Baofeng Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Baofeng Zhang has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lin Wei
School of International Economics and Trade, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing, China
3 shared publications Weiguo Fang
School of Economics and Management Beihang University Beijing 100191 China
3 shared publications- Shaofu Du
University of Science and Technology of China
2 shared publications - Weiguo Fang
School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing, China
2 shared publications Alexandre Dolgui
LS2N–CNRS, IMT Atlantique Nantes 44300 France
1 shared publication- Chen Yang
School of Economics and Management Beihang University Beijing 100083 China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 290
Dual channel or not? Implication of free-riding in altering consumer channel preferences
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 290
Dual channel or not? Implication of free-riding in altering consumer channel preferences
- 4 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 33 (1) , 415-456
Combat counterfeits effectively or not? Encroachment and financing strategies with production disruption risk
Counterfeits spur brand‐name supply chain to engage in manufacturer encroachment. Financial constraint disturbs encroachment strategies, especially with disruption risks. Developing an analytical model investigates how supply chain finance with production disruption risk affects encroachment strategy and its efficacy in combating counterfeits. We obtain optimal strategies for three scenarios: rich, moderately poor, and poor brand‐name supply chains. Encroachment strategies effectively combat counterfeits in rich and moderately poor brand‐name supply chains. The production disruption risk reduces the manufacturer's willingness to encroach, regardless of financial positions. Relative to rich brand‐name supply chains with encroachment, trade credit with risk‐free bank credit increases the manufacturer encroachment's likelihood, while it with costly bank credit reduces this likelihood. Financial cooperation through trade credit in moderately poor brand‐name supply chains effectively curbs counterfeiting. Even if bank credits are perfectly competitive, optimal strategies in poor brand‐name supply chains with encroachment depend on initial capitals, violating classical Modigliani‐Miller (M&M) theory.
- 4 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 33 (1) , 415-456
Combat counterfeits effectively or not? Encroachment and financing strategies with production disruption risk
Counterfeits spur brand‐name supply chain to engage in manufacturer encroachment. Financial constraint disturbs encroachment strategies, especially with disruption risks. Developing an analytical model investigates how supply chain finance with production disruption risk affects encroachment strategy and its efficacy in combating counterfeits. We obtain optimal strategies for three scenarios: rich, moderately poor, and poor brand‐name supply chains. Encroachment strategies effectively combat counterfeits in rich and moderately poor brand‐name supply chains. The production disruption risk reduces the manufacturer's willingness to encroach, regardless of financial positions. Relative to rich brand‐name supply chains with encroachment, trade credit with risk‐free bank credit increases the manufacturer encroachment's likelihood, while it with costly bank credit reduces this likelihood. Financial cooperation through trade credit in moderately poor brand‐name supply chains effectively curbs counterfeiting. Even if bank credits are perfectly competitive, optimal strategies in poor brand‐name supply chains with encroachment depend on initial capitals, violating classical Modigliani‐Miller (M&M) theory.
- 5 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 320 (2) , 343-357
Agency selling or reselling: The role of cause marketing
- 5 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 320 (2) , 343-357
Agency selling or reselling: The role of cause marketing
- 11 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 29 (6) , 3681-3711
Stackelberg equilibrium strategies and coordination of a low‐carbon supply chain with a risk‐averse retailer
This paper examines the impact of retailer's risk aversion on the equilibrium strategies and channel coordination in the presence of consumers’ low‐carbon preference. The stochastic market demand is dependent on the carbon reduction level, advertisement for low‐carbon products and their interplay. The mean‐CVaR criterion is adopted to measure the risk‐averse retailer's objective. The Stackelberg equilibrium carbon reduction level, order quantity and advertising level are derived. We find that the manufacturer's investment in carbon reduction can encourage the retailer to put more effort into advertising and increase the order quantity. All of the carbon reduction levels, advertising levels, and order quantity decrease when the retailer becomes conservative. An option and cost‐sharing combined contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. We prove that if the trade‐off coefficient (the weight that the retailer puts on expected profit) is higher than a threshold, the supply chain can achieve coordination even though the retailer's degree of risk aversion is extremely high. If the trade‐off coefficient is below the threshold, the supply chain can be coordinated only if the retailer's degree of risk aversion is not very high. The retailer's risk attitude and option price play significant roles in the profit allocation of the supply chain under coordination. Our numerical examples show that the retailer benefits from a higher degree of risk aversion or a higher option price under coordination.
