest to use a regression approach to model key characteristics of the compound Poisson distribution and to account for this heterogeneity. We show how the new model class can reproduce stylised facts of financial networks. We test the new modelling framework on two types of empirical network data: First we consider networks that represent exposures based on a special type of financial derivatives, namely Credit Default Swaps. Second we consider data from the locational banking statistics available from the Bank for International Settlements. From these data we can construct networks that represent cross-border liabilities of financial institutions aggregated on the country level and hence represent a global liabilities network. For both types of financial networks we find that compound Poisson distributions with regression fit the data well. As an application of the framework we show how it can be used for predicting unobserved edges (including their weights) in a network in which some parts of the edges are observed and other parts are not observed. This is relevant for assessing systemic risk in financial networks that are not fully observable.