GTGiuliano Torrengo

Giuliano Torrengo

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Giuliano Torrengo has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The ABC of the R-theory of time

    by Giuliano Torrengo

    This paper examines Nathan Oaklander’s development of the “R-theory” of time, as presented in New Directions in the Russellian Theory of Time (2024), co-authored with Emiliano Boccardi and Erwin Tegtmeier. The R-theory proposes an alternative to the traditional opposition between A-theories and B-theories of time by grounding temporal passage not in tensed facts or a “moving present,” but in primitively dynamic relations of succession. Drawing on Russell and Bergmann, the authors distinguish between a temporal ontology (what exists in time) and an ontology of time (what time is), emphasizing the phenomenology of temporal experience as central to metaphysical inquiry. Passage is understood as grounded in acquaintance with dynamic succession relations between events, rather than in the exemplification of tense properties. This allows the R-theory to reject both A-theoretic tense realism and the static “block universe” often associated with the B-theory, while preserving the veridicality of temporal experience. The paper reconstructs the metaphysical motivations behind the R-theory, highlights its critique of the traditional B-theory, and raises concerns about the coherence of “local” dynamic passage, especially in relation to relativistic spacetime and the risk of reintroducing a global moving present.

  • Open Access

    A note on temporal phenomenology and belief formation

    by Giuliano Torrengo

    In this paper, I offer a commentary on the recent article “The moving open future, temporal phenomenology, and temporal passage,” focusing on the temporally aperspectival hypothesis . According to it, the widely shared belief in robust passage is due to a low-level perceptual mechanism involving awareness of temporally aperspectival perceptions being replaced over time. I interpret the phenomenology at play as ambiguous between an inward-directed awareness (focused on the renewal of experiences themselves) and an outward-directed interpretation (focused on the renewal of what we experience). Following in part some suggestions by the authors, I argue that this duality, combined with the influence of passage-friendly language and metaphors, may explain the observed distribution between those who do and do not believe in robust temporal passage. I also suggest that distinguishing between two related but distinct beliefs—the Priorian Belief in external robust passage and a Husserlian Belief in the internal renewal of experience—could clarify the 70%–30% split in intuitions about temporal passage documented by X-phi studies.

  • Open Access

    The closed future

    by Giuliano Torrengo

    Many philosophers take for granted that there is a strong pre‐theoretical intuition that the future is open and that it is worth trying to make sense of that intuition in theoretical terms. In this paper, I give a characterisation of the ordinary intuition in terms of three elements: our sense of agency, the difference in normativity between memories and expectations and naïve understanding of causality. Those intuitions allow us to pin down certain desiderata that an account of openness should respect. Firstly, the fact that the future is open is not merely due to our epistemic situation (the fact that we do not know what the future will bring). Secondly, openness is not merely a matter of nomological indeterminism; even if indeterminism is part of what makes the future open, it cannot be the end of the story. Thirdly, openness requires more than ‘modal flexibility’ (i.e. the fact that the future could be different from what actually will be). I provide a minimal theory of openness, which respects those desiderata and which is based on the semantic notion of unsettledness and the metaphysical notion of indeterminacy. Roughly, the future is open if future‐tensed claims concerning contingent matters are such that their truth value is presently unsettled, and they are semantically unsettled because the future is metaphysically indeterminate. I then argue that this theory is compatible with what I call the closed future view. According to the latter, there is only one way in which things will go, although, given indeterminism, it is unsettled which way it is. I then consider an objection to my compatibility claim: if the open future claim is metaphysically substantive, there should be a way to differentiate it from the closed future scenario. I consider whether a friend of openness could rely on a dynamic metaphysics of time (such as presentism, or the growing block view) in order to differentiate their position from the closed future scenario. I argue that the appeal to a dynamic universe is ineffective.


  • Open Access

    Taste Fragmentalism

    by Giuseppe Spolaore, Samuele Iaquinto, Giuliano Torrengo

    This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine’s fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted—in an absolute manner—by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb’s being tasty and the state of rhubarb’s being distasteful) can both constitute reality in an absolute manner, although no agent can have joint access to both states. We will then develop a formalised version of our view by means of an exact truthmaker semantics for taste assertions. Within this framework—we argue—our linguistic and inferential practices concerning cases of faultless disagreement are elegantly vindicated, thus suggesting that taste fragmentalism is worth of further consideration.


