J. Michael Greig
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
J. Michael Greig has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Andrew J. Enterline
University of North Texas
4 shared publications- Nicolas Rost
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) at United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Visiting Scientist, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) at, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA
2 shared publications Paul F. Diehl
Department of Political Science , University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign , Urbana, Illinois, USA
2 shared publications- Andrew J. Enterline
Department of Political Science , University of North Texas , 1155 Union Circle #305340, Denton, TX, 76203-5017, USA
1 shared publication Eric Keels
Air War College , USA
1 shared publication- Eric Keels
U.S. Air War College
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (5) , 780-806
Paper Tigers: Assessing the Role of Corruption in Shaping Conflict Outcomes
While government corruption is often cited as a reason for poor military performance, little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding how governance structures influence corruption’s impact. To address this gap, we introduce a theory of how corruption undermines military efficacy in armed conflicts, arguing that regime type plays a critical role in shaping the impact of corruption on military performance. We focus specifically on public sector theft and embezzlement on fighting effectiveness. This type of corruption brings especially pernicious effects as it stokes morale problems among military personnel and weakens oversight of fighting effectiveness. To test our theory, we examine the outcomes of all lethal military interstate disputes (MIDS) and intrastate armed conflicts through 2014. Bridging the comparative politics and military effectiveness literatures, our results offer greater insight into how autocratic policies hinder armed forces as well as the need for stronger civilian oversight to ensure battlefield efficacy.
- 1 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (5) , 780-806
Paper Tigers: Assessing the Role of Corruption in Shaping Conflict Outcomes
While government corruption is often cited as a reason for poor military performance, little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding how governance structures influence corruption’s impact. To address this gap, we introduce a theory of how corruption undermines military efficacy in armed conflicts, arguing that regime type plays a critical role in shaping the impact of corruption on military performance. We focus specifically on public sector theft and embezzlement on fighting effectiveness. This type of corruption brings especially pernicious effects as it stokes morale problems among military personnel and weakens oversight of fighting effectiveness. To test our theory, we examine the outcomes of all lethal military interstate disputes (MIDS) and intrastate armed conflicts through 2014. Bridging the comparative politics and military effectiveness literatures, our results offer greater insight into how autocratic policies hinder armed forces as well as the need for stronger civilian oversight to ensure battlefield efficacy.
- 11 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 67 (4)
Fair-Weather Abusers? Civil War Dynamics and the Onset of State-Sponsored Violence
Despite decades of rigorous research on the use of government-sponsored violence in armed conflicts, there remains significant uncertainty as to when and where leaders choose to target civilians in war. We argue that the variation in the use of state repression is explained in part by how soldiers perceive battlefield gains by rebel forces. Specifically, while strong opposition forces are often a necessary condition for elites convincing agents to engage in state-sponsored brutality, this is modified by the soldiers’ beliefs surrounding the outcome of the war. If government soldiers believe that rebels are likely to win the war, we posit that they will likely shirk orders to target civilians, fearing post-war accountability. We test this argument by examining subnational variation in battlefield dynamics and the use of government one-sided violence from 1992 to 2010.
- 11 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 67 (4)
Fair-Weather Abusers? Civil War Dynamics and the Onset of State-Sponsored Violence
Despite decades of rigorous research on the use of government-sponsored violence in armed conflicts, there remains significant uncertainty as to when and where leaders choose to target civilians in war. We argue that the variation in the use of state repression is explained in part by how soldiers perceive battlefield gains by rebel forces. Specifically, while strong opposition forces are often a necessary condition for elites convincing agents to engage in state-sponsored brutality, this is modified by the soldiers’ beliefs surrounding the outcome of the war. If government soldiers believe that rebels are likely to win the war, we posit that they will likely shirk orders to target civilians, fearing post-war accountability. We test this argument by examining subnational variation in battlefield dynamics and the use of government one-sided violence from 1992 to 2010.
