Markus I. Eronen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Markus I. Eronen has a total of 72 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Laura Francina Bringmann
Department of Psychometrics and Statistics, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands
8 shared publications - Anne M. Scheel
Utrecht University
2 shared publications - Caspar J. Van Lissa
Department of Methodology and Statistics, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
2 shared publications - Denny Borsboom
Department of Psychological Methods, University of Amsterdam
2 shared publications - Freek Oude Maatman
Radboud University Nijmegen
2 shared publications Jason Nak
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 203-223
On Worms, Mirror Neurons, and Explaining Human Behavior
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 203-223
On Worms, Mirror Neurons, and Explaining Human Behavior
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Establishing Psychological Phenomena: An Alternative Methodological Perspective on Scientific Practice
We argue that psychology should aim its empirical research efforts at establishing phenomena. Psychology typically conceptualizes research in terms of testing theories against data. An alternative approach in philosophy of science views the scientific method in terms of a three-level relation between data, phenomena, and theory. In this conceptualization, phenomena are understood as robust features of the world, which are evidenced by patterns in data. Theories explain phenomena by positing the existence and causal operation of entities, processes, and structures that give rise to these phenomena. We argue that much psychological research should be understood as establishing phenomena rather than testing theories. Focussing on establishing phenomena will aid the robustness of psychological research, while simultaneously creating a better foundation for theory creation. We outline how envisioning scientific research in terms of the relation between data, phenomena, and theory has far-reaching consequences: a) it offers an alternative methodological organization, where the description and free exploration of data is of greater importance than it currently is, b) it formulates new ways of thinking about methodological concepts such as replicability, generalizability, and validity, and c) it allows us to develop guidelines for incorporating this perspective into practice that can substantially improve psychological science.
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessEstablishing Psychological Phenomena: An Alternative Methodological Perspective on Scientific Practice
We argue that psychology should aim its empirical research efforts at establishing phenomena. Psychology typically conceptualizes research in terms of testing theories against data. An alternative approach in philosophy of science views the scientific method in terms of a three-level relation between data, phenomena, and theory. In this conceptualization, phenomena are understood as robust features of the world, which are evidenced by patterns in data. Theories explain phenomena by positing the existence and causal operation of entities, processes, and structures that give rise to these phenomena. We argue that much psychological research should be understood as establishing phenomena rather than testing theories. Focussing on establishing phenomena will aid the robustness of psychological research, while simultaneously creating a better foundation for theory creation. We outline how envisioning scientific research in terms of the relation between data, phenomena, and theory has far-reaching consequences: a) it offers an alternative methodological organization, where the description and free exploration of data is of greater importance than it currently is, b) it formulates new ways of thinking about methodological concepts such as replicability, generalizability, and validity, and c) it allows us to develop guidelines for incorporating this perspective into practice that can substantially improve psychological science.
- Open Access
- 23 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Psychology
- Vol. 4 (1) , 36
Experience sampling methods require more than numbers
The experience sampling method (ESM) collects people’s real-time reports about their feelings, actions, and surroundings. While this method originally included both numerical and open-ended responses, most studies today focus only on the numbers. We argue that ESM researchers should collect and analyze open-ended responses again, as they are crucial for understanding what the numbers really mean, and for capturing parts of experience that numbers alone cannot, such as context, the “why” behind responses, and the temporal order of events. Open-ended responses can improve ESM data by grounding it in real-world experiences and phenomena as they are experienced in everyday life. Therefore, handbooks and guidelines on ESM should again include dedicated sections on collecting and analyzing open-ended text items. We highlight future work that is needed to achieve the systematic integration of open-ended items and their analysis into ESM research.
- 23 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Psychology
- Vol. 4 (1) , 36
Open AccessExperience sampling methods require more than numbers
The experience sampling method (ESM) collects people’s real-time reports about their feelings, actions, and surroundings. While this method originally included both numerical and open-ended responses, most studies today focus only on the numbers. We argue that ESM researchers should collect and analyze open-ended responses again, as they are crucial for understanding what the numbers really mean, and for capturing parts of experience that numbers alone cannot, such as context, the “why” behind responses, and the temporal order of events. Open-ended responses can improve ESM data by grounding it in real-world experiences and phenomena as they are experienced in everyday life. Therefore, handbooks and guidelines on ESM should again include dedicated sections on collecting and analyzing open-ended text items. We highlight future work that is needed to achieve the systematic integration of open-ended items and their analysis into ESM research.
