TCTheodore E. Christensen

Theodore E. Christensen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Theodore E. Christensen has a total of 87 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • A Decade Later: The Changing Landscape of Non-GAAP Reporting

    by Jason A. Ashby, Theodore E. Christensen, Lynn H. Davis, Benjamin C. Whipple

    SYNOPSIS: We provide evidence on recent trends in managers’ non-GAAP reporting. First, the rapid increase in non-GAAP earnings disclosures identified in prior research has leveled off in recent years. Moreover, managers are more likely to provide these non-GAAP metrics in concert with analysts, and instances in which only managers report non-GAAP metrics have declined. Managers exclude both nonrecurring and recurring items more frequently in the recent decade, and the magnitude of their recurring item exclusions has dramatically increased. Finally, we find that exclusion persistence has increased in the recent decade and is significant, regardless of whether or not analysts corroborate managers’ metrics. We also find that the lowest quality non-GAAP reporting still occurs when managers report non-GAAP earnings while analysts do not. It is important to recognize, however, that non-GAAP earnings remain considerably more persistent than non-GAAP exclusions, suggesting that non-GAAP earnings still provide meaningful information about core performance. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M48.

  • Open Access

    Do we Really know What we Think we know about Investors' Reliance on GAAP and Non-GAAP Earnings?

    by Theodore E. Christensen, Melissa Fay Lewis-Western, Collin Rabe, Hongyu (Jack) Wang

    Prior research concludes that investors perceive non-GAAP earnings to be more informative than GAAP earnings. We argue that this interpretation is too broad because, following Regulation G, investors simultaneously observe GAAP earnings, non-GAAP earnings, and the reconciliation between them. Consequently, commonly used empirical models identify investors’ responses to the joint information conveyed by these disclosures, rather than a general preference for one earnings measure viewed in isolation. Because these measures are exact linear combinations of one another, the estimated coefficients from relevant regression models yield specific, limited interpretations. We clarify these interpretations by defining three distinct effects—the “included income effect,” the “excluded income effect,” and the “composition effect”—and demonstrate how alternative regression specifications provide equivalent economic inferences, conditional on the appropriate treatment of outlier observations. We find that both investors and analysts respond to all three effects, with the composition effect providing a broad measure of the decision-usefulness of non-GAAP disclosures. These responses have remained remarkably stable over the past two decades despite substantial growth in non-GAAP reporting, yet vary considerably across firms. Our results refine the interpretation of prior research on investor responses to non-GAAP disclosures and inform future research and ongoing policy discussions regarding non-GAAP reporting.

  • The future performance implications of Non-GAAP firms’ investments

    by Minkwan Ahn, Theodore E. Christensen, Ryan G. Johnson, Melissa F. Lewis-Western


  • Open Access

    The Future Performance Implications of Non-GAAP Firms’ Investments

    by Minkwan Ahn, Theodore E. Christensen, Ryan G. Johnson, Melissa Fay Lewis-Western

    We investigate whether consistently reporting non-GAAP performance metrics is associated with investment efficiency. Prior research finds a positive association between firms’ disclosure of non-GAAP performance measures and investment levels, concluding that non-GAAP reporting can lead to overinvestment. We corroborate this positive association, but additional tests are not consistent with the conclusion that non-GAAP reporting motivates inefficient overinvestment. Specifically, we explore the relation between investment and future cash flows as a proxy for the realization of investments in positive net present value projects. We find that the investments of firms that consistently report non-GAAP metrics are associated with higher future operating cash flows, which is inconsistent with overinvestment. We observe similar positive associations in a myriad of specifications and performance horizons, and also using future returns and earnings to capture future performance. Our evidence is not consistent with arguments that the higher investment levels of firms reporting non-GAAP performance metrics are indicative of negative performance consequences. Given the prevalence of non-GAAP reporting and the SEC’s ongoing concern with the consequences of non-GAAP disclosure, our analyses offer timely evidence relevant to this important discussion.

