Bryce Huebner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Bryce Huebner has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Marc D. Hauser
Departments of Psychology and Human Evolutionary Biology Harvard University
2 shared publications- Andy Blitzer
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, USA
1 shared publication - Carl Brusse
School of Philosophy, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
1 shared publication - Genevieve Hayman
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC20057.@Georgetown.edubrycehuebner.weebly.com
1 shared publication - Hagop Sarkissian
Department of Philosophy, The City University of New York, Graduate Center and Baruch College, New York, USA
1 shared publication - Joseph Jebari
Georgetown-Howard Center for Medical Humanities and Health Justice, Washington, DC 20001, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
- Vol. 81 (3) , 414-417
Aesthetic Life and Why it Matters
I can’t say what drew me toward the dark atmospheres of post-punk and industrial music, or the dissonant and abrasive sounds of metal and hardcore. But in the early 1990s, these kinds of music awakened a desire to explore the aesthetic possibilities that were found just beyond what was readily available. As a teenager, I listened to two public radio shows each week. One of them aimed to evoke dark atmospheres; the other one played diverse forms of extreme music. I also started to spend a lot of time in two record shops. One of them focused on punk, hardcore, and skate culture; the other one was dedicated to the love of all things metal. Finally, I went to all-ages clubs to dance to dark music, and I went to a lot of metal and hardcore shows. For thirty years, I have dedicated a great deal of time and effort to exploring related aesthetic phenomena. My engagements with the relevant musical communities have changed in numerous ways and my exploratory tendencies have varied substantially over the years. But I’ve always been a metalhead, and engagements with metal communities have shaped my understanding of what it means to live a good life in profound ways.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
- Vol. 81 (3) , 414-417
Aesthetic Life and Why it Matters
I can’t say what drew me toward the dark atmospheres of post-punk and industrial music, or the dissonant and abrasive sounds of metal and hardcore. But in the early 1990s, these kinds of music awakened a desire to explore the aesthetic possibilities that were found just beyond what was readily available. As a teenager, I listened to two public radio shows each week. One of them aimed to evoke dark atmospheres; the other one played diverse forms of extreme music. I also started to spend a lot of time in two record shops. One of them focused on punk, hardcore, and skate culture; the other one was dedicated to the love of all things metal. Finally, I went to all-ages clubs to dance to dark music, and I went to a lot of metal and hardcore shows. For thirty years, I have dedicated a great deal of time and effort to exploring related aesthetic phenomena. My engagements with the relevant musical communities have changed in numerous ways and my exploratory tendencies have varied substantially over the years. But I’ve always been a metalhead, and engagements with metal communities have shaped my understanding of what it means to live a good life in profound ways.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Res Philosophica
- Vol. 100 (1) , 63-91
A Neuro-YogÄcÄra Manifesto
In this article, I defend a neuro-Yogacara framework that is based on an understanding of allostatic regulation, and organized around the following four philosophical claims: 1) experience is shaped, in deep and pervasive ways, by a person’s history and their ecological and social context; 2) each moment of experience occurs amid an ongoing flow of conscious activity, which reflects the attempt to integrate diverse sensory and cognitive experiences into a subjective awareness of a world; 3) every claim about a specific feature of experience is an abstraction, which only makes sense within the context of a complex and multidimensional experience of a world; and 4) the experience of being a self, in a world, is malleable.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Res Philosophica
- Vol. 100 (1) , 63-91
A Neuro-YogÄcÄra Manifesto
In this article, I defend a neuro-Yogacara framework that is based on an understanding of allostatic regulation, and organized around the following four philosophical claims: 1) experience is shaped, in deep and pervasive ways, by a person’s history and their ecological and social context; 2) each moment of experience occurs amid an ongoing flow of conscious activity, which reflects the attempt to integrate diverse sensory and cognitive experiences into a subjective awareness of a world; 3) every claim about a specific feature of experience is an abstraction, which only makes sense within the context of a complex and multidimensional experience of a world; and 4) the experience of being a self, in a world, is malleable.
- 28 May 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 43, e95
Unification at the cost of realism and precision
Veissière et al. must sacrifice explanatory realism and precision in order to develop a unified formal model. Drawing on examples from cognitive archeology, we argue that this makes it difficult for them to derive the kinds of testable predictions that would allow them to resolve debates over the nature of human social cognition and cultural acquisition.
