Peter Dauvergne

A loosely aligned, informal grouping of developing states is pressing for a strong plastics treaty. This article evaluates the past influence and future prospects of this “quasi-bloc” of high-ambition developing countries (HADCs). We argue that the HADC quasi-bloc is driving demands for stringent controls across the full life cycle of plastics, including on oil and gas feedstock, petrochemical processing and product design. It is also energizing calls for robust financing to support just transitions to low-plastic economies, while amplifying the demands of Indigenous peoples and civil society to address the injustices of plastic pollution. Notably, during treaty talks in Busan in 2024 and Geneva in 2025, the HADC quasi-bloc stood firm against petrostates and industry interests seeking to weaken the treaty. HADCs share much in common, including histories of subjugation and disproportionate vulnerability to plastic pollution. Yet the cohesion and power of the HADC quasi-bloc should not be overstated. This is not a formal coalition, but rather an ad hoc, fluid grouping of states with shared interests and concerns. Looking ahead, the HADC quasi-bloc, alongside high-ambition states in the Global North, appears to have enough power to block a weak treaty, but achieving strong obligations presents a far greater political challenge.

Eco-anxiety is surging as environmental crises escalate. As the ecopsychology literature reveals, the effects and intensity of eco-anxiety vary across cultures, circumstances, and personality types. Eco-anxiety can prompt some people to disengage from environmentalism and can even become a debilitating disorder. Yet, high eco-anxiety also correlates with pro-environmental lifestyle choices, increased participation in environmental collective action, and a spirit of resistance. In this Forum article, we consider the implications of eco-anxiety for global environmental politics (GEP) and argue that it can be harnessed to create positive change. Historically, periods of heightened environmental concern have preceded GEP milestones. Eco-anxiety may now be contributing to a resurgence of youth advocacy, grassroots activism, and direct-action environmentalism. Such trends highlight potentially positive influences of eco-anxiety on GEP, although further research is needed to disentangle the sociocultural dimensions and subemotions of eco-anxiety and determine how these can be productively harnessed within GEP.

States were again unable to reach consensus on the text of a plastics treaty during negotiations in Geneva in 2025. The majority of states stood firm against petrochemical interests and demanded a “high-ambition” treaty with binding global obligations across the full life cycle of plastics. What these states specifically support, however, varies considerably, as does the strength of their commitment. The case of South Korea offers insights into how changes in political leadership, industry lobbying, shifting narratives and competing foreign policy goals can shape the nature of ambition. Early in the negotiations, South Korea called for ambitious measures and was chosen to host the final round of talks set for late 2024. Yet, this did not translate into meaningful action or strong advocacy in later stages. Some South Korean policymakers may have been sincerely committed to global controls. South Korea’s early signaling of high ambition, however, was primarily motivated by strategic calculations to influence the treaty and become a “global pivotal state.” Its support for ambition, moreover, grew increasingly ambiguous as leadership changed and as states describing themselves as “ambitious” pushed for binding controls on plastics production and supply. South Korea’s foreign policy strategy, we further argue, failed to enhance the country’s diplomatic standing, as its ambiguous ambition came to light, and as industry recalcitrance, bureaucratic infighting and political turmoil undermined its capacity for effective leadership.

Support for a high-ambition plastics treaty is gaining strength, particularly within global civil society and among lower-income developing countries. Still, opposition to binding measures – such as obligations to regulate petrochemicals or reduce global plastics production – remains intense and widespread. We propose the concept of a “petrochemical historical bloc” to help reveal the depth and extent of the forces opposing strong global governance of plastics. At the bloc’s core are petrostates and industry, especially producers of oil and gas feedstock, petrochemicals and plastics. Extending its influence are broader social forces – including certain political and economic institutions, consultancy firms and nongovernmental organizations – that reinforce and legitimize the discourses and tactics thwarting a high-ambition treaty. This bloc is driving up plastics production, externalizing the costs of pollution, distorting scientific knowledge and lobbying to derail negotiations. Yet the petrochemical historical bloc is neither monolithic nor all-powerful. Investigating differing interests and evolving politics within this bloc, we contend, can expose disingenuous rhetoric, weaken low-ambition alliances and reveal opportunities to overcome resistance to ambitious governance. In light of this, and toward highlighting fractures and potential counter-alliances and strategies, we call for a global research inquiry to map the full scope and nature of the petrochemical historical bloc.