YLYuanming Lai

Yuanming Lai

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Yuanming Lai has a total of 51 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Fuzzing JavaScript JIT Compilers With Optimization Path Feedback

    by Jiming Wang, Chenggang Wu, Yan Kang, Yuhao Hu, Yue Sun, Jikai Ren, Yuanming Lai, Mengyao Xie, Chao Zhang, Tao Li, et al.

    Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler is a core component of JavaScript engines, which takes JavaScript code as input and applies a series of optimization passes on it and transforms it to machine code. The optimization passes often have some assumptions (e.g., variable types) on the input program, and therefore will yield vulnerabilities if the assumptions are violated. To discover such bugs, it is essential to thoroughly test different optimization passes, but previous work fails to do so and mainly focused on exploring code coverage. In this paper, we present the first optimization path guided fuzzing solution for JavaScript JIT compilers, namely OptFuzz, which focuses on exploring optimization paths. Specifically, we utilize an optimization subpath metric to approximate the optimization path, and use it as feedback to guide seed preservation and seed scheduling. Furthermore, we identify optimization triggering by analyzing code transformations at the JIT intermediate representation (IR) level, and preserve optimization subpaths only when optimizations are triggered. We implemented OptFuzz on four baseline fuzzers and evaluated it on 4 mainstream JavaScript engines. On earlier engine versions, OptFuzz found several times more bugs than baselines. On the latest engines, OptFuzz discovered 52 new bugs, among which 43 have been confirmed or fixed.

  • Open Access

    SyzParam : Incorporating Runtime Parameters into Kernel Driver Fuzzing

    by Yue Sun, Yan Kang, Chenggang Wu, Kangjie Lu, Jiming Wang, Xingwei Li, Yuhao Hu, Jikai Ren, Yuanming Lai, Mengyao Xie, et al.


  • Open Access

    Tide: An Efficient Kernel-level Isolation Execution Environment on AArch64 via Dynamically Adjusting Output Address Size

    by Shiyang Zhang, Chenggang Wu, Chengxuan Hou, Jinglin Lv, Yinqian Zhang, Qianyu Guo, Yuanming Lai, Mengyao Xie, Yan Kang, Zhe Wang

  • Open Access

    Shining Light on the Inter-procedural Code Obfuscation: Keep Pace with Progress in Binary Diffing

    by Peihua Zhang, Chenggang Wu, Hanzhi Hu, Lichen Jia, Mingfan Peng, Jiali Xu, Mengyao Xie, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Zhe Wang

    Software obfuscation techniques have lost their effectiveness due to the rapid development of binary diffing techniques, which can achieve accurate function matching and identification. In this paper, we propose a new inter-procedural code obfuscation mechanism KHaos , 1 which moves the code across functions to obfuscate the function by using compilation optimizations. Three obfuscation primitives are proposed to separate, aggregate, and hide the function. They can be combined to enhance the obfuscation effect further. This article also reveals distinguishing factors on obfuscation and compiler optimization and presents novel observations to gain insights into the impact of actively utilizing compiler optimization in obfuscation. A prototype of KHaos is implemented and evaluated on a large number of real-world programs. Experimental results show that KHaos outperforms existing code obfuscations and can significantly reduce the accuracy rates of six state-of-the-art binary diffing techniques with lower runtime overhead.


  • Open Access

    PANIC: PAN-assisted Intra-process Memory Isolation on ARM

    by Jiali Xu, Mengyao Xie, Chenggang Wu, Yinqian Zhang, Qijing Li, Xuan Huang, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Wei Wang, Qiang Wei, et al.


  • SpecWands: An Efficient Priority-Based Scheduler Against Speculation Contention Attacks

    by Bowen Tang, Chenggang Wu, Pen-Chung Yew, Yinqian Zhang, Mengyao Xie, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Wei Wang, Qiang Wei, Zhe Wang

    Transient Execution Attacks (TEAs) have gradually become a major security threat to modern high-performance processors. They exploit the vulnerability of speculative execution to illegally access private data, and transmit them through timing-based covert channels. While new vulnerabilities are discovered continuously, the covert channels can be categorised to two types: 1) Persistent Type, in which covert channels are based on the layout changes of buffering, e.g. through caches or TLBs; 2) Volatile Type, in which covert channels are based on the contention of sharing resources, e.g. through execution units or issuing ports. The defenses against the persistent-type covert channels have been well addressed, while those for the volatile-type are still rather inadequate. Existing mitigation schemes for the volatile type such as Speculative Compression and Time-Division-Multiplexing will introduce significant overhead due to the need to stall the pipeline or to disallow resource sharing. In this paper, we look into such attacks and defenses with a new perspective, and propose a scheduling-based mitigation scheme, called SpecWands. It consists of three priority-based scheduling policies to prevent an attacker from transmitting the secret in different contention situations. SpecWands not only can defend against both inter-thread and intra-thread based attacks, but also can keep most of the performance benefit from speculative execution and resource-sharing. We evaluate its runtime overhead on SPEC 2017 benchmarks and realistic programs. The experimental results show that SpecWands has a significant performance advantage over the other two representative schemes.