- 28 May 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 43, e95
Unification at the cost of realism and precision
Veissière et al. must sacrifice explanatory realism and precision in order to develop a unified formal model. Drawing on examples from cognitive archeology, we argue that this makes it difficult for them to derive the kinds of testable predictions that would allow them to resolve debates over the nature of human social cognition and cultural acquisition.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by WellBeing International Publications in Animal Sentience
- Vol. 5 (29) , 13
Drawing the boundaries of animal sentience
We welcome Mikhalevich & Powell’s (2020) (M&P) call for a more “‘inclusive”’ animal ethics, but we think their proposed shift toward a moral framework that privileges false positives over false negatives will require radically revising the paradigm assumption in animal research: that there is a clear line to be drawn between sentient beings that are part of our moral community and nonsentient beings that are not.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by WellBeing International Publications in Animal Sentience
- Vol. 5 (29) , 13
Drawing the boundaries of animal sentience
We welcome Mikhalevich & Powell’s (2020) (M&P) call for a more “‘inclusive”’ animal ethics, but we think their proposed shift toward a moral framework that privileges false positives over false negatives will require radically revising the paradigm assumption in animal research: that there is a clear line to be drawn between sentient beings that are part of our moral community and nonsentient beings that are not.
- 12 December 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 42, e254
Temporal updating, behavioral learning, and the phenomenology of time-consciousness
Hoerl & McCormack claim that the temporal updating system only represents the world as present. This generates puzzles regarding the phenomenology of temporal experience. We argue that recent models of reinforcement learning suggest that temporal updating must have a minimal temporal structure; and we suggest that this helps to clarify what it means to experience the world as temporally structured.
- 12 December 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 42, e254
Temporal updating, behavioral learning, and the phenomenology of time-consciousness
Hoerl & McCormack claim that the temporal updating system only represents the world as present. This generates puzzles regarding the phenomenology of temporal experience. We argue that recent models of reinforcement learning suggest that temporal updating must have a minimal temporal structure; and we suggest that this helps to clarify what it means to experience the world as temporally structured.
- 17 May 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 41, e105
From objectivized morality to objective morality
Stanford holds that the externalization and objectivization of moral judgments are what sustain human cooperative lifeways. We reply that the central function of human moral psychology is to track and respond to the structural features of our social environment, and we argue that moral obligations are grounded in the relationship between individual agents and the stability of their social groups.
- 17 May 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 41, e105
From objectivized morality to objective morality
Stanford holds that the externalization and objectivization of moral judgments are what sustain human cooperative lifeways. We reply that the central function of human moral psychology is to track and respond to the structural features of our social environment, and we argue that moral obligations are grounded in the relationship between individual agents and the stability of their social groups.
- 14 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (12) , 3273-3292
What is a philosophical effect? Models of data in experimental philosophy
- 14 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (12) , 3273-3292
What is a philosophical effect? Models of data in experimental philosophy
- 29 April 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 37 (2) , 145-146
Massively representational minds are not always driven by goals, conscious or otherwise
The language of conscious and unconscious goals is rooted in a folk-taxonomy that is likely to inhibit progress in cognitive science. Severing the commitment to this taxonomy would allow Huang & Bargh (H&B) to consider a wider variety of representational forms with motivational force and to entertain the intriguing possibility that variations in the number of active-but-redundant representations account for variance in social behavior.
- 29 April 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 37 (2) , 145-146
Massively representational minds are not always driven by goals, conscious or otherwise
The language of conscious and unconscious goals is rooted in a folk-taxonomy that is likely to inhibit progress in cognitive science. Severing the commitment to this taxonomy would allow Huang & Bargh (H&B) to consider a wider variety of representational forms with motivational force and to entertain the intriguing possibility that variations in the number of active-but-redundant representations account for variance in social behavior.
- 24 December 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 256-258
Conclusion
This chapter briefly summarizes the main conclusions of the book. It lays out the core elements of the macrocognitive approach to collective mentality, and serves as a reminder that collective mentality is likely to be rare, and where it arises, quite minimal. These arguments are then briefly situated within a broader set of claims about social ontology and social epistemology.
- 24 December 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 256-258
Conclusion
This chapter briefly summarizes the main conclusions of the book. It lays out the core elements of the macrocognitive approach to collective mentality, and serves as a reminder that collective mentality is likely to be rare, and where it arises, quite minimal. These arguments are then briefly situated within a broader set of claims about social ontology and social epistemology.