Yu-Tzung Chang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yu-Tzung Chang has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yun-Han Chu
Department of Political Science, Institute of Political Science, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
4 shared publications Min-Hua Huang
3 shared publicationsChong-Min Park
1 shared publication- Chun-Tung Kuo
Institute of Health Behaviors and Community Sciences, College of Public Health, National Taiwan University, Taipei; Center for Survey Research, Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
1 shared publication - Darren Liu
West Virginia University
1 shared publication - Duan-Rung Chen
Institute of Health Behaviors and Community Sciences, College of Public Health, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by JMIR Publications Inc. in JMIR Preprints
Managing Public Health with AI in Taiwan: The Roles of National Identity and Privacy Concern in Shaping Public Attitudes (Preprint)
BACKGROUND The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the deployment of AI-driven surveillance systems for public health governance, raising both public health benefits and ethical concerns. In Taiwan’s post-pandemic context, public acceptance of government-deployed AI surveillance systems remains underexplored. OBJECTIVE This study investigates how perceived AI capabilities, privacy concerns, and national identity collectively influence public acceptance of AI surveillance technologies in Taiwan. METHODS We conducted a cross-sectional online survey in August 2024 with 4,899 adults in Taiwan, recruited through both university-affiliated and commercial platforms. The outcome variable was public acceptance of government-deployed surveillance AI systems. Key variables included perceived AI capability (independent variable), privacy concerns (mediator), and national identity (moderator), along with sociodemographic and political covariates. We applied Hayes’ PROCESS macro (Model 15) to test a moderated mediation model. All predictors were mean-centered, and 5,000 bootstrap samples were used to calculate 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. RESULTS Higher perceived AI capability was associated with greater acceptance of government-deployed surveillance systems, both directly and indirectly through reduced privacy concerns. Taiwanese identity moderated this mediation pathway: individuals identifying strongly as Taiwanese exhibited higher acceptance, even when privacy concerns were high. These effects were more pronounced for intrusive AI surveillance technologies (e.g., geolocation, facial recognition) than for non-intrusive ones (e.g., health data analytics). CONCLUSIONS Public support for AI surveillance depends not only on perceived technical capability but also on sociopolitical context and collective identity. To ensure ethical AI governance, trust-building must be grounded in transparency, privacy protection, and public deliberation.
- 2 July 2025
- Published by JMIR Publications Inc. in JMIR Preprints
Open AccessManaging Public Health with AI in Taiwan: The Roles of National Identity and Privacy Concern in Shaping Public Attitudes (Preprint)
BACKGROUND The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the deployment of AI-driven surveillance systems for public health governance, raising both public health benefits and ethical concerns. In Taiwan’s post-pandemic context, public acceptance of government-deployed AI surveillance systems remains underexplored. OBJECTIVE This study investigates how perceived AI capabilities, privacy concerns, and national identity collectively influence public acceptance of AI surveillance technologies in Taiwan. METHODS We conducted a cross-sectional online survey in August 2024 with 4,899 adults in Taiwan, recruited through both university-affiliated and commercial platforms. The outcome variable was public acceptance of government-deployed surveillance AI systems. Key variables included perceived AI capability (independent variable), privacy concerns (mediator), and national identity (moderator), along with sociodemographic and political covariates. We applied Hayes’ PROCESS macro (Model 15) to test a moderated mediation model. All predictors were mean-centered, and 5,000 bootstrap samples were used to calculate 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. RESULTS Higher perceived AI capability was associated with greater acceptance of government-deployed surveillance systems, both directly and indirectly through reduced privacy concerns. Taiwanese identity moderated this mediation pathway: individuals identifying strongly as Taiwanese exhibited higher acceptance, even when privacy concerns were high. These effects were more pronounced for intrusive AI surveillance technologies (e.g., geolocation, facial recognition) than for non-intrusive ones (e.g., health data analytics). CONCLUSIONS Public support for AI surveillance depends not only on perceived technical capability but also on sociopolitical context and collective identity. To ensure ethical AI governance, trust-building must be grounded in transparency, privacy protection, and public deliberation.
- 2 December 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 99-107
Perceived Inequality and Democratic Support
The erosion of democracy in many Western countries, often described as “democratic deconsolidation,” has led to increased scholarly interest concerning the impact of economic inequality on democracy. Observers of East Asian politics have wrestled with this question: As perceived income inequality in East Asian countries becomes more severe, will it erode support for democracy in the region? Our results are quite unexpected. This article explores how people assess the performance of the democratic system, whether preference for autocracy is rising, and the various factors behind support for democracy among citizens in East Asia. Contrary to the assumptions of many, we found that where there are higher levels of perceived inequality, people have a demonstrably lower preference for autocratic governance. This is especially the case for non-democratic countries in Asia and in countries that have never experienced full liberal democracy. These findings show that perceived inequality makes democracy much more attractive, and authoritarian forms of government much less attractive. Therefore, a higher perception of economic inequality does not in itself appear to erode democratic consolidation or to obstruct further democratization in East Asia.
