Xiu-Deng Zheng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Xiu-Deng Zheng has a total of 105 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yi Tao
Chinese Academy of Sciences
31 shared publications Cong Li
11 shared publicationsYi Tao
State Key Laboratory of Animal Biodiversity Conservation and Integrated Pest Management, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
9 shared publicationsTian-Jiao Feng
State Key Laboratory of Animal Biodiversity Conservation and Integrated Pest Management, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
8 shared publications- Ross Cressman
Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
5 shared publications - Sabin Lessard
Département de Mathématiques et de Statistique, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Quebec H3C 3J7, Canada
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 9 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Nature
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-22
Kin Selection Underpins Family Dynamics in Rural China
- 9 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Nature
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-22
Kin Selection Underpins Family Dynamics in Rural China
- 2 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 686
Impact of uncertain payoffs on evolution of cooperation in TFT-AllD game based on imitation dynamics
- 2 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 686
Impact of uncertain payoffs on evolution of cooperation in TFT-AllD game based on imitation dynamics
- Open Access
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Global Science Press in CSIAM Transactions on Life Sciences
Evolutionary Stability in Stochastic Environments
Evolutionary stability (or evolutionarily stable strategy) is the core concept of evolutionary game theory. Although evolutionary game theory has achieved great success in evolutionary biology, economics and social science, etc. over the past forty years, how to understand the impact of environmental stochastic fluctuations on the evolutionary stability is still one of the most challenging issues in evolutionary game theory. This paper mainly introduces the recent advances in the study of stochastic evolutionary stability and stochastic Nash equilibrium within the framework of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. These studies may provide a possible way to better understand the complexity of evolutionary game dynamics in real world situations.
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Global Science Press in CSIAM Transactions on Life Sciences
Open AccessEvolutionary Stability in Stochastic Environments
Evolutionary stability (or evolutionarily stable strategy) is the core concept of evolutionary game theory. Although evolutionary game theory has achieved great success in evolutionary biology, economics and social science, etc. over the past forty years, how to understand the impact of environmental stochastic fluctuations on the evolutionary stability is still one of the most challenging issues in evolutionary game theory. This paper mainly introduces the recent advances in the study of stochastic evolutionary stability and stochastic Nash equilibrium within the framework of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. These studies may provide a possible way to better understand the complexity of evolutionary game dynamics in real world situations.
- 10 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 192
Noise-induced stochastic Nash equilibrium in evolutionary game dynamics
- 10 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 192
Noise-induced stochastic Nash equilibrium in evolutionary game dynamics
- 19 August 2024
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 110 (2) , 024211
Impact of environmental stochastic fluctuations on the evolutionary stability of imitation dynamics
To show the impact of environmental noise on imitation dynamics, the stochastic stability and stochastic evolutionary stability of a discrete-time imitation dynamics with random payoffs are studied in this paper. Based on the stochastic local stability of fixation states and constant interior equilibria in a two-phenotype model, we extend the concept of stochastic evolutionary stability to the stochastic imitation dynamics, which is defined as a strategy such that, if all the members of the population adopt it, then the probability for any mutant strategy to invade the population successfully under the influence of natural selection is arbitrarily low. Our main results show clearly that the stochastic evolutionary stability of the system depends only on the properties of the mean matrix of the random payoff matrix and is independent of the randomness of the random payoff matrix. Moreover, as two examples, we show also that under the framework of stochastic imitation dynamics, the noise intensity affects the evolution of cooperative behavior in a stochastic prisoner's dilemma game and the system's nonlinear dynamic behavior.
- 19 August 2024
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 110 (2) , 024211
Impact of environmental stochastic fluctuations on the evolutionary stability of imitation dynamics
To show the impact of environmental noise on imitation dynamics, the stochastic stability and stochastic evolutionary stability of a discrete-time imitation dynamics with random payoffs are studied in this paper. Based on the stochastic local stability of fixation states and constant interior equilibria in a two-phenotype model, we extend the concept of stochastic evolutionary stability to the stochastic imitation dynamics, which is defined as a strategy such that, if all the members of the population adopt it, then the probability for any mutant strategy to invade the population successfully under the influence of natural selection is arbitrarily low. Our main results show clearly that the stochastic evolutionary stability of the system depends only on the properties of the mean matrix of the random payoff matrix and is independent of the randomness of the random payoff matrix. Moreover, as two examples, we show also that under the framework of stochastic imitation dynamics, the noise intensity affects the evolution of cooperative behavior in a stochastic prisoner's dilemma game and the system's nonlinear dynamic behavior.
