Gottfried Vosgerau
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Gottfried Vosgerau has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Nicolas Lindner
Heinrich-Heine-Universität
9 shared publications- Matthis Synofzik
German Center for Neurodegenerative Diseases (DZNE) Tübingen Germany
6 shared publications Raphael van Riel
6 shared publicationsAlbert Newen
Ruhr-University Bochum
5 shared publicationsCarsten Held
September 2005
3 shared publicationsMarkus Knauff
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Argumentation
- p. 1-29
Biased Reasoning, Argument Analysis, and the Principle of Charity
A significant proportion of human reasoning is systematically biased, a fact that sits uneasily with argumentation theory’s methodological commitment to the principle of charity. Traditionally, the principle requires arguments to be reconstructed as plausibly and rationally as possible, which conflicts with the definition of cognitive biases as irrational. The aim of this paper is to show that we can and should integrate cognitive biases into argument reconstruction. Firstly, we demonstrate both the ubiquity and societal consequences of biased reasoning. We then articulate a trilemma for argument analysis: (i) exclude biased reasoning from reconstruction, (ii) redefine it as rational, or (iii) abandon the principle of charity. We argue that this trilemma can be resolved by adopting a nuanced understanding of charity that puts sufficient emphasis on the descriptive standard of accuracy alongside the normative standard of plausibility. By properly pursuing these dual aims, we can account for instances of biased reasoning in argument analysis in terms of the underlying mental states and processes. By taking the effect of the in-group bias in climate skepticism as an instructive example, we present one way of integrating cognitive biases into argument analysis by reconstructing instances of biased reasoning as arguments. The aim of such reconstructions is not to vindicate biased reasoning as epistemically sound, after all, but rather to make its justificatory structure transparent and discussable.
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Argumentation
- p. 1-29
Open AccessBiased Reasoning, Argument Analysis, and the Principle of Charity
A significant proportion of human reasoning is systematically biased, a fact that sits uneasily with argumentation theory’s methodological commitment to the principle of charity. Traditionally, the principle requires arguments to be reconstructed as plausibly and rationally as possible, which conflicts with the definition of cognitive biases as irrational. The aim of this paper is to show that we can and should integrate cognitive biases into argument reconstruction. Firstly, we demonstrate both the ubiquity and societal consequences of biased reasoning. We then articulate a trilemma for argument analysis: (i) exclude biased reasoning from reconstruction, (ii) redefine it as rational, or (iii) abandon the principle of charity. We argue that this trilemma can be resolved by adopting a nuanced understanding of charity that puts sufficient emphasis on the descriptive standard of accuracy alongside the normative standard of plausibility. By properly pursuing these dual aims, we can account for instances of biased reasoning in argument analysis in terms of the underlying mental states and processes. By taking the effect of the in-group bias in climate skepticism as an instructive example, we present one way of integrating cognitive biases into argument analysis by reconstructing instances of biased reasoning as arguments. The aim of such reconstructions is not to vindicate biased reasoning as epistemically sound, after all, but rather to make its justificatory structure transparent and discussable.
- Open Access
- 12 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (3)
Conceptual spaces: Naturalness or cognitive sparseness?
The conceptual spaces framework posits that conceptual content is structured geometrically, and is equipped with cognitive criteria of naturalness (namely, convexity and principles of cognitive economy). Its proponents suggest that cognitive naturalness is naturalness simpliciter, a novel move in a debate that is traditionally focused on how the world, and not the mind, is structured. We argue that “cognitive naturalness” is a misnomer and that the framework describes cognitive sparseness instead. To demonstrate this, we explore the approach’s shortcomings across various branches of the naturalness debate, most notably its failure to distinguish natural kinds from fictional kinds. Our diagnosis is that the evolutionary pragmatism employed by its proponents fails to establish a connection to the real world, thus failing to secure the ontological and epistemic objectivity required for a theory of naturalness. We propose an alternative view, ecological empiricism, which posits that natural concepts or properties are those revealed through interaction with the real world.
- 12 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (3)
Open AccessConceptual spaces: Naturalness or cognitive sparseness?
The conceptual spaces framework posits that conceptual content is structured geometrically, and is equipped with cognitive criteria of naturalness (namely, convexity and principles of cognitive economy). Its proponents suggest that cognitive naturalness is naturalness simpliciter, a novel move in a debate that is traditionally focused on how the world, and not the mind, is structured. We argue that “cognitive naturalness” is a misnomer and that the framework describes cognitive sparseness instead. To demonstrate this, we explore the approach’s shortcomings across various branches of the naturalness debate, most notably its failure to distinguish natural kinds from fictional kinds. Our diagnosis is that the evolutionary pragmatism employed by its proponents fails to establish a connection to the real world, thus failing to secure the ontological and epistemic objectivity required for a theory of naturalness. We propose an alternative view, ecological empiricism, which posits that natural concepts or properties are those revealed through interaction with the real world.
- 22 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 309-317
Repräsentationale Theorien des Bewusstseins
- Open Access
- 7 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 52 (4) , 845-848
The Cognitive and Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness – Editor’s Introduction
Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue ‘The Cognitive Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness’, including brief introductions of the individual contributions.
- 7 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 52 (4) , 845-848
Open AccessThe Cognitive and Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness – Editor’s Introduction
Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue ‘The Cognitive Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness’, including brief introductions of the individual contributions.
- Open Access
- 30 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 52 (4) , 959-978
Ecological Empiricism
Both metaphysics and cognitive science raise the question of what natural concepts or properties are. A link between the two is notoriously hard to establish. I propose to take natural concepts or properties to be those that are revealed in interaction. The concept of affordances is refined and naturalized to spell out how interacting with objects grounds concepts. I will call this account “Ecological Empiricism”. I argue that the notion of naturalness within this framework turns out to be a gradable – there are more or less natural properties – and dependent on the perspective taken – metaphysically natural properties are different from cognitive natural properties. From a metaphysical point of view, perfect correlations between actions and sensory input are relevant, which are best approximated by scientific measurement. For cognition, simple or basic actions are relevant. Although metaphysical and cognitive naturalness does not coincide according to Ecological Empiricism, it presents a common framework with a uniform conception of naturalness.
- 30 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 52 (4) , 959-978
Open AccessEcological Empiricism
Both metaphysics and cognitive science raise the question of what natural concepts or properties are. A link between the two is notoriously hard to establish. I propose to take natural concepts or properties to be those that are revealed in interaction. The concept of affordances is refined and naturalized to spell out how interacting with objects grounds concepts. I will call this account “Ecological Empiricism”. I argue that the notion of naturalness within this framework turns out to be a gradable – there are more or less natural properties – and dependent on the perspective taken – metaphysically natural properties are different from cognitive natural properties. From a metaphysical point of view, perfect correlations between actions and sensory input are relevant, which are best approximated by scientific measurement. For cognition, simple or basic actions are relevant. Although metaphysical and cognitive naturalness does not coincide according to Ecological Empiricism, it presents a common framework with a uniform conception of naturalness.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-11
Einleitung
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-157
Bewusstsein und Erlebnisqualitäten
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 207-221
Emotionen
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 101-125
Die Rolle des Körpers und der Umwelt
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 159-183
Selbstwissen und Selbstbewusstsein