Matthew Moran
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Matthew Moran has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Wyn Q. Bowen
King’s College London
16 shared publications - Christopher Hobbs
King’s College London
14 shared publications Christopher Hobbs
King’s College London
6 shared publicationsDina Esfandiary
King’s College London
6 shared publicationsHassan Elbahtimy
King’s College London
6 shared publications- David I. Waddington
Concordia University
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Nonproliferation Review
- Vol. 28 (4-6) , 275-295
Exploring the human dimension of nuclear security: the history, theory, and practice of security culture
Over the past two decades, the international community has devoted considerable attention to the human dimension of nuclear security. This trend is part of a more holistic approach to securing nuclear facilities, grounded in the concept of culture, that moves beyond the traditional focus of physical-protection measures. But what explains this shift and what does it entail? This article begins by demonstrating, through a series of real-life case studies, the potential for human factors to undermine nuclear-security systems. It then considers the rise and consolidation of “culture” as a concept used to better understand and organize international efforts to strengthen nuclear security. Nuclear-security culture is then explored in practice, drawing on a review of relevant initiatives as well as empirical research conducted by the authors at several UK nuclear sites. A number of likely challenges for developing an effective nuclear-security culture at the operational level are discussed, as is the value of the culture-focused guidance developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The article concludes that while nuclear-security culture has been widely promoted at the international level, there exists considerable scope for new initiatives to further strengthen engagement at the working level of industry.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Nonproliferation Review
- Vol. 28 (4-6) , 275-295
Open AccessExploring the human dimension of nuclear security: the history, theory, and practice of security culture
Over the past two decades, the international community has devoted considerable attention to the human dimension of nuclear security. This trend is part of a more holistic approach to securing nuclear facilities, grounded in the concept of culture, that moves beyond the traditional focus of physical-protection measures. But what explains this shift and what does it entail? This article begins by demonstrating, through a series of real-life case studies, the potential for human factors to undermine nuclear-security systems. It then considers the rise and consolidation of “culture” as a concept used to better understand and organize international efforts to strengthen nuclear security. Nuclear-security culture is then explored in practice, drawing on a review of relevant initiatives as well as empirical research conducted by the authors at several UK nuclear sites. A number of likely challenges for developing an effective nuclear-security culture at the operational level are discussed, as is the value of the culture-focused guidance developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The article concludes that while nuclear-security culture has been widely promoted at the international level, there exists considerable scope for new initiatives to further strengthen engagement at the working level of industry.
- Open Access
- 19 October 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 29 (5) , 797-831
The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the “Resolve plus Bombs” Formula
This article examines responses to the Syrian government’s possession and eventual use of chemical weapons (CW) in that country’s civil war from 2012 to 2013. During this time, the United States and other outside powers applied coercive strategies, in both deterrent and compellent modes. Outcomes varied: compellence in the form of coercive diplomacy achieved a partial success, getting Syria to give up much of its chemical stockpile, but there were multiple deterrence failures, culminating in a large-scale sarin gas attack in August 2013. We examine this record to draw lessons about factors associated with the effectiveness of coercion. Our analysis draws on insights from existing research on both deterrence and coercive diplomacy to develop an integrated analytical framework involving the interplay of three factors: credibility, motivations, and assurance. We find the typical default approach to coercion, based on demonstrating toughness and threatening to impose costs using airpower—an approach we call the “resolve plus bombs” formula—was not sufficient to change Syria’s calculations regarding chemical use.
- 19 October 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 29 (5) , 797-831
Open AccessThe Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the “Resolve plus Bombs” Formula
This article examines responses to the Syrian government’s possession and eventual use of chemical weapons (CW) in that country’s civil war from 2012 to 2013. During this time, the United States and other outside powers applied coercive strategies, in both deterrent and compellent modes. Outcomes varied: compellence in the form of coercive diplomacy achieved a partial success, getting Syria to give up much of its chemical stockpile, but there were multiple deterrence failures, culminating in a large-scale sarin gas attack in August 2013. We examine this record to draw lessons about factors associated with the effectiveness of coercion. Our analysis draws on insights from existing research on both deterrence and coercive diplomacy to develop an integrated analytical framework involving the interplay of three factors: credibility, motivations, and assurance. We find the typical default approach to coercion, based on demonstrating toughness and threatening to impose costs using airpower—an approach we call the “resolve plus bombs” formula—was not sufficient to change Syria’s calculations regarding chemical use.
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 51-74
Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification: Opportunities and Challenges
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 51-74
Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification: Opportunities and Challenges
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 121-148
Trust and Verification: Empirical Insights
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-17
Introduction
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 19-49
Verification in the Nuclear Arena: Nature, Significance and Practice
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 19-49
Verification in the Nuclear Arena: Nature, Significance and Practice
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 75-97
The Human Side of Verification: Trust and Confidence
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 75-97
The Human Side of Verification: Trust and Confidence
- 24 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-154
Conclusion: Looking to the Future
- 13 December 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- Vol. 33 (3) , 391-406
Fusing algorithms and analysts: open-source intelligence in the age of ‘Big Data’
In the age of ‘Big Data’, the potential value of open-source information for intelligence-related purposes is widely recognised. Of late, progress in this space has increasingly become associated with software that can expand our ability to gather, filter, interrelate and manipulate data through automated processes. The trend towards automation is both innovative and necessary. However, techno-centric efforts to replace human analysts with finely crafted algorithms across the board, from collection to synthesis and analysis of information, risk limiting the potential of OSINT rather than increasing its scope and impact. Effective OSINT systems must be carefully designed to facilitate complementarity, exploit the strengths, and mitigate the weaknesses of both human analysts and software solutions, obtaining the best contribution from both. Drawing on insights from the field of cognitive engineering, this article considers at a conceptual level how this might be achieved.
- 13 December 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- Vol. 33 (3) , 391-406
Fusing algorithms and analysts: open-source intelligence in the age of ‘Big Data’
In the age of ‘Big Data’, the potential value of open-source information for intelligence-related purposes is widely recognised. Of late, progress in this space has increasingly become associated with software that can expand our ability to gather, filter, interrelate and manipulate data through automated processes. The trend towards automation is both innovative and necessary. However, techno-centric efforts to replace human analysts with finely crafted algorithms across the board, from collection to synthesis and analysis of information, risk limiting the potential of OSINT rather than increasing its scope and impact. Effective OSINT systems must be carefully designed to facilitate complementarity, exploit the strengths, and mitigate the weaknesses of both human analysts and software solutions, obtaining the best contribution from both. Drawing on insights from the field of cognitive engineering, this article considers at a conceptual level how this might be achieved.