Eduardo Schiehll

We investigate the occurrence and the persistence of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) decoupling when firms are exposed to heterogeneity in shareholder proposal activism, reflected by the different orientation of shareholder activists and the competing nature of their demands. We find that the greater the extent that shareholder proposals blend financial and social logics, the more likely firms are to respond by adopting policies that are not fully implemented in practice. Our results also suggest that decoupling is more persistent among targeted firms that are exposed to heightened heterogeneity in shareholder proposal activism. Our findings suggest that such heterogeneity not only prompts decoupling but also leads to its persistence, contributing to our understanding about why firms may place their legitimacy at risk to respond to shareholder activism, and the conditions that motivate (or inhibit) such behavior. Our study contributes to the symbolic management literature and the ongoing debate on whether and how shareholders impact societal challenges.

We analyze ESG-related news coverage to examine media attention patterns as a reflection of stakeholders’ perceived salience of ESG issues at both the industry and firm levels, offering insights into the evolving nature of ESG materiality. Using longitudinal data visualization over an 11-year period, we show that media attention to ESG issues varies significantly over time and across firms within the same industry. While some issues receive consistent attention, others exhibit shifting patterns, signaling changing stakeholders’ perceived salience. Focusing on SASB-informed financially material ESG issues, we also show that perceived salience varies even among high-relevance topics. Some firms align with their industry’s patterns, while others diverge markedly, reinforcing the view that ESG materiality is both dynamic and firm-specific. These insights suggest that static ESG materiality assessment frameworks may be insufficient for informing long-term sustainability strategies or corporate disclosure practices. For investors, our results underscore the value of media-based ESG signals in complementing traditional materiality assessments. Acknowledging the evolving nature of ESG materiality is essential for firms and investors aiming to develop ESG strategies that respond to shifts in stakeholders’ perceived salience of ESG issues.

As sustainability becomes more critical to corporate strategy and performance, firms, investors, and researchers must continue to refine methods for measuring and addressing the gap between rhetoric and reality. Closing this gap is crucial to ensuring that externally oriented ESG claims are supported by genuine internal actions that benefit both the firm and society at large. To address this issue, this study introduces a theoretically driven framework to assess the alignment (or lack thereof) between firms’ ESG policies and their actual implementation. By proposing a more granular and objective measure, we address a gap in the existing literature. Additionally, we empirically validate this framework using data from ASSET4, providing insights into the extent and persistence of this phenomenon using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2016 to 2022. Our results reveal that misalignment between internal actions and external endorsements in managing environmental and social issues is both significant and persistent across the years analyzed. Over 80% of the sample firms exhibit this misalignment, underscoring its prevalence within the sample. In more recent years, however, firms have shown a clear tendency to prioritize internal actions over initiatives aimed at externally endorsing their efforts. Building on the framework we propose to measure ESG policy–practice decoupling, along with the empirical analysis we conducted, we discuss its broader implications and outline several opportunities for future research.

In this study, we investigate whether information demands made by common agents, specifically common institutional owners, drive firms to adopt a reporting framework that enhances the comparability and financial materiality of environmental, social, and governance information. Using a sample of 3659 unique US firms from 2015 to 2021, we collected data on the adoption of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board's reporting framework—identifying first movers, followers, and non‐adopting firms—and their levels of common institutional ownership. Our results are robust across changes in the levels of common institutional ownership, various combinations of fixed effects, and the application of an instrumental variable approach. Our findings support the idea that investors' demand drives comparability and financial materiality in sustainability reporting and that common ownership enhances such disclosure by alleviating the concern over the proprietary costs of revealing sensitive information. Our study offers new insights into patterns of intra‐industry disclosure behavior and a better understanding of how a group of increasingly significant market participants (i.e., common institutional owners) influences firms' commitment to investor‐focused disclosure.