- 11 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 29 (6) , 3681-3711
Stackelberg equilibrium strategies and coordination of a low‐carbon supply chain with a risk‐averse retailer
This paper examines the impact of retailer's risk aversion on the equilibrium strategies and channel coordination in the presence of consumers’ low‐carbon preference. The stochastic market demand is dependent on the carbon reduction level, advertisement for low‐carbon products and their interplay. The mean‐CVaR criterion is adopted to measure the risk‐averse retailer's objective. The Stackelberg equilibrium carbon reduction level, order quantity and advertising level are derived. We find that the manufacturer's investment in carbon reduction can encourage the retailer to put more effort into advertising and increase the order quantity. All of the carbon reduction levels, advertising levels, and order quantity decrease when the retailer becomes conservative. An option and cost‐sharing combined contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. We prove that if the trade‐off coefficient (the weight that the retailer puts on expected profit) is higher than a threshold, the supply chain can achieve coordination even though the retailer's degree of risk aversion is extremely high. If the trade‐off coefficient is below the threshold, the supply chain can be coordinated only if the retailer's degree of risk aversion is not very high. The retailer's risk attitude and option price play significant roles in the profit allocation of the supply chain under coordination. Our numerical examples show that the retailer benefits from a higher degree of risk aversion or a higher option price under coordination.
- 25 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
- Vol. 159
By-state fairness in selling to the newsvendor
- 25 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
- Vol. 159
By-state fairness in selling to the newsvendor
- 23 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 29 (3) , 1868-1896
Impacts of barter exchange and decision biases in a two‐level supply chain under pull contract
Barter exchange has been growingly popular in business for its advantage to liquidate excessive inventory. While barter exchange is relevant to supply chain management, little is known about its impacts on the supply chain contracting and efficiency. This study explores these issues in a two‐level supply chain under a wholesale‐price pull contract, where the manufacturer undertakes the inventory risk. Stackelberg equilibriums are derived when the two supply chain agents are rational and biased, respectively. We show that barter exchange encourages the retailer to provide a lower wholesale price to the manufacturer and induces the manufacturer to produce more. Barter exchange benefits the retailer and the supply chain system, thereby improving the supply chain efficiency, but may harm the manufacturer. We further examine the impacts of the supply chain agents' decision biases in barter exchange, where the retailer and the manufacturer may overestimate or underestimate the supply rate of what the retailer needs. When the retailer believes the manufacturer holds the same level of bias, the retailer's overestimation renders it to offer a lower wholesale price, thereby leading the manufacturer to produce less. This finding implies that the retailer's overestimation enhances double marginalization and reduces the supply chain efficiency. The manufacturer's overestimation leads it to produce more. However, when the biased retailer learns the manufacturer's decision bias accurately, the retailer's overestimation brings a higher wholesale price, thereby inducing a higher manufacturer's production quantity and a higher supply chain efficiency. The manufacturer's overestimation induces a lower wholesale price and a higher production quantity.