- Open Access
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The state and status of theory in psychological science
Psychology’s theory problem, long noted since Meehl, persists: most theories are verbal, underspecified, and make weak predictions, so hypotheses rarely follow from theory and findings seldom constrain it. Historical empiricism and today’s incentives (novelty, significance, volume) favor flexible, low-risk, strategically vague theorizing, while reforms and training emphasize methods over theory construction and formal/computational modeling. The result is fragmented subfields, drifting constructs, and “effects” that don’t cumulate—fueling replication failures, post-hoc rationalization, and shallow applied progress. Improving epistemic design requires educating and rewarding precise, falsifiable theories.
- 13 February 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe state and status of theory in psychological science
Psychology’s theory problem, long noted since Meehl, persists: most theories are verbal, underspecified, and make weak predictions, so hypotheses rarely follow from theory and findings seldom constrain it. Historical empiricism and today’s incentives (novelty, significance, volume) favor flexible, low-risk, strategically vague theorizing, while reforms and training emphasize methods over theory construction and formal/computational modeling. The result is fragmented subfields, drifting constructs, and “effects” that don’t cumulate—fueling replication failures, post-hoc rationalization, and shallow applied progress. Improving epistemic design requires educating and rewarding precise, falsifiable theories.
- Open Access
- 23 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
On worms, mirror neurons and explaining human behavior
A key challenge for psychological theorizing is: At what level(s) should we look for the best explanations and predictions of human behavior? The dominant view is that potentially the best theories to explain behavior are found in neuroscience and biology. Therefore, we start from the perspective of these lower levels, and consider the prospects of developing theories based on those levels. We focus on C. elegans, a model organism whose entire neuronal connectome is mapped, and use it as a case study to highlight the difficulties in developing neuroscientific theories of cognition and behavior. We argue that the neuroscientific levels are not promising avenues for constructing explanatory or predictive psychological theories. This is due to the immense complexity and context-dependency of biological systems, even those as simple as C. elegans. In order to tackle this complexity, we need higher-level variables that capture stable features of these systems. For psychological theory development, this implies that we should focus on conceptual work and discovering robust phenomena, and take psychology and behavior as the starting points.
- 23 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessOn worms, mirror neurons and explaining human behavior
A key challenge for psychological theorizing is: At what level(s) should we look for the best explanations and predictions of human behavior? The dominant view is that potentially the best theories to explain behavior are found in neuroscience and biology. Therefore, we start from the perspective of these lower levels, and consider the prospects of developing theories based on those levels. We focus on C. elegans, a model organism whose entire neuronal connectome is mapped, and use it as a case study to highlight the difficulties in developing neuroscientific theories of cognition and behavior. We argue that the neuroscientific levels are not promising avenues for constructing explanatory or predictive psychological theories. This is due to the immense complexity and context-dependency of biological systems, even those as simple as C. elegans. In order to tackle this complexity, we need higher-level variables that capture stable features of these systems. For psychological theory development, this implies that we should focus on conceptual work and discovering robust phenomena, and take psychology and behavior as the starting points.
- Open Access
- 23 January 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Unraveling Networks: The conceptual incoherence of the network approach
The network approach to psychopathology promises (personalized) visualizations of the structure of mental disorders, in turn allowing for prediction of disorder development and identification of intervention targets. In this paper, we argue that these goals are problematized by conceptual incoherence between the approach’s two pillars: the network theory of mental disorders, and the suite of methods known as ‘network psychometrics’. First, we argue that, if it is to be clinically informative, network psychometrics requires (1) an embedding argument to justify that a causally sufficient set of variables has been modeled, and (2) a concomitant argument supporting the assumption that the human-environment system is near-decomposable. Then, we show that current versions of the network theory of psychopathology raise severe obstacles for such arguments, if not outright blocking them. In turn, the network approach to psychopathology appears to unravel unless changes are made to its pillars.
