Hans-Theo Normann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Hans-Theo Normann has a total of 51 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dirk Engelmann
University of London - Royal Holloway - Department of Economics
5 shared publicationsSteffen Huck
University College London - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics
5 shared publicationsWieland Müller
University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics; Tilburg University - Department of Economics
5 shared publications- Alexander K. Koch
University of Aarhus - Department of Economics and Business Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
4 shared publications Mariana Blanco
Universidad del Rosario
4 shared publications- Nikos Nikiforakis
Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 190
The spoils of algorithmic collusion: Profit allocation among asymmetric firms
- 26 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 190
Open AccessThe spoils of algorithmic collusion: Profit allocation among asymmetric firms
- Open Access
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 154, 267-284
Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 154, 267-284
Open AccessInformation unraveling and limited depth of reasoning
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Algorithmic Cooperation
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. These situations are often strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the deter-minants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We run a sequence of computational experiments, accompanied by additional repeated prisoner’s dilemma games played by humans in the lab. We find that the same factors that increase human cooperation largely also determine the cooperation rates of algorithms. However, algorithms tend to play different strategies than humans. Algorithms cooperate less than humans when cooperation is very risky or not incentive-compatible.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAlgorithmic Cooperation
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. These situations are often strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the deter-minants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We run a sequence of computational experiments, accompanied by additional repeated prisoner’s dilemma games played by humans in the lab. We find that the same factors that increase human cooperation largely also determine the cooperation rates of algorithms. However, algorithms tend to play different strategies than humans. Algorithms cooperate less than humans when cooperation is very risky or not incentive-compatible.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Algorithmic Cooperation
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. Often these situations are strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the determinants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We run a sequence of computational experiments, accompanied by additional repeated prisoner's dilemma games played by humans in the lab. We find that the same factors that increase human cooperation largely also determine the cooperation rates of algorithms. However, algorithms tend to play different strategies than humans. Algorithms cooperate less than humans when cooperation is very risky or not incentive compatible.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAlgorithmic Cooperation
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. Often these situations are strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the determinants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We run a sequence of computational experiments, accompanied by additional repeated prisoner's dilemma games played by humans in the lab. We find that the same factors that increase human cooperation largely also determine the cooperation rates of algorithms. However, algorithms tend to play different strategies than humans. Algorithms cooperate less than humans when cooperation is very risky or not incentive compatible.
- Open Access
- 12 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Cooperation in Multiplayer Dilemmas
We analyze multiplayer prisoner's dilemmas in continuous-time experiments. We control for strategic incentives when the number of players changes (that is, we keep constant the payoffs from all defect, all cooperate, and unilateral defection and cooperation). By studying three different prisoner's dilemma variants for various numbers of players, we can disentangle strategic incentives and strategic uncertainty. In a further treatment variation, we allow for the explicit use of mixed strategies. We find that cooperation rates decay in the number of players, suggesting that strategic uncertainty is a prominent driver of cooperation. Strategic incentives also matter, even in treatments with a higher number of players. Allowing for the explicit use of mixed strategies strongly reduces cooperation rates. Strategy frequency estimations suggest that the strategies adopted in larger groups are not so dissimilar from those in two-player experiments. At an aggregate level, we find that proportional tit-for-tat well explains cooperation decisions.
- 12 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCooperation in Multiplayer Dilemmas
We analyze multiplayer prisoner's dilemmas in continuous-time experiments. We control for strategic incentives when the number of players changes (that is, we keep constant the payoffs from all defect, all cooperate, and unilateral defection and cooperation). By studying three different prisoner's dilemma variants for various numbers of players, we can disentangle strategic incentives and strategic uncertainty. In a further treatment variation, we allow for the explicit use of mixed strategies. We find that cooperation rates decay in the number of players, suggesting that strategic uncertainty is a prominent driver of cooperation. Strategic incentives also matter, even in treatments with a higher number of players. Allowing for the explicit use of mixed strategies strongly reduces cooperation rates. Strategy frequency estimations suggest that the strategies adopted in larger groups are not so dissimilar from those in two-player experiments. At an aggregate level, we find that proportional tit-for-tat well explains cooperation decisions.
- 23 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 152
Human-algorithm interaction: Algorithmic pricing in hybrid laboratory markets
- 23 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 152
Human-algorithm interaction: Algorithmic pricing in hybrid laboratory markets
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 158, 367-378
How much priority bonus should be given to registered organ donors? An experimental analysis
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 158, 367-378
How much priority bonus should be given to registered organ donors? An experimental analysis
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 111, 360-379
Collusion and bargaining in asymmetric Cournot duopoly—An experiment
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 111, 360-379
Collusion and bargaining in asymmetric Cournot duopoly—An experiment
- 19 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 121 (4) , 1705-1727
Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*
We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.
- 19 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 121 (4) , 1705-1727
Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*
We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 85 (1) , 255-275
Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence — experimental evidence
Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: When a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra‐competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run n‐firm Cournot experiments with written cheap‐talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to talk. We conduct this comparison for two, four, and six firms. We find that two firms indeed find it easier to collude tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain from communication increases with the number of firms, at a decreasing rate.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 85 (1) , 255-275
Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence — experimental evidence
Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: When a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra‐competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run n‐firm Cournot experiments with written cheap‐talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to talk. We conduct this comparison for two, four, and six firms. We find that two firms indeed find it easier to collude tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain from communication increases with the number of firms, at a decreasing rate.