Walter Beckert

We study the health impact of food and beverage price promotion strategies—multi‐buy offers and price discounts, typically biased toward unhealthy product categories—in British consumer retail. We are the first to employ econometric models from the marketing literature to analyze the impact of price promotions with a focus on population health. Our dynamic, reduced form demand model incorporates endogenous inventory (stock piling), consumption rates imputed from repeat purchases and allows for unobserved household heterogeneity. We find that removing price discounts is more effective for reducing purchase volume compared to removing multi‐buy offers for 10 out of 12 food and drink groups, particularly those products for which price reduction is more common than multibuy. We find that price promotions induce consumption—and waste –through behavioral effects, associated with increased household inventory (stockpiling).

This paper studies regulatory policy interventions aimed at protecting sticky consumers who are exposed to exploitation. We model heterogeneous consumer switching costs alongside asymmetric market shares. This setting encompasses many markets in which established firms are challenged by new entrants. We identify circumstances under which such interventions can be counterproductive, both with regard to the stated consumer protection objective and the complementary aim to promote competition.

This paper studies patient choice of provider following government reforms in the 2000s, which allowed for‐profit surgical centers to compete with existing public National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in England. For‐profit providers offer significant benefits, notably shorter waiting times. We estimate the extent to which different types of patients benefit from the reforms, and we investigate mechanisms that cause differential benefits. Our counterfactual simulations show that, in terms of the value of access, entry of for‐profit providers benefitted the richest patients twice as much as the poorest, and white patients six times as much as ethnic minority patients. Half of these differences is explained by healthcare geography and patient health, while primary care referral practice plays a lesser, though non‐negligible role. We also show that, with capitated reimbursement, different compositions of patient risks between for‐profit surgical centers and existing public hospitals put public hospitals at a competitive disadvantage.

We investigate the consequences of discreteness in the assignment variable in regression-discontinuity designs for cases where the outcome variable is itself discrete. We find that constructing confidence intervals that have the correct level of coverage in these cases is sensitive to the assumed distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Since local linear estimators are improperly centered, a smaller variance for unobserved heterogeneity in discrete outcomes actually requires larger confidence intervals, since standard confidence intervals become narrower around a biased estimator, leading to a higher-than-nominal false positive rate. We provide a method for mapping structural assumptions regarding the distribution and variance of unobserved heterogeneity to the construction of "honest" confidence intervals that have the correct level of coverage. An application to retirement behavior reveals that the spike in retirement at age 62 in the United States can be reconciled with a wider range of values for the variance of unobserved heterogeneity (due to reservation wages or offers) than the spike at age 65.