Agnieszka Rusinowska
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Agnieszka Rusinowska has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michel Grabisch
Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne
13 shared publications - René van Den Brink
Department of Economics, VU University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
6 shared publications - Harrie de Swart
Tilburg University
4 shared publications Rudolf Berghammer
3 shared publicationsAhmet Ozkardas
Turgut Özal University
2 shared publications- Antoine Mandel
Université Paris
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Formation of international environmental agreements and payoffallocation
Dealing with climate change requires that all countries engage in costlyefforts to reduce their emissions. Reaching this objective has so far beenelusive because it is in the best interest of each country to let the othersdo the effort and benefit itself from a better environment. The presence ofnegative externalities and strategic behavior have made game theory anatural paradigm to design an international environmental agreement (IEA)that codifies what countries should do. Considering that countries aresovereign and no supranational entity can impose an agreement, a stream ofliterature adopted a noncooperative mode of play to the formation of anenvironmental coalition. On the other hand, as joint optimization of allcountries' payoff leads to the best outcome, cooperative games approach hasalso been proposed to share the cost of climate change. Both approaches havetheir pros and cons.In this paper, we propose a model of coalition formation that combines bothcooperative and noncooperative modes of play. Starting from any givencoalition, we implement a Markov process that shows sequentially whichcountries join or leave the coalition until reaching an absorbing state. Allpossible sequential scenarios are considered and an allocation to the playeris made taking into account individual rationality. An illustration withvulnerable and invulnerable countries to pollution is given.
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFormation of international environmental agreements and payoffallocation
Dealing with climate change requires that all countries engage in costlyefforts to reduce their emissions. Reaching this objective has so far beenelusive because it is in the best interest of each country to let the othersdo the effort and benefit itself from a better environment. The presence ofnegative externalities and strategic behavior have made game theory anatural paradigm to design an international environmental agreement (IEA)that codifies what countries should do. Considering that countries aresovereign and no supranational entity can impose an agreement, a stream ofliterature adopted a noncooperative mode of play to the formation of anenvironmental coalition. On the other hand, as joint optimization of allcountries' payoff leads to the best outcome, cooperative games approach hasalso been proposed to share the cost of climate change. Both approaches havetheir pros and cons.In this paper, we propose a model of coalition formation that combines bothcooperative and noncooperative modes of play. Starting from any givencoalition, we implement a Markov process that shows sequentially whichcountries join or leave the coalition until reaching an absorbing state. Allpossible sequential scenarios are considered and an allocation to the playeris made taking into account individual rationality. An illustration withvulnerable and invulnerable countries to pollution is given.
- Open Access
- 4 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 185
Dynamic network formation with farsighted players and limited capacities
- 4 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 185
Open AccessDynamic network formation with farsighted players and limited capacities
- Open Access
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 1-12
Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Michel Grabisch
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 1-12
Open AccessIntroduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Michel Grabisch
- Open Access
- 16 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 66 (2) , 423-472
Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions
We provide an axiomatic approach to the allocation of responsibility for GHG emissions in supply chains. Considering a set of axioms standardly used in networks and decision theory, and consistent with legal principles underlying responsibility, we show that responsibility measures shall be based on exponential discounting of upstream and downstream emissions. From a network theory perspective, the proposed responsibility measure corresponds to a convex combination of the Bonacich centralities for the upstream and downstream weighted adjacency matrices. Scope 1 emissions, consumption-based accounting and income-based accounting are obtained as particular cases of our approach, which also gives a precise meaning to scope 3 emissions while avoiding double-counting. We apply our approach to the assessment of country-level responsibility for global GHG emissions and to sector-level responsibility in the USA. We examine how the responsibility of countries/sectors varies with the discounting of indirect emissions. We identify three groups of countries/sectors: producers of emissions whose responsibility decreases with the discounting factor, consumers of emissions whose responsibility increases with the discounting factor, and an intermediary group whose responsibility mostly depends on the network position and varies non-monotonically with the discounting factor. Overall, our axiomatic approach provides strong normative foundations for the definition of reporting requirements for indirect emissions and for the allocation of responsibility in claims for climate-related loss and damage.