This study examines which factors facilitate (obstruct) the discretion exercised by ground‐level governance actors, such as internal auditors, in justifying their governance work. To achieve this objective, we rely on two complementary theoretical perspectives. One perspective proposes that the organizational embeddedness of ground‐level governance actors, ordained by high‐level governance actors (such as the board of directors), obstructs their discretion. In contrast, the other perspective, building on institutional complexity, propounds that multiple institutional demands facilitate the situated agency and discretion of ground‐level governance actors. Consistent with the emerging multilevel research on institutional complexity, we combine these two perspectives by including both the structural and static meso‐level factors (i.e. organizational embeddedness) as well as actors' situated agency. Utilizing three comparative cases, we demonstrate that internal auditors' ability to exercise discretion is facilitated (obstructed) when organizational embeddedness enables (constrains) the cohabitation of multiple institutional logics at the organizational level. In doing so, we identify organizationally situated agency as an underlying factor driving internal auditors’ justification approaches in their governance work.

How does a board of directors respond to stringent transnational regulations on corporate governance? We explore this question in a case study that includes interviews with key governance actors of a bank dealing with regulatory changes in the European Union (EU) initiated in 2010 in response to the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Our findings suggest that transnational regulations introduced a conflicting prescription to the directors, who were caught between two needs: existing local governance practices and transnational regulatory compliance. Contributing to the international corporate governance research, our findings corroborate the resistance to transnational regulations and the distrust attributable to boards of directors’ role struggles and the invasive accountability mechanisms introduced by such regulations. We, therefore, contribute to the ongoing discussion on how the conflicting layers of corporate governance—local versus global—and how the discontinuities between competing existing practices and the prescriptions of transnational regulations can provoke micro-resistance.

Research Question/Issue: What combinations of board attributes and contextual factors explain boards' selective distribution of attention between their dual role of resource provisioning and monitoring? At the board level, we consider board structure and breadth of knowledge, while the context in which boards operate is captured by the degree of external scrutiny, operational complexity, performance, and ownership structure.Research Findings/Insights: Our study demonstrates that there are multiple ways board attributes bundle and combine with important elements of the context to promote similar board attention structures. Our findings provide evidence of the causal complexity underlying this phenomenon and corroborate the notions of equifinality and asymmetric causality among board‐, firm‐, and institution‐level conditions conducive to boards allocating more attention to either their resource provisioning or monitoring roles.Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings support the attention‐based view (ABV), suggesting that boards' selective distribution of attention is regulated by the combination of skills and knowledge directors bring to the firm and the stimuli provided by contextual factors. In doing so, we underscore the need for an extended theory on board effectiveness, as resource dependence‐ and agency‐based prescriptions about boards' behavior may be incomplete, since there is limited consideration by these theories of the bounded rationality of directors and the complex relationships between the factors that can frame boards' selective distribution of attention.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our study informs efforts to disentangle the conditions under which different attributes combine and regulate boards' distribution of attention, which has implications for nomination committees and powerful actors who have influence on board appointments. Because our results reveal several causal paths that can promote similar board attention structures, decision makers may wish to recruit directors with specific attributes that will be the best fit for the firm's contextual conditions.

We examine the role of country‐level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) on firm investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we extend prior literature on the relation between investor protection and ICFS and provide new evidence on how these country‐level attributes interact to explain a firm's ICFS. We find that either the strong legal protection of minority shareholders or the strong legal protection of creditors reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. However, in countries with strong levels of both minority shareholder and creditor protection, ICFS increases. Our results remain robust after controlling for several alternative explanations. The results support the argument that overregulation arises when policymakers increase investor protection at levels that lead firms to avoid external sources of finance, hampering firm investment. Our findings suggest that countries face a regulatory trade‐off such that increasing investor protection (either shareholder or creditors protection) enhances financial markets efficiency, but excessive regulation can indeed lead to financial markets inefficiencies.

Certain economic actors are considered by many as involved in or associated with an activity that is considered unethical or immoral, such as the producers of tobacco, alcohol and firearms (often referred to as sin stocks). In an environment in which stakeholders are increasingly interested in sustainable development and corporate social responsibility, it is important to understand how firms respond to these issues which divide public opinion. Our study compares the environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance for a targeted sample of 79 sin stocks and a control group of comparable firms. We observe that sin stocks have a lower overall ESG performance as well as for each of the three ESG pillars, and that this difference is more significant in relation to governance and some key social and environmental issues for which sin stocks could have compensated risk exposure with responsible management practices. In other words, our results demonstrate that sin stocks are exposed to more severe ESG issues and consistently lack the necessary practices to mitigate these issues. Our study provides relevant insights into the informativeness of ESG scores to distinguish firms (and sectors) investing in management practices that offset ESG risk exposure.