Alexander E. Saak
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alexander E. Saak has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
David A. Hennessy
Department of Economics Iowa State University
2 shared publications- Jeffrey M. Peterson
Kansas State University
2 shared publications Amani Elobeid
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at Iowa State University
1 shared publicationBrian Willott
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri-Columbia
1 shared publicationCheng Fang
UN Food and Agriculture Organization
1 shared publicationD. Scott Brown
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri-Columbia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 66 (1) , 21-64
A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
- 14 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 66 (1) , 21-64
A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
- 1 June 2017
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 65 (2) , 309-335
The Value of Delegated Quality Control
- 1 June 2017
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 65 (2) , 309-335
The Value of Delegated Quality Control
- Open Access
- 1 November 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 136, 88-91
Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment
- 1 November 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 136, 88-91
Open AccessTeams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment
- 17 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Hydrogeology Journal
- Vol. 20 (5) , 835-849
Groundwater pumping by heterogeneous users
- 17 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Hydrogeology Journal
- Vol. 20 (5) , 835-849
Groundwater pumping by heterogeneous users
- 28 March 2012
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 60 (1) , 104-135
Dynamic Informative Advertising of New Experience Goods
This paper analyzes the optimal advertising and price policies of a monopolist who sells a new experience good over time to a population of heterogeneous forward‐looking buyers. We consider advertising that can complement or substitute for learning‐by‐purchasing, and we show that the advertising intensity always peaks during the early stages when the price extracts surplus from the buyers who are yet to learn their valuation for the good. We also show that even though informative advertising may temporarily raise prices and slow down the learning process, an advertising ban can reduce welfare.
- 28 March 2012
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 60 (1) , 104-135
Dynamic Informative Advertising of New Experience Goods
This paper analyzes the optimal advertising and price policies of a monopolist who sells a new experience good over time to a population of heterogeneous forward‐looking buyers. We consider advertising that can complement or substitute for learning‐by‐purchasing, and we show that the advertising intensity always peaks during the early stages when the price extracts surplus from the buyers who are yet to learn their valuation for the good. We also show that even though informative advertising may temporarily raise prices and slow down the learning process, an advertising ban can reduce welfare.
- 2 February 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 94 (3) , 763-785
Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers' trust. The optimal number of firms that share a common reputation is greater when (1) trades are more frequent and public information is disseminated more rapidly, (2) the deviation gain is smaller compared to the quality premium, (3) customers' information regarding firms' quality is more precise, or (4) intragroup information about firms' quality is more global. From a positive perspective, we suggest how social norms can influence the reputation of regional products. We also offer an efficiency explanation for food scares. From a normative point of view, in our model, protection of geographical indications increases and mandatory traceability decreases welfare and incentives to provide quality without taking into account direct implementation costs.
- 2 February 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 94 (3) , 763-785
Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers' trust. The optimal number of firms that share a common reputation is greater when (1) trades are more frequent and public information is disseminated more rapidly, (2) the deviation gain is smaller compared to the quality premium, (3) customers' information regarding firms' quality is more precise, or (4) intragroup information about firms' quality is more global. From a positive perspective, we suggest how social norms can influence the reputation of regional products. We also offer an efficiency explanation for food scares. From a normative point of view, in our model, protection of geographical indications increases and mandatory traceability decreases welfare and incentives to provide quality without taking into account direct implementation costs.
- 12 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 93 (4) , 1131-1150
A Model of Labeling with Horizontal Differentiation and Cost Variability
We study optimal disclosure of variety by a multiproduct firm with random costs. The prices for labeled varieties are increasing functions of the cost differential and do not reveal which variety is cheaper to produce. Nondisclosure is most common under moderate uncertainty about costs and not too much idiosyncrasy in valuations and quality asymmetry. Mandatory disclosure decreases expected welfare when cost variability is large and quality asymmetry is small. The cheaper variety tends to be oversupplied (undersupplied) when disclosure is voluntary (mandatory). Competition among multiproduct firms that source inputs in the same upstream market may not lead to more disclosure.
- 12 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 93 (4) , 1131-1150
A Model of Labeling with Horizontal Differentiation and Cost Variability
We study optimal disclosure of variety by a multiproduct firm with random costs. The prices for labeled varieties are increasing functions of the cost differential and do not reveal which variety is cheaper to produce. Nondisclosure is most common under moderate uncertainty about costs and not too much idiosyncrasy in valuations and quality asymmetry. Mandatory disclosure decreases expected welfare when cost variability is large and quality asymmetry is small. The cheaper variety tends to be oversupplied (undersupplied) when disclosure is voluntary (mandatory). Competition among multiproduct firms that source inputs in the same upstream market may not lead to more disclosure.
- 28 February 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 102 (2) , 67-69
Private information in monopoly with random participation
- 28 February 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 102 (2) , 67-69
Private information in monopoly with random participation
- 1 March 2008
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 56 (1) , 169-189
THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN MONOPOLY
- 1 March 2008
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 56 (1) , 169-189
THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN MONOPOLY
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 54 (2) , 214-228
Groundwater use under incomplete information
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 54 (2) , 214-228
Groundwater use under incomplete information