- 27 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 45 (5) , 838-864
The Conditional Effectiveness of Directive Mediation
This research re-examines the effectiveness of directive mediation in interstate rivalries. To do so, highlighting the importance of disputants’ willingness for successful directive mediation, this study identifies four conditions that affect the levels of disputants’ willingness to engage in mediation talks and proposes that the presence of such conditions improves or worsens the efficacy of directive strategies. We expect heavy-handed mediators will be less effective in a dispute involving highly interdependent or power-imbalanced rivalries while directive mediation performs poorly when it is led by unbiased mediators or when it is employed for long-running rivals. Our empirical findings, based on two existing rivalry datasets, suggest that directive mediation fares well when mediators are biased, when rivals are power-balanced, and when rivalries are protracted, and that the efficacy of directive mediation improves in disputes involving highly interdependent strategic rivals but decreases in the cases between highly interdependent general rivals.
- 27 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 45 (5) , 838-864
The Conditional Effectiveness of Directive Mediation
This research re-examines the effectiveness of directive mediation in interstate rivalries. To do so, highlighting the importance of disputants’ willingness for successful directive mediation, this study identifies four conditions that affect the levels of disputants’ willingness to engage in mediation talks and proposes that the presence of such conditions improves or worsens the efficacy of directive strategies. We expect heavy-handed mediators will be less effective in a dispute involving highly interdependent or power-imbalanced rivalries while directive mediation performs poorly when it is led by unbiased mediators or when it is employed for long-running rivals. Our empirical findings, based on two existing rivalry datasets, suggest that directive mediation fares well when mediators are biased, when rivals are power-balanced, and when rivalries are protracted, and that the efficacy of directive mediation improves in disputes involving highly interdependent strategic rivals but decreases in the cases between highly interdependent general rivals.
- 2 November 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 43 (6) , 967-993
State Capacity, Regime Type, and Sustaining the Peace after Civil War
About half of the nations that experience civil war eventually relapse into renewed conflict within a few years after the original war ends. This observation has motivated a stream of research into the factors that affect the risk of peace failure in the aftermath of civil war. While the outcome of the previous civil war—for example, military victory versus peace agreement—structures the post-war environment in ways that affect the risk of peace failure, the capacity of the post-war state to enact and implement policies that affect the incentives for and capacity of groups to undertake armed violence as a means of advancing their interests should also affect the risks of peace failure. Using Geddes’ categories of nondemocratic regime types, we will present a theory of how different regime types have varying capacities to repress and/or implement accommodative policies that affect the risk of peace failure. We test propositions derived from this theory with a series of event history models. Our findings suggest that while peace agreements significantly increase the duration of post-civil war peace, peace agreements involving some types of nondemocratic regimes actually increase the risk of post-civil war peace failure.
- 2 November 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 43 (6) , 967-993
State Capacity, Regime Type, and Sustaining the Peace after Civil War
About half of the nations that experience civil war eventually relapse into renewed conflict within a few years after the original war ends. This observation has motivated a stream of research into the factors that affect the risk of peace failure in the aftermath of civil war. While the outcome of the previous civil war—for example, military victory versus peace agreement—structures the post-war environment in ways that affect the risk of peace failure, the capacity of the post-war state to enact and implement policies that affect the incentives for and capacity of groups to undertake armed violence as a means of advancing their interests should also affect the risks of peace failure. Using Geddes’ categories of nondemocratic regime types, we will present a theory of how different regime types have varying capacities to repress and/or implement accommodative policies that affect the risk of peace failure. We test propositions derived from this theory with a series of event history models. Our findings suggest that while peace agreements significantly increase the duration of post-civil war peace, peace agreements involving some types of nondemocratic regimes actually increase the risk of post-civil war peace failure.
