Dimitrios P. Tsomocos

We study the distributional consequences of climate-focused financial regulation. We build a finite-horizon heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and endogenous climate damages to compare green capital requirements, which restrict credit to polluting firms, with carbon taxes. Green capital regulation lowers emissions but misallocates credit, reduces aggregate efficiency, and raises inequality primarily through depressed wages in the brown sector. Carbon taxes achieve larger emission reductions with smaller inequality costs, as tax revenues can be redistributed to workers. When economies are highly reliant on brown energy, capital requirements complement carbon taxes by curbing pollution externalities, while redistribution through taxes mitigates regressive effects. Empirical evidence from OECD data and voluntary bank credit contraction supports the model's mechanism: developed economies experience rising inequality when brown credit contracts. The results highlight a central policy trade-off: instruments that most effectively reduce climate damages tend to exacerbate inequality, making joint design of regulation and taxation essential.

When default losses elevate borrowing costs, expanding credit cannot stabilize the economy because default rates feedback to lending rates through bank balance sheets. Asset management companies (AMCs) break this loop by purchasing nonperforming loans at their long-run recovery values, thereby fixing the effective default rate that banks face. Government purchases of performing loans expand credit but leave this feedback intact. In a model calibrated to the eurozone, the AMC reduces quarterly default rates by 0.8 percentage points, lowers lending rates by 1.6 percentage points, and raises welfare by 0.2%. Government purchases crowd out bank deposits, contracting credit; default rates rise by 1.8 percentage points, lending rates increase by 1.2 percentage points, and welfare falls by 0.3%.

Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8, Ireland, Slovenia, and Spain set up public Asset Management Companies (AMCs), purchasing delinquent loans equal to 44%, 16%, and 10% of GDP, respectively. Though deemed successful, it’s unclear if this was de facto traditional capital and liquidity support. We show that AMCs have a systematic advantage in reducing pecuniary externalities and costs associated with loan delinquencies. AMCs enhance average returns to bank lending, promoting additional lending (bank lending channel) and improving corporate borrowers’ balance sheets (balance sheet channel). The welfare gains of well-designed and well-managed AMCs are between 0.2% and 0.5% of steady-state consumption, independent of whether they are financed through fiscal transfers or sterilized monetary transfers; AMCs can complement traditional fiscal and monetary policies in managing financial crises.

Innovativity - an economy's ability to produce the innovations that drive total factor productivity (TFP) growth - requires both ideas and the ability to process those ideas into new products and/or techniques. We model innovativity as a function of endogenous idea processing capability subject to an exogenous idea supply constraint and derive an empirical measure of innovativity that is independent of the TFP data itself. Using exogenous shocks and theoretical restrictions, we establish that: i) innovativity predicts the evolution of average TFP growth; ii) idea processing capability is the binding constraint on innovativity; and iii) average TFP growth declined after 1970 due to a constraints on idea processing capability, not idea supply.

The Eurozone Debt Crisis has rekindled the debate on the nexus between currency areas and fiscal sovereigns. After the crisis, much of the intellectual and political debate has been on the benefit of a fiscal union, the idea of creating a common fiscal entity that is well equipped to make state-contingent cross-country transfers within the eurozone. Although the role of a benevolent fiscal union can in theory be welfare-improving for a currency union, it is understood that this is a highly politically constrained option, particularly in the Eurozone. Given this constraint, in this paper, we take the implausibility of fiscal union as given, and argue that debt restructuring can be a close substitute to a fiscal union, leading to welfare improvement. In contrast to a fiscal union that resorts to the government’s visible hand to move nominal resources across countries, the debt restructuring plan designs the bankruptcy rules, but it allows the invisible hand of the markets to make the choice based on context-dependent incentives. Much of the insight in this paper originates from Goodhart, Peiris and Tsomocos (2018) and Wang (2019). The authors show that debt restructuring is particularly vital in currency unions and can lead to significant welfare improvement for both the debtor and the creditor, given a hard government budget constraint. A wider implication of this paper is that for the understanding of modern monetary and financial phenomena, particularly the viability of a currency union, we simply cannot ignore the interplay of liquidity and default.

This paper models the role of the lender of last resort (LoLR) in a general equilibrium framework. We allow for heterogeneous agents and a risk-averse banking sector, and incorporate the frictions of endogenous default, liquidity, and money. Adverse supply shocks in monetary endowments trigger default, leading to deterioration in the value of bank assets, and subsequent bank illiquidity in some states of the world. LoLR intervention is then assessed with regards to its economy-wide effect on welfare, bank profitability, and the level of default. The results provide a rationalisation for constructive ambiguity and the ‘too big to fail’ problem.

We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to jointly study various regulations in the presence of credit and run risk. Banks choose between liquid and illiquid assets on the asset side, and between deposits and equity on the liability side. The endogenously determined asset portfolio and capital structure interact to support credit extension, as well as to provide liquidity and risk-sharing services to the real economy. Our modifications create wedges in the asset and liability mix between the private equilibrium and a social planner’s equilibrium. Correcting these distortions requires the joint implementation of a capital and a liquidity regulation.