- 2 December 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 99-107
Perceived Inequality and Democratic Support
The erosion of democracy in many Western countries, often described as “democratic deconsolidation,” has led to increased scholarly interest concerning the impact of economic inequality on democracy. Observers of East Asian politics have wrestled with this question: As perceived income inequality in East Asian countries becomes more severe, will it erode support for democracy in the region? Our results are quite unexpected. This article explores how people assess the performance of the democratic system, whether preference for autocracy is rising, and the various factors behind support for democracy among citizens in East Asia. Contrary to the assumptions of many, we found that where there are higher levels of perceived inequality, people have a demonstrably lower preference for autocratic governance. This is especially the case for non-democratic countries in Asia and in countries that have never experienced full liberal democracy. These findings show that perceived inequality makes democracy much more attractive, and authoritarian forms of government much less attractive. Therefore, a higher perception of economic inequality does not in itself appear to erode democratic consolidation or to obstruct further democratization in East Asia.
- 9 January 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary China
- Vol. 26 (106) , 616-631
How Chinese Citizens Perceive Cross-Strait Relations: Survey Results from Ten Major Cities in China
While many studies have investigated Taiwanese people’s attitudes towards cross-Strait relations, few studies explore how Chinese people on the other side of the Taiwan Strait perceive the Taiwan issue. Using data collected via a telephone survey that covers 2,000 respondents from ten major cities in China in 2013, this article presents empirical evidence to fill this gap. It finds that most Chinese citizens’ attitudes are aligned with the government’s propaganda on cross-Strait relations. In particular, Chinese citizens have inaccurate perceptions of Taiwanese support for reunification with China. This article also finds that when Chinese respondents think that the city in which they live is more economically advanced than Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, they would support: (1) a faster pace towards a resolution, and (2) the use of military force to resolve cross-Strait confrontations. These findings offer new perspectives on studies of cross-Strait relations and Chinese nationalism.
- 9 January 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary China
- Vol. 26 (106) , 616-631
How Chinese Citizens Perceive Cross-Strait Relations: Survey Results from Ten Major Cities in China
While many studies have investigated Taiwanese people’s attitudes towards cross-Strait relations, few studies explore how Chinese people on the other side of the Taiwan Strait perceive the Taiwan issue. Using data collected via a telephone survey that covers 2,000 respondents from ten major cities in China in 2013, this article presents empirical evidence to fill this gap. It finds that most Chinese citizens’ attitudes are aligned with the government’s propaganda on cross-Strait relations. In particular, Chinese citizens have inaccurate perceptions of Taiwanese support for reunification with China. This article also finds that when Chinese respondents think that the city in which they live is more economically advanced than Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, they would support: (1) a faster pace towards a resolution, and (2) the use of military force to resolve cross-Strait confrontations. These findings offer new perspectives on studies of cross-Strait relations and Chinese nationalism.
- 14 June 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 24 (2) , 347-366
Does China’s middle class prefer (liberal) democracy?
Many surveys show that China’s political regime, under the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rules, enjoys a high level of public support. However, it is still uncertain whether China’s emerging middle class will become the “agent of democratization” as suggested by modernization theory. Using the data of Asian Barometer Survey conducted in China in 2011, this article demonstrates that the relationship between class identity and preference for liberal democracy in China may be inverted U-shaped. The Chinese middle class shows a higher preference to features of liberal democratic regimes than its counterparts of the lower- and upper-class. Members of the Chinese middle class also tend to regard democracy as the best form of government. Thus, the middle class has the potential to initiate democratization in China if the Chinese government fails to keep satisfying the middle class’ quest for economic well-being and protection of property rights.
- 14 June 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 24 (2) , 347-366
Does China’s middle class prefer (liberal) democracy?
Many surveys show that China’s political regime, under the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rules, enjoys a high level of public support. However, it is still uncertain whether China’s emerging middle class will become the “agent of democratization” as suggested by modernization theory. Using the data of Asian Barometer Survey conducted in China in 2011, this article demonstrates that the relationship between class identity and preference for liberal democracy in China may be inverted U-shaped. The Chinese middle class shows a higher preference to features of liberal democratic regimes than its counterparts of the lower- and upper-class. Members of the Chinese middle class also tend to regard democracy as the best form of government. Thus, the middle class has the potential to initiate democratization in China if the Chinese government fails to keep satisfying the middle class’ quest for economic well-being and protection of property rights.
- 1 August 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of East Asian Studies
- Vol. 14 (2) , 211-248
Language Stereotypes in Contemporary Taiwan: Evidence from an Experimental Study
We collected original experimental data, using the matched-guise technique, to examine the Taiwanese people's evaluational reactions to two major spoken languages in contemporary Taiwan: Mandarin and Taiwanese. Taking advantage of the effectiveness of the experimental technique in controlling for possible unobserved confounding variables, we clearly and systematically demonstrate that (1) language stereotypes do exist in today's Taiwan, and (2) there are some serious and significant implications for Taiwan's public opinion and democratic politics. Our data show that such language stereotypes are of great salience and consistently decoded for political issues, less so for socioeconomic issues, and almost insignificant for personality features. Our data also confirm that these language stereotypes are not just proxies of Taiwan's regional divisions; the Taiwanese people cognitively differentiate between the spoken languages' political and socioeconomic implications (despite some mild halo effect between the two).