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in BioSystems
- Vol. 244, 105282
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation coupled with ecological feedback compensation
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in BioSystems
- Vol. 244, 105282
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation coupled with ecological feedback compensation
- 12 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 570, 111524
Weak selection and stochastic evolutionary stability in a stochastic replicator dynamics
- 12 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 570, 111524
Weak selection and stochastic evolutionary stability in a stochastic replicator dynamics
- 12 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 438
Noise-induced sustainability of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game
- 12 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 438
Noise-induced sustainability of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game
- 15 April 2022
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 105 (4) , 044403
Stochastic replicator dynamics and evolutionary stability
To develop the concept of evolutionary stability in a stochastic environment, we investigate the continuous-time dynamics of a two-phenotype linear evolutionary game with generally correlated random payoffs in pairwise interactions. By using the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization procedure and Itô's formula, we deduce a stochastic differential equation for the phenotype frequencies that extends the replicator equation, called the stochastic replicator equation. We give conditions for stochastic stability of a fixation state or a constant interior equilibrium point with respect to the stochastic dynamics of the two phenotypes. We show that, if a fixation state is stochastically stable, then the pure strategy corresponding to this fixation state must be stochastically evolutionarily stable with respect to mixed strategies. However, this is not the case for a mixed strategy that corresponds to a stochastically stable constant interior equilibrium point with respect to the two phenotypes.
- 15 April 2022
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 105 (4) , 044403
Stochastic replicator dynamics and evolutionary stability
To develop the concept of evolutionary stability in a stochastic environment, we investigate the continuous-time dynamics of a two-phenotype linear evolutionary game with generally correlated random payoffs in pairwise interactions. By using the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization procedure and Itô's formula, we deduce a stochastic differential equation for the phenotype frequencies that extends the replicator equation, called the stochastic replicator equation. We give conditions for stochastic stability of a fixation state or a constant interior equilibrium point with respect to the stochastic dynamics of the two phenotypes. We show that, if a fixation state is stochastically stable, then the pure strategy corresponding to this fixation state must be stochastically evolutionarily stable with respect to mixed strategies. However, this is not the case for a mixed strategy that corresponds to a stochastically stable constant interior equilibrium point with respect to the two phenotypes.
- 14 March 2022
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 105 (3) , 034303
Stochastic evolutionary stability in matrix games with random payoffs
Evolutionary game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy have been not only extensively developed and successfully applied to explain the evolution of animal behavior, but also widely used in economics and social sciences. Recently, in order to reveal the stochastic dynamical properties of evolutionary games in randomly fluctuating environments, the concept of stochastic evolutionary stability based on conditions for stochastic local stability for a fixation state was developed in the context of a symmetric matrix game with two phenotypes and random payoffs in pairwise interactions [Zheng et al., Phys. Rev. E 96, 032414 (2017)]. In this paper, we extend this study to more general situations, namely, multiphenotype symmetric as well as asymmetric matrix games with random payoffs. Conditions for stochastic local stability and stochastic evolutionary stability are established. Conditions for a fixation state to be stochastically unstable and almost everywhere stochastically unstable are distinguished in a multiphenotype setting according to the initial population state. Our results provide some alternative perspective and a more general theoretical framework for a better understanding of the evolution of animal behavior in a stochastic environment.
- 14 March 2022
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 105 (3) , 034303
Stochastic evolutionary stability in matrix games with random payoffs
Evolutionary game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy have been not only extensively developed and successfully applied to explain the evolution of animal behavior, but also widely used in economics and social sciences. Recently, in order to reveal the stochastic dynamical properties of evolutionary games in randomly fluctuating environments, the concept of stochastic evolutionary stability based on conditions for stochastic local stability for a fixation state was developed in the context of a symmetric matrix game with two phenotypes and random payoffs in pairwise interactions [Zheng et al., Phys. Rev. E 96, 032414 (2017)]. In this paper, we extend this study to more general situations, namely, multiphenotype symmetric as well as asymmetric matrix games with random payoffs. Conditions for stochastic local stability and stochastic evolutionary stability are established. Conditions for a fixation state to be stochastically unstable and almost everywhere stochastically unstable are distinguished in a multiphenotype setting according to the initial population state. Our results provide some alternative perspective and a more general theoretical framework for a better understanding of the evolution of animal behavior in a stochastic environment.