- 16 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 66 (2) , 423-472
Open AccessNetwork-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions
We provide an axiomatic approach to the allocation of responsibility for GHG emissions in supply chains. Considering a set of axioms standardly used in networks and decision theory, and consistent with legal principles underlying responsibility, we show that responsibility measures shall be based on exponential discounting of upstream and downstream emissions. From a network theory perspective, the proposed responsibility measure corresponds to a convex combination of the Bonacich centralities for the upstream and downstream weighted adjacency matrices. Scope 1 emissions, consumption-based accounting and income-based accounting are obtained as particular cases of our approach, which also gives a precise meaning to scope 3 emissions while avoiding double-counting. We apply our approach to the assessment of country-level responsibility for global GHG emissions and to sector-level responsibility in the USA. We examine how the responsibility of countries/sectors varies with the discounting of indirect emissions. We identify three groups of countries/sectors: producers of emissions whose responsibility decreases with the discounting factor, consumers of emissions whose responsibility increases with the discounting factor, and an intermediary group whose responsibility mostly depends on the network position and varies non-monotonically with the discounting factor. Overall, our axiomatic approach provides strong normative foundations for the definition of reporting requirements for indirect emissions and for the allocation of responsibility in claims for climate-related loss and damage.
- Open Access
- 13 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 359-375
Power in plurality voting games
Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce an equal impact power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players.
- 13 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 99 (1-2) , 359-375
Open AccessPower in plurality voting games
Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce an equal impact power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players.
- Open Access
- 11 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 223
A dynamic analysis of criminal networks
- 11 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 223
Open AccessA dynamic analysis of criminal networks
- Open Access
Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting
We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes’ initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avoid nodes targeted by the opponent. Importantly, although not theoretically relevant, targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the distribution of initial opinions.
Open AccessCompeting for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting
We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes’ initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avoid nodes targeted by the opponent. Importantly, although not theoretically relevant, targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the distribution of initial opinions.
- 12 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 55-73
Binary Opinion Models of Influence and Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks
- 12 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 55-73
Binary Opinion Models of Influence and Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks
- Open Access
- 29 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 319 (2) , 669-677
Degree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks
- 29 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 319 (2) , 669-677
Open AccessDegree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks
- Open Access
- 26 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Network-Based Allocation of Responsibility for GHG-Emissions
We develop a network-based model to assign responsibility for direct and indirect emissions. We introduce a responsibility measure which is based on exponential discounting and takes into account the relative share of responsibility for both upstream and downstream emissions. The responsibility for emission is computed on the basis of the discounted sum of walks for a given node in a given network. It corresponds to a convex combination of the Bonacich centralities for the upstream and downstream weighted adjacency matrices. In view of legal disputes and international negotiations on assigning emissions responsibilities, we apply a normative approach based on the set of appropriate axioms and provide axiomatic foundations for designing liability of GHG-emissions. The responsibility measure is characterized by a set of natural and appealing axioms such as anonymity, monotonicity, additivity, tail-convergence, recursivity and consistency. We support our theoretical results by applying the model to the World Input-Output Database 2016 Release.
- 26 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessNetwork-Based Allocation of Responsibility for GHG-Emissions
We develop a network-based model to assign responsibility for direct and indirect emissions. We introduce a responsibility measure which is based on exponential discounting and takes into account the relative share of responsibility for both upstream and downstream emissions. The responsibility for emission is computed on the basis of the discounted sum of walks for a given node in a given network. It corresponds to a convex combination of the Bonacich centralities for the upstream and downstream weighted adjacency matrices. In view of legal disputes and international negotiations on assigning emissions responsibilities, we apply a normative approach based on the set of appropriate axioms and provide axiomatic foundations for designing liability of GHG-emissions. The responsibility measure is characterized by a set of natural and appealing axioms such as anonymity, monotonicity, additivity, tail-convergence, recursivity and consistency. We support our theoretical results by applying the model to the World Input-Output Database 2016 Release.