- 26 June 2014
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in International Negotiation
- Vol. 19 (2) , 257-284
To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: Civil War Mediation and International Criminal Justice
The International Criminal Court (icc) came into force in July 2002 with the potential to drastically alter both the war fighting and peacemaking behavior of states. Theiccis designed to try and subsequently punish those found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Supporters of theicchave argued that its establishment will erode the norm of impunity that state and military leaders have historically enjoyed. Yet, another logic suggests that the initiation of aniccinvestigation or the issuance of an arrest warrant for individuals embroiled in an ongoing dispute may make matters worse. Such individuals may see little reason to stop fighting and reach a settlement if conflict resolution results in their detention in The Hague. Indeed, suspected war criminals and their patrons may wish to escalate their violence in order to avoid showing any sign of weakness or possibility of capitulation lest their enemies press the fight or their rivals seek to undermine their authority. In this article, we explore the potential impact of theiccon the likelihood of peace by examining the impact of actions by theicc– the initiation of investigations into conflict situations and the issuance of arrest warrants for those suspected of committing violations of international law – on the likelihood of mediation. Our findings suggest that whileiccarrest warrants can encourage mediation, the initiation of investigations by theicccan actually undermine the occurrence of mediation.
- 26 June 2014
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in International Negotiation
- Vol. 19 (2) , 257-284
To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: Civil War Mediation and International Criminal Justice
The International Criminal Court (icc) came into force in July 2002 with the potential to drastically alter both the war fighting and peacemaking behavior of states. Theiccis designed to try and subsequently punish those found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Supporters of theicchave argued that its establishment will erode the norm of impunity that state and military leaders have historically enjoyed. Yet, another logic suggests that the initiation of aniccinvestigation or the issuance of an arrest warrant for individuals embroiled in an ongoing dispute may make matters worse. Such individuals may see little reason to stop fighting and reach a settlement if conflict resolution results in their detention in The Hague. Indeed, suspected war criminals and their patrons may wish to escalate their violence in order to avoid showing any sign of weakness or possibility of capitulation lest their enemies press the fight or their rivals seek to undermine their authority. In this article, we explore the potential impact of theiccon the likelihood of peace by examining the impact of actions by theicc– the initiation of investigations into conflict situations and the issuance of arrest warrants for those suspected of committing violations of international law – on the likelihood of mediation. Our findings suggest that whileiccarrest warrants can encourage mediation, the initiation of investigations by theicccan actually undermine the occurrence of mediation.
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (4) , 680-693
Rebels at the Gates: Civil War Battle Locations, Movement, and Openings for Diplomacy
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 59 (4) , 680-693
Rebels at the Gates: Civil War Battle Locations, Movement, and Openings for Diplomacy
- 17 January 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 40 (2) , 166-190
The Durability of Imposed Democracy
Why do imposed democracies endure and how do policy choices by imposing states affect durability? To study these questions, we formulate expectations linking durability to structural domestic conditions, the level of domestic security in the state into which a polity is imposed, the policies of imposing states, and the regional environment within which an imposed democracy is nested. We use event history to test our expectations on a sample of democracies imposed during the twentieth century. We find that relatively immutable, structural conditions, such as ethnic cleavages, economic development, and prior democratic experience strongly influence the durability of imposed democracies. While some policy choices made by imposing states can impact the survival of imposed democracy, they do so only modestly relative to the environment in which a democracy is imposed.
- 17 January 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 40 (2) , 166-190
The Durability of Imposed Democracy
Why do imposed democracies endure and how do policy choices by imposing states affect durability? To study these questions, we formulate expectations linking durability to structural domestic conditions, the level of domestic security in the state into which a polity is imposed, the policies of imposing states, and the regional environment within which an imposed democracy is nested. We use event history to test our expectations on a sample of democracies imposed during the twentieth century. We find that relatively immutable, structural conditions, such as ethnic cleavages, economic development, and prior democratic experience strongly influence the durability of imposed democracies. While some policy choices made by imposing states can impact the survival of imposed democracy, they do so only modestly relative to the environment in which a democracy is imposed.