- 23 January 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessUnraveling Networks: The conceptual incoherence of the network approach
The network approach to psychopathology promises (personalized) visualizations of the structure of mental disorders, in turn allowing for prediction of disorder development and identification of intervention targets. In this paper, we argue that these goals are problematized by conceptual incoherence between the approach’s two pillars: the network theory of mental disorders, and the suite of methods known as ‘network psychometrics’. First, we argue that, if it is to be clinically informative, network psychometrics requires (1) an embedding argument to justify that a causally sufficient set of variables has been modeled, and (2) a concomitant argument supporting the assumption that the human-environment system is near-decomposable. Then, we show that current versions of the network theory of psychopathology raise severe obstacles for such arguments, if not outright blocking them. In turn, the network approach to psychopathology appears to unravel unless changes are made to its pillars.
- Top Cited Papers
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 8 (8) , 1448-1459
Causal inference on human behaviour
Making causal inferences regarding human behaviour is difficult given the complex interplay between countless contributors to behaviour, including factors in the external world and our internal states. We provide a non-technical conceptual overview of challenges and opportunities for causal inference on human behaviour. The challenges include our ambiguous causal language and thinking, statistical under- or over-control, effect heterogeneity, interference, timescales of effects and complex treatments. We explain how methods optimized for addressing one of these challenges frequently exacerbate other problems. We thus argue that clearly specified research questions are key to improving causal inference from data. We suggest a triangulation approach that compares causal estimates from (quasi-)experimental research with causal estimates generated from observational data and theoretical assumptions. This approach allows a systematic investigation of theoretical and methodological factors that might lead estimates to converge or diverge across studies.
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 8 (8) , 1448-1459
Top Cited PapersCausal inference on human behaviour
Making causal inferences regarding human behaviour is difficult given the complex interplay between countless contributors to behaviour, including factors in the external world and our internal states. We provide a non-technical conceptual overview of challenges and opportunities for causal inference on human behaviour. The challenges include our ambiguous causal language and thinking, statistical under- or over-control, effect heterogeneity, interference, timescales of effects and complex treatments. We explain how methods optimized for addressing one of these challenges frequently exacerbate other problems. We thus argue that clearly specified research questions are key to improving causal inference from data. We suggest a triangulation approach that compares causal estimates from (quasi-)experimental research with causal estimates generated from observational data and theoretical assumptions. This approach allows a systematic investigation of theoretical and methodological factors that might lead estimates to converge or diverge across studies.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 14 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Vol. 31 (4) , 340-346
Back to Basics: The Importance of Conceptual Clarification in Psychological Science
Although the lack of conceptual clarity has been observed to be a widespread and fundamental problem in psychology, conceptual clarification plays a mostly marginal role in psychological research. In this article, we argue that better conceptualization of psychological phenomena is needed to move psychology forward as a science. We first show how conceptual unclarity seeps through all aspects of psychological research, from everyday concepts to statistical measures. We then turn to recommendations on how to improve conceptual clarity in psychology, emphasizing the importance of seeing research as an iterative process in which it is necessary to revisit the phenomena that are the foundations of theories and models, as well as how they are conceptualized and measured.
- 14 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Vol. 31 (4) , 340-346
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessBack to Basics: The Importance of Conceptual Clarification in Psychological Science
Although the lack of conceptual clarity has been observed to be a widespread and fundamental problem in psychology, conceptual clarification plays a mostly marginal role in psychological research. In this article, we argue that better conceptualization of psychological phenomena is needed to move psychology forward as a science. We first show how conceptual unclarity seeps through all aspects of psychological research, from everyday concepts to statistical measures. We then turn to recommendations on how to improve conceptual clarity in psychology, emphasizing the importance of seeing research as an iterative process in which it is necessary to revisit the phenomena that are the foundations of theories and models, as well as how they are conceptualized and measured.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Behaviour Research and Therapy
- Vol. 149, 104011
Psychopathological networks: Theory, methods and practice
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Behaviour Research and Therapy
- Vol. 149, 104011
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessPsychopathological networks: Theory, methods and practice
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 447-455
Levels of Organization in Evo-Devo