Heinrich Wansing
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Heinrich Wansing has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hitoshi Omori
Tohoku University
7 shared publications - Yaroslav Shramko
Kryvyi Rih State Pedagogical University
6 shared publications Graham Priest
4 shared publicationsDaniel Skurt
Ruhr University Bochum
3 shared publications- Grigory K. Olkhovikov
Department of Philosophy I, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
3 shared publications - Nils Kürbis
University of Łodź
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 63-73
Commentary on Priest and Wansing on Dialetheism and Dimathematism
- 28 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 63-73
Open AccessCommentary on Priest and Wansing on Dialetheism and Dimathematism
- Open Access
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- p. 1-9
Editorial Introduction to the Special Issue of Studia Logica Dedicated to the Memory of Nuel Belnap
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- p. 1-9
Open AccessEditorial Introduction to the Special Issue of Studia Logica Dedicated to the Memory of Nuel Belnap
- 15 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 114 (2) , 223-235
Four Goodbyes: Memories of Professor Ryszard Wójcicki
- 15 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 114 (2) , 223-235
Four Goodbyes: Memories of Professor Ryszard Wójcicki
- Open Access
- 13 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- p. 1-29
Abelian Logic on the Bochum Plan (and the American Plan as Well)
In this paper, we introduce two new semantic presentations of Abelian logic, the non-trivial negation inconsistent logic of Abelian lattice-ordered groups, which was independently developed by Ettore Casari, and by Robert Meyer and John Slaney. Abelian logic is presented through a methodology that combines elements of what is sometimes referred to as the “Bochum Plan” and the “American Plan.” While the Bochum Plan is an approach to defining contra-classical logics, the American Plan-developed by Nuel Belnap and Michael Dunn-in particular offers a conception of negation that invites an application of the Bochum Plan. The first semantics is a ternary frame Kripke semantics, and the second is based on ideas from Edwin Mares’ work. Thereby emerges a condition for the falsity of Abelian implication to be supported, which we analyse further in the separate context of the first-degree entailment logic. The perspectives are united in the end to provide a defence against the scepticism concerning the status of the Abelian negation as a negation.
- 13 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- p. 1-29
Open AccessAbelian Logic on the Bochum Plan (and the American Plan as Well)
In this paper, we introduce two new semantic presentations of Abelian logic, the non-trivial negation inconsistent logic of Abelian lattice-ordered groups, which was independently developed by Ettore Casari, and by Robert Meyer and John Slaney. Abelian logic is presented through a methodology that combines elements of what is sometimes referred to as the “Bochum Plan” and the “American Plan.” While the Bochum Plan is an approach to defining contra-classical logics, the American Plan-developed by Nuel Belnap and Michael Dunn-in particular offers a conception of negation that invites an application of the Bochum Plan. The first semantics is a ternary frame Kripke semantics, and the second is based on ideas from Edwin Mares’ work. Thereby emerges a condition for the falsity of Abelian implication to be supported, which we analyse further in the separate context of the first-degree entailment logic. The perspectives are united in the end to provide a defence against the scepticism concerning the status of the Abelian negation as a negation.
- Open Access
- 12 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 18 (3) , 859-899
BI-CONNEXIVE LOGIC, BILATERALISM, AND NEGATION INCONSISTENCY
In this paper we study logical bilateralism understood as a theory of two primitive derivability relations, namely provability and refutability, in a language devoid of a primitive strong negation and without a falsum constant, $\bot $ , and a verum constant, $\top $ . There is thus no negation that toggles between provability and refutability, and there are no primitive constants that are used to define an “implies falsity” negation and a “co-implies truth” co-negation. This reduction of expressive power notwithstanding, there remains some interaction between provability and refutability due to the presence of (i) a conditional and the refutability condition of conditionals and (ii) a co-implication and the provability condition of co-implications. Moreover, assuming a hyperconnexive understanding of refuting conditionals and a dual understanding of proving co-implications, neither non-trivial negation inconsistency nor hyperconnexivity is lost for unary negation connectives definable by means of certain surrogates of falsum and verum. Whilst a critical attitude towards $\bot $ and $\top $ can be justified by problematic aspects of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of the logical operations for these constants, the aim to reduce the availability of a toggling negation and observations on undefinability may also give further reasons to abandon $\bot $ and $\top $ .- 12 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 18 (3) , 859-899
Open AccessBI-CONNEXIVE LOGIC, BILATERALISM, AND NEGATION INCONSISTENCY
In this paper we study logical bilateralism understood as a theory of two primitive derivability relations, namely provability and refutability, in a language devoid of a primitive strong negation and without a falsum constant, $\bot $ , and a verum constant, $\top $ . There is thus no negation that toggles between provability and refutability, and there are no primitive constants that are used to define an “implies falsity” negation and a “co-implies truth” co-negation. This reduction of expressive power notwithstanding, there remains some interaction between provability and refutability due to the presence of (i) a conditional and the refutability condition of conditionals and (ii) a co-implication and the provability condition of co-implications. Moreover, assuming a hyperconnexive understanding of refuting conditionals and a dual understanding of proving co-implications, neither non-trivial negation inconsistency nor hyperconnexivity is lost for unary negation connectives definable by means of certain surrogates of falsum and verum. Whilst a critical attitude towards $\bot $ and $\top $ can be justified by problematic aspects of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of the logical operations for these constants, the aim to reduce the availability of a toggling negation and observations on undefinability may also give further reasons to abandon $\bot $ and $\top $ . - Open Access
- 2 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-22
A Note on the Historiography of Pre-modern Connexive Logic
The historiography of connexive logic has seen some pitfalls. In the present note, we show that the reception of principles characteristic of connexive logic provides an example of how an unwarranted bias in favor of what is now called ‘classical logic’ and an often accompanying aversion against contradictions can negatively affect the historiography of logic. Moreover, we briefly outline the coverage of the present volume 60 Years of Connexive Logic.
- 2 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-22
Open AccessA Note on the Historiography of Pre-modern Connexive Logic
The historiography of connexive logic has seen some pitfalls. In the present note, we show that the reception of principles characteristic of connexive logic provides an example of how an unwarranted bias in favor of what is now called ‘classical logic’ and an often accompanying aversion against contradictions can negatively affect the historiography of logic. Moreover, we briefly outline the coverage of the present volume 60 Years of Connexive Logic.
- Open Access
- 2 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 241-252
Ten Open Problems in Connexive Logic
In this short note, which is the final chapter of the volume 60 Years of Connexive Logic, we list ten open problems. Some of these problems are technical and precisely stated, while others are less technical and even speculative. We hope that the list inspires some readers to contribute to the field by tackling one or many of the problems.
- 2 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 241-252
Open AccessTen Open Problems in Connexive Logic
In this short note, which is the final chapter of the volume 60 Years of Connexive Logic, we list ten open problems. Some of these problems are technical and precisely stated, while others are less technical and even speculative. We hope that the list inspires some readers to contribute to the field by tackling one or many of the problems.