  • Data visualization in 10-K filings

    by Theodore E. Christensen, Karson E. Fronk, Joshua A. Lee, Karen K. Nelson


  • Explaining accruals quality over time

    by Theodore E. Christensen, Jenna D'ADduzio, Karen K. Nelson


  • Comparing Non-GAAP EPS in Earnings Announcements and Proxy Statements

    by Dirk E. Black, Ervin L. Black, Theodore E. Christensen, Kurt H. Gee

    We compare non-GAAP earnings per share (EPS) in firms’ annual earnings announcements and proxy statements using hand-collected data from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings. We find that proxies for capital market incentives (contracting incentives) are more highly associated with firms’ disclosure of non-GAAP EPS in annual earnings announcements (proxy statements). However, we find systematic differences in the properties of firms’ non-GAAP earnings and exclusions depending on whether they disclose non-GAAP EPS in both the earnings announcement and the proxy statement. When firms disclose non-GAAP EPS in both documents, we find that non-GAAP EPS is more useful for assessing firm value. Specifically, these firms are more likely to: (1) exclude nonrecurring items, (2) exclude less persistent earnings components, and (3) provide less aggressive non-GAAP EPS. Our results suggest that non-GAAP EPS is higher in quality for investors when disclosed in both the annual earnings announcement and the proxy statement. We provide some of the first large-sample evidence consistent with the use of non-GAAP EPS metrics in both financial reporting and compensation contracting.This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.


  • Accruals earnings management proxies: Prudent business decisions or earnings manipulation?

    by Theodore E. Christensen, Adrienna Huffman, Melissa F. Lewis‐Western, Rachel Scott

    Over the last 5 years, the top accounting journals have published 388 articles that incorporate an empirical proxy for accruals‐based earnings management. Researchers use these proxies to measure diverse managerial activities that represent fundamentally different constructs (from beneficial earnings management at one end of the spectrum to earnings manipulation at the other). We present a simple framework that defines the specific construct of “earnings manipulation” and places it within the context of the broader concept of “earnings management.” At the construct level, one distinguishing characteristic of earnings manipulation is that accruals reversals cause future earnings to be lower than earnings would have been absent the manipulation. We explore the extent to which increases in 11 common earnings management proxies—that account for 88% of the research published in the last 5 years—result in future earnings that are lower than the firm's average earnings to determine which measures are more likely to reflect earnings manipulation. Our results indicate substantial variation across earnings management proxies in this characteristic with some (including the most commonly used proxies) consistently exhibiting a positive association with future performance, suggesting that they generally do not reflect earnings manipulation. Supplemental analyses that consider earnings persistence and performance of the proxies across firm life‐cycle stages yield similar inferences. Finally, we propose two simple empirical solutions that researchers can implement to capture the construct of earnings manipulation.


  • Can short sellers constrain aggressive non-GAAP reporting?

    by Nilabhra Bhattacharya, Theodore E. Christensen, Qunfeng Liao, Bo Ouyang


  • The Genesis of Voluntary Disclosure: An Analysis of Firms’ First Earnings Guidance

    by Kristian D. Allee, Theodore E. Christensen, Bryan S. Graden, Kenneth J. Merkley

    We investigate a firm’s decision to initiate earnings guidance during its first year as a public company following its initial public offering (IPO), which we label “early guidance.” Using a sample of firms with IPOs between 2001 and 2010, we find that almost 60% provide early guidance and that only one-third of the firms that do not provide guidance during the first year subsequently decide to guide. Consistent with the importance of liquidity incentives following the IPO, we find that firms are significantly more likely to provide early guidance when their IPOs are backed by venture capital or private equity investors. Our results indicate that firms with higher-quality IPO information are more likely to provide early earnings guidance. We also find that early guidance has significant implications for future disclosure choices. Firms that guide soon after the IPO are significantly more likely to guide again and to provide regular future guidance (i.e., they establish a regular guidance policy). Finally, we find evidence suggesting that the credibility of initial guidance is lower than that of subsequent guidance, and subsequent guidance credibility relates to both the length of firms’ guidance history and the accuracy of their initial guidance disclosures.This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.