- 23 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 29 (3) , 1868-1896
Impacts of barter exchange and decision biases in a two‐level supply chain under pull contract
Barter exchange has been growingly popular in business for its advantage to liquidate excessive inventory. While barter exchange is relevant to supply chain management, little is known about its impacts on the supply chain contracting and efficiency. This study explores these issues in a two‐level supply chain under a wholesale‐price pull contract, where the manufacturer undertakes the inventory risk. Stackelberg equilibriums are derived when the two supply chain agents are rational and biased, respectively. We show that barter exchange encourages the retailer to provide a lower wholesale price to the manufacturer and induces the manufacturer to produce more. Barter exchange benefits the retailer and the supply chain system, thereby improving the supply chain efficiency, but may harm the manufacturer. We further examine the impacts of the supply chain agents' decision biases in barter exchange, where the retailer and the manufacturer may overestimate or underestimate the supply rate of what the retailer needs. When the retailer believes the manufacturer holds the same level of bias, the retailer's overestimation renders it to offer a lower wholesale price, thereby leading the manufacturer to produce less. This finding implies that the retailer's overestimation enhances double marginalization and reduces the supply chain efficiency. The manufacturer's overestimation leads it to produce more. However, when the biased retailer learns the manufacturer's decision bias accurately, the retailer's overestimation brings a higher wholesale price, thereby inducing a higher manufacturer's production quantity and a higher supply chain efficiency. The manufacturer's overestimation induces a lower wholesale price and a higher production quantity.
- 13 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 28 (5) , 2548-2580
Financing a risk‐averse manufacturer in a pull contract: early payment versus retailer investment
This work focuses on a two‐level supply chain with a pull contract, where the retailer acts as a leader and the capital‐constrained manufacturer as a follower who undertakes the inventory risk. In the presence of demand uncertainty, the manufacturer is risk‐averse, and the risk is measured by the semideviation method. To finance the capital‐constrained manufacturer, we investigate two collaborative supply chain finance schemes: retailer's early payment (EP) financing and retailer investment (RI) financing. We characterize the manufacturer's optimal production quantity and the retailer's wholesale price under EP and RI. Under the two financing schemes, the manufacturer obtains a higher utility when his risk aversion degree is moderate, while the retailer is worse off in the presence of a higher risk aversion degree. Under RI, both optimal production quantity and wholesale price decrease in the proportion of dividends shared by the manufacturer. For the manufacturer (or the retailer or the total supply chain), we derive the associated parameter region in which RI achieves a higher performance than EP. When RI and EP are available, there exists a common parameter region in which RI is preferred by the manufacturer, retailer, and total supply chain.
- 13 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 28 (5) , 2548-2580
Financing a risk‐averse manufacturer in a pull contract: early payment versus retailer investment
This work focuses on a two‐level supply chain with a pull contract, where the retailer acts as a leader and the capital‐constrained manufacturer as a follower who undertakes the inventory risk. In the presence of demand uncertainty, the manufacturer is risk‐averse, and the risk is measured by the semideviation method. To finance the capital‐constrained manufacturer, we investigate two collaborative supply chain finance schemes: retailer's early payment (EP) financing and retailer investment (RI) financing. We characterize the manufacturer's optimal production quantity and the retailer's wholesale price under EP and RI. Under the two financing schemes, the manufacturer obtains a higher utility when his risk aversion degree is moderate, while the retailer is worse off in the presence of a higher risk aversion degree. Under RI, both optimal production quantity and wholesale price decrease in the proportion of dividends shared by the manufacturer. For the manufacturer (or the retailer or the total supply chain), we derive the associated parameter region in which RI achieves a higher performance than EP. When RI and EP are available, there exists a common parameter region in which RI is preferred by the manufacturer, retailer, and total supply chain.
- 15 April 2020
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Industrial Management & Data Systems
- Vol. 120 (5) , 1003-1038
Inventory financing a risk-averse newsvendor with strategic default
Purpose: The paper aims to explore the optimal strategies of inventory financing when the risk-averse retailer has different objectives, in the presence of multi-risk, i.e. demand risk, non-operational risk and retailer's strategic default risk.Design/methodology/approach: This paper develops an inventory financing model consisting of a bank and a risk-averse retailer with strategic default. This paper considers two scenarios, i.e. the capital-constrained retailer cares about its profit or firm value. In the first scenario, the bank acts as a Stackelberg leader determining its interest rate, and the retailer acts as a follower determining its pledged quantity. In the second one, the bank capital market is perfectly competitive. Lagrange multiplier method is adopted to solve the optimization.Findings: The optimal strategies in inventory financing scheme in two scenarios are derived. Only when the initial stock is relatively high, the retailer pledges part of the initial stock. Retailer's risk aversion reduces its pledged quantity and performance. The strategic default reduces its profit. When it is relatively high, the bank refuses to offer the loan.Practical implications: Analytical inventory and financing strategies are specified to help retailers and banks to better understand the interaction of finance and operations management and to better respond to multi-risk.Originality/value: New results and managerial insights are derived by incorporating partially endogenous strategic default and risk aversion into inventory financing, which enriches the interfaces of operations management and finance.