- 1 August 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of East Asian Studies
- Vol. 14 (2) , 211-248
Language Stereotypes in Contemporary Taiwan: Evidence from an Experimental Study
We collected original experimental data, using the matched-guise technique, to examine the Taiwanese people's evaluational reactions to two major spoken languages in contemporary Taiwan: Mandarin and Taiwanese. Taking advantage of the effectiveness of the experimental technique in controlling for possible unobserved confounding variables, we clearly and systematically demonstrate that (1) language stereotypes do exist in today's Taiwan, and (2) there are some serious and significant implications for Taiwan's public opinion and democratic politics. Our data show that such language stereotypes are of great salience and consistently decoded for political issues, less so for socioeconomic issues, and almost insignificant for personality features. Our data also confirm that these language stereotypes are not just proxies of Taiwan's regional divisions; the Taiwanese people cognitively differentiate between the spoken languages' political and socioeconomic implications (despite some mild halo effect between the two).
- 1 November 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Political Science Review
- Vol. 32 (5) , 598-619
Procedural quality only? Taiwanese democracy reconsidered
Over the last decade, a growing number of students of democracy have sought to develop means of framing and assessing the quality of democracy and identifying ways to improve the quality of democratic governance. In this article, we review the recent efforts to conceptualize and measure quality of democracy by way of introducing a comprehensive method for measuring some essential properties of liberal democracy. Next, we present an empirical assessment of the quality of democracy in Taiwan based on the sub-dimensions formulated by Morlino – specifically, rule of law, accountability, participation, competition, freedom, equality, and responsiveness. We find that in the areas of accountability, participation, and freedom, Taiwan has made considerable progress. However, Taiwan’s young democracy still has room for improvement in the areas of the rule of law, equality, and responsiveness.
- 1 November 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Political Science Review
- Vol. 32 (5) , 598-619
Procedural quality only? Taiwanese democracy reconsidered
Over the last decade, a growing number of students of democracy have sought to develop means of framing and assessing the quality of democracy and identifying ways to improve the quality of democratic governance. In this article, we review the recent efforts to conceptualize and measure quality of democracy by way of introducing a comprehensive method for measuring some essential properties of liberal democracy. Next, we present an empirical assessment of the quality of democracy in Taiwan based on the sub-dimensions formulated by Morlino – specifically, rule of law, accountability, participation, competition, freedom, equality, and responsiveness. We find that in the areas of accountability, participation, and freedom, Taiwan has made considerable progress. However, Taiwan’s young democracy still has room for improvement in the areas of the rule of law, equality, and responsiveness.
- 31 December 2008
- Published by Columbia University Press
- p. 83-113
4. How Citizens View Taiwan’s New Democracy
- 31 December 2008
- Published by Columbia University Press
- p. 83-113
4. How Citizens View Taiwan’s New Democracy
- 1 March 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 27 (1) , 45-62
Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis
- 1 March 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 27 (1) , 45-62
Identifying sources of democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis
- 1 July 2007
- Published by Project MUSE in Journal of Democracy
- Vol. 18 (3) , 66-80
The Democracy Barometers(Part I): Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia
From Bangkok to Manila, Taipei, Seoul, and Ulaanbaatar, East Asia's third-wave democracies are in distress. Data from the first and second Asian Barometer Surveys can help us systematically to assess the extent of normative commitment to democracy that citizens feel in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Compared to levels of popular support for democracy, strength of authoritarian detachment, and satisfaction with the performance of democracy observed in other regions, our six East Asian democracies appear on a par with similarly situated societies elsewhere in the world. The lesson is that this form of government must win citizens' support through better performance.
- 1 July 2007
- Published by Project MUSE in Journal of Democracy
- Vol. 18 (3) , 66-80
The Democracy Barometers(Part I): Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia
From Bangkok to Manila, Taipei, Seoul, and Ulaanbaatar, East Asia's third-wave democracies are in distress. Data from the first and second Asian Barometer Surveys can help us systematically to assess the extent of normative commitment to democracy that citizens feel in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Compared to levels of popular support for democracy, strength of authoritarian detachment, and satisfaction with the performance of democracy observed in other regions, our six East Asian democracies appear on a par with similarly situated societies elsewhere in the world. The lesson is that this form of government must win citizens' support through better performance.
- 1 June 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Public Opinion Research
- Vol. 18 (2) , 246-255
The Uneven Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in East Asia
The consolidation of a democracy requires ‘broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine’ (Diamond, 1999, p. 65). An assessment of the extent of normative commitment to democracy among the public at large can tell us much about how far the political system has really traveled toward democratic consolidation (Chu, Diamond, & Shin, 2001).
- 1 June 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Public Opinion Research
- Vol. 18 (2) , 246-255
The Uneven Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in East Asia
The consolidation of a democracy requires ‘broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine’ (Diamond, 1999, p. 65). An assessment of the extent of normative commitment to democracy among the public at large can tell us much about how far the political system has really traveled toward democratic consolidation (Chu, Diamond, & Shin, 2001).