  • Open Access

    Explanation, persistence, and location

    by Giuliano Torrengo, Valerio Buonomo

    According to the “received view” the disagreement between endurantism and perdurantism is ontological and concerns the existence of temporal parts of continuants. In a recent paper, (Wasserman 2016) argues that the ontological conception of these theories does not address the crucial point: explaining the way things persist. According to Wasserman, perdurantism is not just the view that things have temporal parts; it is the view that things persist by (or in virtue of) having temporal parts. Moreover, in the last decade an alternative understanding of the dispute between endurantism and perdurantism, the so called “locative turn”, has lead to an understanding of these two theories as concerning crucially locational rather than mereological notions. Our main aim in this paper is to bring together those two revisionary approaches to the received view, and show how they can enrich each other and open up further dimension of the debate. Finally in the last section we focus on some of the non-standard accounts of persistence and location that arise from this approach, such as “autonomism of persistence and location” and “reverse locational endurantism/perdurantism”.


  • Open Access

    Fear of the Past

    by Davide Bordini, Giuliano Torrengo

    A widespread (and often tacit) assumption is that fear is an anticipatory emotion and, as such, inherently future-oriented. Prima facie, such an assumption is threatened by cases where we seem to be afraid of things in the past: if it is possible to fear the past, then fear entertains no special relation with the future—or so some have argued. This seems to force us to choose between an account of fear as an anticipatory emotion (supported by pre-theoretical intuitions as well as empirical research in psychology) and admitting cases of past-oriented fear. In this paper, we argue for a proposal that dissolves this dilemma. Our claim is: with the right account in place, the future-orientation of fear can be made compatible with, and is actually explanatory of, cases where we are genuinely afraid of something in the past. So, there is no need to choose: fear is still future-oriented, even when we are genuinely afraid of things in the past. The key is a correct understanding of what fear’s temporal orientation amounts to, and the framework we offer here provides us with such an understanding.


  • Open Access

    The Shape of Things to Come: Introduction to Special Issue on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz

    by Cristian Mariani, Giuliano Torrengo

    In Nothing To Come: A Defence of the Growing Block Theory of Time , Correia and Rosenkranz present in great depth their own version of the Growing Block Theory. This special issue contains several commentaries on Correia and Rosenkranz’s position made by leading figures in contemporary philosophy of time, together with extremely thorough replies by the authors themselves which clarify crucial aspects of their view.

  • Open Access

    The Ways of Presentness

    by Giuliano Torrengo, Daniele Cassaghi

    The idea that the present moment is in some sense experientially privileged has been used in variousarguments from presentnessin favour of the existence of an objective present. Roughly speaking, in the literature we find two different approaches. Either by having an experience of something present we are aware of it as present (perceptual presentness), or by having an experience located in the present we are aware of our experience as present (locational presentness). While the various ways of understanding presentness can be used to formulate different arguments in favour of the existence of an objective present, none of them is ultimately tenable. Eventually, our conclusions will suggest that eliminativism is the best attitude towards presentness.

  • The Ontology of Discrimination

    by Giuliano Torrengo

    Discrimination is a social phenomenon which seems to be widespread across different societies and cultures. Examples of discrimination concerning race, class, gender, and sexual orientation are not difficult to find in contemporary western societies. In this article, the author focus on the ontological ground of this phenomenon, with particular attention to its diffuse and institutionalised forms. The author defends a broadly speaking reductionist approach, according to which the various manifestations of discrimination are grounded on the existence of the effects of “discriminatory stances” in social contexts. Discrimination may become part of the institutional sphere, either by way of bottom-up “crystallisation” of discriminatory practices, or by top-down “dilution” of institutional defaults into ordinary interactions.

  • Frightening times

    by Davide Bordini, Giuliano Torrengo

    In this paper, we discuss the inherent temporal orientation of fear, a matter on which philosophers seem to have contrasting opinions. According to some, fear is inherentlypresent‐oriented; others instead maintain that it is inherentlyfuture‐oriented or that it hasnoinherent temporal orientation at all. Despite the differences, however, all these views seem to understand fear's temporal orientation asone‐dimensional—that is, as uniquely determined by the represented temporal location of the intentional object of fear. By contrast, we present a view that introduces atwo‐dimensional account of fear's temporal orientation. On such a view, we can say that fear is inherently future‐oriented, independently of its being about something in the present or the future.