- 15 April 2020
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Industrial Management & Data Systems
- Vol. 120 (5) , 1003-1038
Inventory financing a risk-averse newsvendor with strategic default
Purpose: The paper aims to explore the optimal strategies of inventory financing when the risk-averse retailer has different objectives, in the presence of multi-risk, i.e. demand risk, non-operational risk and retailer's strategic default risk.Design/methodology/approach: This paper develops an inventory financing model consisting of a bank and a risk-averse retailer with strategic default. This paper considers two scenarios, i.e. the capital-constrained retailer cares about its profit or firm value. In the first scenario, the bank acts as a Stackelberg leader determining its interest rate, and the retailer acts as a follower determining its pledged quantity. In the second one, the bank capital market is perfectly competitive. Lagrange multiplier method is adopted to solve the optimization.Findings: The optimal strategies in inventory financing scheme in two scenarios are derived. Only when the initial stock is relatively high, the retailer pledges part of the initial stock. Retailer's risk aversion reduces its pledged quantity and performance. The strategic default reduces its profit. When it is relatively high, the bank refuses to offer the loan.Practical implications: Analytical inventory and financing strategies are specified to help retailers and banks to better understand the interaction of finance and operations management and to better respond to multi-risk.Originality/value: New results and managerial insights are derived by incorporating partially endogenous strategic default and risk aversion into inventory financing, which enriches the interfaces of operations management and finance.
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 138
Service and pricing strategies with competition and cooperation in a dual-channel supply chain with demand disruption
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 138
Service and pricing strategies with competition and cooperation in a dual-channel supply chain with demand disruption
- 17 February 2018
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 27 (6) , 3079-3103
Option contract strategies with risk‐aversion and emergency purchase
This paper considers a one‐period supply chain consisting of a risk‐averse retailer and a risk‐neutral supplier. As a Stackelberg leader, the supplier produces short life‐cycle products to the retailer and determines the option price. The newsvendor‐like retailer orders call option from the supplier with an emergency order opportunity. The analytical model shows that when the emergency purchase price is low, the risk‐averse retailer's optimal order quantity is less than that of a risk‐neutral retailer and independent of the retail price. It is surprising that when it is moderate or high, the risk‐averse retailer may order less than, equal to, or more than a risk‐neutral one. Computational studies are given to investigate the key parameters on optimal decisions and profits. It shows a risk‐averse retailer may get higher profit than a risk‐neutral one. The retailer benefits from a low emergency purchase price, while it harms the supplier.
- 17 February 2018
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 27 (6) , 3079-3103
Option contract strategies with risk‐aversion and emergency purchase
This paper considers a one‐period supply chain consisting of a risk‐averse retailer and a risk‐neutral supplier. As a Stackelberg leader, the supplier produces short life‐cycle products to the retailer and determines the option price. The newsvendor‐like retailer orders call option from the supplier with an emergency order opportunity. The analytical model shows that when the emergency purchase price is low, the risk‐averse retailer's optimal order quantity is less than that of a risk‐neutral retailer and independent of the retail price. It is surprising that when it is moderate or high, the risk‐averse retailer may order less than, equal to, or more than a risk‐neutral one. Computational studies are given to investigate the key parameters on optimal decisions and profits. It shows a risk‐averse retailer may get higher profit than a risk‐neutral one. The retailer benefits from a low emergency purchase price, while it harms the supplier.