  • Open Access

    SPECWANDS: An Efficient Priority-based Scheduler Against Speculation Contention Attacks

    by Bowen Tang, Chenggang Wu, Pen-Chung Yew, Yinqian Zhang, Mengyao Xie, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Wei Wang, Qiang Wei, Zhe Wang

    Transient Execution Attacks (TEAs) have gradually become a major security threat to modern high-performance processors. They exploit the vulnerability of speculative execution to illegally access private data, and transmit them through timing-based covert channels. While new vulnerabilities are discovered continuously, the covert channels can be categorised to two types: 1) Persistent Type, in which covert channels are based on the layout changes of buffering, e.g. through caches or TLBs; 2) Volatile Type, in which covert channels are based on the contention of sharing resources, e.g. through execution units or issuing ports. The defenses against the persistent-type covert channels have been well addressed, while those for the volatile-type are still rather inadequate. Existing mitigation schemes for the volatile type such as Speculative Compression and Time-Division-Multiplexing will introduce significant overhead due to the need to stall the pipeline or to disallow resource sharing. In this paper, we look into such attacks and defenses with a new perspective, and propose a scheduling-based mitigation scheme, called SPECWANDS. It consists of three priority-based scheduling policies to prevent an attacker from transmitting the secret in different contention situations. SPECWANDS not only can defend against both inter-thread and intra-thread based attacks, but also can keep most of the performance benefit from speculative execution and resource-sharing. We evaluate its runtime overhead on SPEC 2017 benchmarks and realistic programs. The experimental results show that SPECWANDS has a significant performance advantage over the other two representative schemes.

  • Open Access

    Khaos: The Impact of Inter-procedural Code Obfuscation on Binary Diffing Techniques

    by Peihua Zhang, Chenggang Wu, Mingfan Peng, Kai Zeng, Ding Yu, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Wei Wang, Zhe Wang

    Software obfuscation techniques can prevent binary diffing techniques from locating vulnerable code by obfuscating the third-party code, to achieve the purpose of protecting embedded device software. With the rapid development of binary diffing techniques, they can achieve more and more accurate function matching and identification by extracting the features within the function. This makes existing software obfuscation techniques, which mainly focus on the intra-procedural code obfuscation, no longer effective. In this paper, we propose a new inter-procedural code obfuscation mechanism Khaos, which moves the code across functions to obfuscate the function by using compilation optimizations. Two obfuscation primitives are proposed to separate and aggregate the function, which are called fission and fusion respectively. A prototype of Khaos is implemented based on the LLVM compiler and evaluated on a large number of real-world programs including SPEC CPU 2006 & 2017, CoreUtils, JavaScript engines, etc. Experimental results show that Khaos outperforms existing code obfuscations and can significantly reduce the accuracy rates of five state-of-the-art binary diffing techniques (less than 19%) with lower runtime overhead (less than 7%).

  • Dancing With Wolves: An Intra-Process Isolation Technique With Privileged Hardware

    by Chenggang Wu, Mengyao Xie, Zhe Wang, Yinqian Zhang, Kangjie Lu, Xiaofeng Zhang, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Min Yang, Tao Li

    Intra-process memory isolation is a cornerstone technique of protecting the sensitive data in memory-corruption defenses, such as the shadow stack in control flow integrity (CFI) and the safe region in code pointer integrity (CPI). In this paper, we propose SEIMI, a highly efficient intra-process memory isolation technique for memory-corruption defenses. The core is to use the efficient Supervisor-mode Access Prevention (SMAP), a hardware feature that is originally used for preventing the kernel from accessing the user space, to achieve intra-process memory isolation. To leverage SMAP, SEIMI creatively executes the user code in the privileged mode. In addition to enabling the new design of the SMAP-based memory isolation, we further develop multiple new techniques to ensure secure escalation of user code. Extensive experiments show that SEIMI outperforms existing isolation mechanisms, including the Memory Protection Keys (MPK) based scheme and the Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) based scheme.


  • Making Information Hiding Effective Again

    by Zhe Wang, Chenggang Wu, Yinqian Zhang, Bowen Tang, Pen-Chung Yew, Mengyao Xie, Yuanming Lai, Yan Kang, Yueqiang Cheng, Zhiping Shi

    Information hiding (IH) is an important building block for many defenses against code reuse attacks, such as code-pointer integrity (CPI), control-flow integrity (CFI) and fine-grained code (re-)randomization, because of its effectiveness and performance. It employs randomization to probabilistically “hide” sensitive memory areas, called safe areas, from attackers and ensures their addresses are not leaked by any pointers directly. These defenses used safe areas to protect their critical data, such as jump targets and randomization secrets. However, recent works have shown that IH is vulnerable to various attacks. In this article, we propose a new IH technique called SafeHidden. It continuously re-randomizes the locations of safe areas and thus prevents the attackers from probing and inferring the memory layout to find its location. A new thread-private memory mechanism is proposed to isolate the thread-local safe areas and prevent adversaries from reducing the randomization entropy. It also randomizes the safe areas after the TLB misses to prevent attackers from inferring the address of safe areas using cache side-channels. Existing IH-based defenses can utilize SafeHidden directly without any change. Our experiments show that SafeHidden not only prevents existing attacks effectively but also incurs low performance overhead.