Colin Hay

Asset-based welfare (ABW) – the use of public policy interventions to encourage individuals to accumulate assets for future welfare needs – has gained prominence across European economies. This looks like a familiar story of policy transfer from an Anglo-liberal epicentre, the UK, in which ABW emerged as a corollary of the country’s growth model. Drawing on short case studies from diverse welfare and growth regimes, this paper argues instead that ABW’s spread is better understood as a common response to similarly interpreted demographic and fiscal pressures. We further show that ABW generates distinct context-specific structural tensions. In the UK, it is parasitic upon the very growth that the growth regime is there to produce. In more export-oriented, consumption-repressing regimes, ABW may prove more economically viable, but its regressive logic – benefiting the asset-rich while disadvantaging the asset-poor – threatens to fracture the cross-class coalitions that underpin welfare provision. The paper thus both challenges standard models of policy diffusion and underscores ABW’s disruptive potential for welfare state development in Europe.

A number of authors make a seemingly compelling case for holding the victim of a wrong morally obliged to accept the genuine apology of the wrongdoer. This is a crucial issue in questions of reparative justice, since reparation typically requires not just the giving but also the acceptance of an apology. Yet it is a case that we should ultimately reject. If it is credible to think that the victim might suffer anew in exercising any duty of this kind, that suffering must be factored into the moral reckoning from the outset. It is only if we can be sure that the victim will not suffer again by attending to, and ultimately accepting, the wrongdoer’s apology that it would be right to impose upon her any duty of this kind. Yet, in all non-trivial cases, the victim’s burden is unknowable in advance and has the potential to be considerable. In such situations, I argue, the victim has no duty to accept the wrongdoer’s apology. There are limits, too, to the utility of the bipartite victim-wrongdoer account of reparation on which such arguments are typically predicated. For the harm the wrongdoer causes is not exclusively suffered by the immediate victim but also by the community of all potential victims. Genuine reparative justice requires more than a recalibration of the relative moral standing of the wrongdoer and the victim through the giving and receiving of an apology. I consider how this might be achieved without imposing upon the victim a burden that fails to achieve the moral reckoning anticipated.

In the wake of the deepest and longest recession that the United Kingdom has experienced since the 1930s, the consequences of Brexit and now COVID too, this article examines the origins, sustenance and puncturing of the growth dynamic it enjoyed since the early 1990s. It identifies what is termed the ‘Anglo-liberal growth model’ and its social policy corollary, ‘asset-based welfare’, considering the symbiotic yet increasingly tense and dynamic interdependence of the two. It argues that although both are compromised by the compound shocks of the crisis, Brexit and COVID, they have in fact become more not less intertwined and interdependent in these more troubled times. It considers the implications for the long-term sustainability of this fractious coupling and the wider consequences for UK economic performance and social welfare in the years ahead.

There are times in the political life of any nation in which its imagining and reimagining become more intensely political, more conscious and more consciously intersubjective. Brexit has provided, provides today and will surely continue to provide a series of such moments. In and through a critical appreciation of Benedict Anderson’s famous reflections on the nation as an ‘imagined community', I consider the (necessarily) imagined character of Brexit and the reimaginings of Britain that its imagining envisaged. I reflect on whether—and if so how and in what ways—‘actually existing Brexit’ is likely to pose a reality check on imagined Brexit, exploring in the process some of the wider political implications.

In what ways, if at all, do past ideologies shape the values of subsequent generations of citizens? Are public attitudes in one period shaped by the discourses and constructions of an earlier generation of political leaders? Using Thatcherism – one variant of the political New Right of the 1980s – as the object of our enquiries, this article explores the extent to which an attitudinal legacy is detectable among the citizens of the UK some 40 years after Margaret Thatcher first became Prime Minister. Our article, drawing on survey data collected in early 2019 (n = 5781), finds that younger generations express and seemingly embrace key tenets of her and her governments’ philosophies. Yet at the same time, they are keen to describe her government’s policies as having ‘gone too far’. Our contribution throws further light on the complex and often covert character of attitudinal legacies. One reading of the data suggests that younger generations do not attribute the broadly Thatcherite values that they hold to Thatcher or Thatcherism since they were socialised politically after such values had become normalised.

Contemporary political economy is predicated on widely shared ideas and assumptions, some explicit but many implicit, about the past. Our aim in this Special Issue is to draw attention to, and to assess critically, these historical assumptions. In doing so, we hope to contribute to a political economy that is more attentive to the analytic assumptions on which it is premised, more aware of the potential oversights, biases, and omissions they contain, and more reflexive about the potential costs of these blind spots. This is an Introduction to one of two Special Issues that are being published simultaneously by New Political Economy and Review of International Political Economy reflecting on blind spots in international political economy. Together, these Special Issues seek to identify the key blind spots in the field and to make sense of how many scholars missed or misconstrued important dynamics that define contemporary capitalism and the other systems and sources of social inequality that characterise our present. This particular Special Issue pursues this goal by looking backwards, to the history of political economy and at the ways in which we have come to tell that history, in order to understand how we got to the present moment.

Which blind spots shape scholarship in International Political Economy (IPE)? That question animates the contributions to a double special issue—one in the Review of International Political Economy, and a companion one in New Political Economy. The global financial crisis had seemed to vindicate broad-ranging IPE perspectives at the expense of narrow economics theories. Yet the tumultuous decade since then has confronted IPE scholars with rapidly-shifting global dynamics, many of which had remained underappreciated. We use the Blind Spots moniker in an attempt to push the topics covered here higher up the scholarly agenda—issues that range from institutionalized racism and misogyny to the rise of big tech, intensifying corporate power, expertise-dynamics in global governance, assetization, and climate change. Gendered and racial inequalities as blind spots have a particular charge. There has been a self-reinforcing correspondence between topics that have counted as important, people to whom they matter personally, and the latter’s ability to build careers on them. In that sense, our mission is not only to highlight collective blind spots that may dull IPE’s capacity to theorize the current moment. It is also a normative one—a form of disciplinary housekeeping to help correct both intellectual and professional entrenched biases.

The two decades either side of the global financial crisis have seen a remarkable surge and an equally remarkable reaction to global inequalities. This has played some part in fuelling the recent populist backlash against globalisation. In response, many global institutions and some national governments have embraced the concept of inclusive growth – proposing a policy agenda designed to share the benefits of economic growth and development more equitably. This paper argues that the current debate about inclusivity suffers from two major misspecifications that weaken the concept and undermine the prospect of the economic and political goals it stands for being achieved. For inclusivity to be meaningful and sustainable it must be understood in multidimensional terms, but attaching it to orthodox thinking on growth continually draws the debate back to narrow economic considerations. The concept has also been hampered by ‘methodological nationalism’, whereby policies for inclusivity are considered predominantly at the national level without adequate attention being given to the multilateral dimensions of inclusivity in a world of global interdependence. To be coherent and applicable, inclusive growth must be (re)conceived multilaterally and embrace a more multidimensional notion of inclusive development that hinges around a meaningful conception of human wellbeing.

Taking stock of the numerous crises that have confronted Europe in the last decade, this special issue investigates the relationship between crisis and the politicisation of the process of European integration. It draws attention in so doing to the epistemic construction of crises. In this conceptual overview, we discuss first, how crises are framed and reframed in relation to the constitutive elements of a political community. Second, we explore the extent to which, and how, the emergence of different understandings of crisis and the ensuing frame competition between them contribute to such politicisation. By elucidating the link between the politics of a now seemingly permanent crisis in Europe and the politicisation of European integration, this introduction sets the framework informing all of the articles in this special issue.