Matthias Hunold
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Matthias Hunold has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ulrich Laitenberger
Telecom ParisTech; Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation
7 shared publications Frank Schlütter
University of Düsseldorf Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economcis (DICE) and Charles River Associates Düsseldorf Germany
2 shared publications- Guillaume Thébaudin2 shared publications
- Reinhold Kesler
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany
2 shared publications Anke Walendzik
1 shared publicationCosima Bauer
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- p. 1-19
Algorithmic price recommendations and collusion: Experimental evidence
This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that recommend collusive pricing strategies. Utilizing a laboratory experiment, we find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment strategy lowers market prices and has a pro-competitive effect. The algorithm that recommends a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy increases the range of market outcomes, including more collusive ones.
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- p. 1-19
Open AccessAlgorithmic price recommendations and collusion: Experimental evidence
This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that recommend collusive pricing strategies. Utilizing a laboratory experiment, we find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment strategy lowers market prices and has a pro-competitive effect. The algorithm that recommends a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy increases the range of market outcomes, including more collusive ones.
- Open Access
- 16 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Foreclosure and Profit Shifting With Partial Vertical Ownership
We demonstrate that the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profit from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but may have significant influence over the target's strategy. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.
- 16 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Open AccessForeclosure and Profit Shifting With Partial Vertical Ownership
We demonstrate that the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profit from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but may have significant influence over the target's strategy. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.
- Open Access
- 14 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 34 (1) , 102-138
Supply contracts under partial forward ownership
With forward ownership, an upstream supplier internalizes the effect of its supply contracts on the downstream firms, which is so far understood to decrease prices. We show that, instead, downstream prices generally increase if firms use two‐part tariffs. The price‐increasing effect of forward ownership occurs with both observable and secret two‐part tariffs, albeit for different economic reasons. The results arise under both quantity and price competition as well as for different belief refinements. Partial forward ownership can be more profitable and more harmful for consumers than a full vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream firm.
- 14 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 34 (1) , 102-138
Open AccessSupply contracts under partial forward ownership
With forward ownership, an upstream supplier internalizes the effect of its supply contracts on the downstream firms, which is so far understood to decrease prices. We show that, instead, downstream prices generally increase if firms use two‐part tariffs. The price‐increasing effect of forward ownership occurs with both observable and secret two‐part tariffs, albeit for different economic reasons. The results arise under both quantity and price competition as well as for different belief refinements. Partial forward ownership can be more profitable and more harmful for consumers than a full vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream firm.
- 15 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 20 (4) , 353-395
Vertical integration of platforms and product prominence
- 15 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 20 (4) , 353-395
Vertical integration of platforms and product prominence
- Open Access
- 3 June 2022
- Published by HAL
Bye-box: An Analysis of Non-Promotion on the Amazon Marketplace 03.06.2022
We study seller and product recommendations of the hybrid e-commerce platform Amazon. Using web-scraped data, we find that Amazon makes the visibility of offers of third-party suppliers in the "buybox" dependent on prices on competing marketplaces like Walmart and eBay. Amazon's own offers are visible regardless of their competitiveness. We find that the absence of seller recommendations makes recommendations to related products more effective and Amazon tends to steer consumers in these situations more often to products it sells itself. We discuss that this behavior is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of an independent marketplace operator.
- 3 June 2022
- Published by HAL
Open AccessBye-box: An Analysis of Non-Promotion on the Amazon Marketplace 03.06.2022
We study seller and product recommendations of the hybrid e-commerce platform Amazon. Using web-scraped data, we find that Amazon makes the visibility of offers of third-party suppliers in the "buybox" dependent on prices on competing marketplaces like Walmart and eBay. Amazon's own offers are visible regardless of their competitiveness. We find that the absence of seller recommendations makes recommendations to related products more effective and Amazon tends to steer consumers in these situations more often to products it sells itself. We discuss that this behavior is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of an independent marketplace operator.
- Open Access
Bye-box: An Analysis of Non-Promotion on the Amazon Marketplace 03.06.2022
We study seller and product recommendations of the hybrid e-commerce platform Amazon. Using web-scraped data, we find that Amazon makes the visibility of offers of third-party suppliers in the "buybox" dependent on prices on competing marketplaces like Walmart and eBay. Amazon's own offers are visible regardless of their competitiveness. We find that the absence of seller recommendations makes recommendations to related products more effective and Amazon tends to steer consumers in these situations more often to products it sells itself. We discuss that this behavior is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of an independent marketplace operator.
Open AccessBye-box: An Analysis of Non-Promotion on the Amazon Marketplace 03.06.2022
We study seller and product recommendations of the hybrid e-commerce platform Amazon. Using web-scraped data, we find that Amazon makes the visibility of offers of third-party suppliers in the "buybox" dependent on prices on competing marketplaces like Walmart and eBay. Amazon's own offers are visible regardless of their competitiveness. We find that the absence of seller recommendations makes recommendations to related products more effective and Amazon tends to steer consumers in these situations more often to products it sells itself. We discuss that this behavior is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of an independent marketplace operator.
- Open Access
- 28 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (1) , 109-145
Supply Chain Innovations and Partial Ownership
When knowledge sharing is non-contractible, we show that competing downstream firms may prefer to help improve an inefficient alternative supply source than help to improve the technology of the efficient actual supplier—even if this is costless. A downstream firm can have incentives to decrease the efficiency of the actual supplier in order to improve its outside options. Non-controlling partial backward ownership can—through the participation of the downstream firm(s) in the upstream profits—align the incentives of the supplier and its competing customers. This improves industry performance while simultaneously benefiting consumers. Partial backward ownership has similar effects as strengthening a downstream firm’s bargaining power and making knowledge sharing contractible.
- 28 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (1) , 109-145
Open AccessSupply Chain Innovations and Partial Ownership
When knowledge sharing is non-contractible, we show that competing downstream firms may prefer to help improve an inefficient alternative supply source than help to improve the technology of the efficient actual supplier—even if this is costless. A downstream firm can have incentives to decrease the efficiency of the actual supplier in order to improve its outside options. Non-controlling partial backward ownership can—through the participation of the downstream firm(s) in the upstream profits—align the incentives of the supplier and its competing customers. This improves industry performance while simultaneously benefiting consumers. Partial backward ownership has similar effects as strengthening a downstream firm’s bargaining power and making knowledge sharing contractible.
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 68 (4) , 737-779
Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence*
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 68 (4) , 737-779
Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence*
- 20 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 70, 102615
Non-Discriminatory Pricing, Partial Backward Ownership, and Entry Deterrence
- 20 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 70, 102615
Non-Discriminatory Pricing, Partial Backward Ownership, and Entry Deterrence
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 39 (1) , 92-116
Rankings of Online Travel Agents, Channel Pricing, and Consumer Protection
We investigate whether online travel agents (OTAs) assign hotels worse positions in their search results if these set lower hotel prices elsewhere.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 39 (1) , 92-116
Rankings of Online Travel Agents, Channel Pricing, and Consumer Protection
We investigate whether online travel agents (OTAs) assign hotels worse positions in their search results if these set lower hotel prices elsewhere.