- 13 September 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 59 (2) , 336-361
Nipping Them in the Bud
Civil conflicts constitute one of the most significant threats to human security. Understanding when belligerents are willing to undertake conflict management efforts is an important first step in better understanding how civil conflicts can be dealt with by the international community. In this article, I examine the occurrence of mediation in low-intensity conflicts. Drawing on insights from the war termination literature, I develop a theoretical argument that links mediation in low-intensity conflicts to the evolution of fighting. I argue that, while the characteristics of a conflict and its belligerents influence when mediation happens, how events unfold on the battlefield also influences the occurrence of mediation. I test this argument by looking at low-intensity conflicts in Africa from 1997 to 2004 using data on mediation in low-intensity conflicts and battle-level civil conflict events. The analysis highlights the important effect of battlefield outcomes and locations upon the occurrence of mediation in low-intensity conflicts.
- 13 September 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 59 (2) , 336-361
Nipping Them in the Bud
Civil conflicts constitute one of the most significant threats to human security. Understanding when belligerents are willing to undertake conflict management efforts is an important first step in better understanding how civil conflicts can be dealt with by the international community. In this article, I examine the occurrence of mediation in low-intensity conflicts. Drawing on insights from the war termination literature, I develop a theoretical argument that links mediation in low-intensity conflicts to the evolution of fighting. I argue that, while the characteristics of a conflict and its belligerents influence when mediation happens, how events unfold on the battlefield also influences the occurrence of mediation. I test this argument by looking at low-intensity conflicts in Africa from 1997 to 2004 using data on mediation in low-intensity conflicts and battle-level civil conflict events. The analysis highlights the important effect of battlefield outcomes and locations upon the occurrence of mediation in low-intensity conflicts.
- 1 June 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Civil Wars
- Vol. 15 (2) , 192-218
Mediation and Peacekeeping in Civil Wars
The occurrence of outside mediation and peacekeeping has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War. But how do third-party states and international organizations decide which civil wars to intervene in? And how do they decide whether to mediate talks between the warring parties or to send peacekeepers? In this study, we propose that third parties are influenced by their interests in a civil war country, they take into account the urgency a civil war poses, and they shy away from particularly challenging civil wars. Empirical tests confirm some of these hypotheses but also yield some contrary results. In contrast to much of the empirical literature, which has mostly treated different conflict management tools separately, this study combines two of the most important aspects of international conflict management – mediation and peacekeeping – into one theoretical framework.
- 1 June 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Civil Wars
- Vol. 15 (2) , 192-218
Mediation and Peacekeeping in Civil Wars
The occurrence of outside mediation and peacekeeping has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War. But how do third-party states and international organizations decide which civil wars to intervene in? And how do they decide whether to mediate talks between the warring parties or to send peacekeepers? In this study, we propose that third parties are influenced by their interests in a civil war country, they take into account the urgency a civil war poses, and they shy away from particularly challenging civil wars. Empirical tests confirm some of these hypotheses but also yield some contrary results. In contrast to much of the empirical literature, which has mostly treated different conflict management tools separately, this study combines two of the most important aspects of international conflict management – mediation and peacekeeping – into one theoretical framework.
- 19 April 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 29 (2) , 127-147
Staying the Course
The use of peacekeeping to manage conflicts in the international system has grown since the end of the Cold War. While much attention has been devoted to what makes peacekeeping successful, the outcome of peacekeeping is ultimately tied to the willingness of the intervening actor(s) to “stay the course” and continue the mission until its objectives are complete. In this article we focus upon the empirical puzzle of peacekeeping missions’ sustainability. After states and international organizations overcome the collective action problem of forming a mission and deploying it, it is puzzling that so many missions drop out before completion. We adopt a competing risks framework in our analysis to identify the forces that determine whether peacekeepers stay until the end of a conflict or withdraw early. Our explanation argues that peacekeepers are more likely to stay the course as the capacity of the mission increases, the costs and risks of peacekeeping diminish, and traction towards peace is observed.
- 19 April 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 29 (2) , 127-147
Staying the Course
The use of peacekeeping to manage conflicts in the international system has grown since the end of the Cold War. While much attention has been devoted to what makes peacekeeping successful, the outcome of peacekeeping is ultimately tied to the willingness of the intervening actor(s) to “stay the course” and continue the mission until its objectives are complete. In this article we focus upon the empirical puzzle of peacekeeping missions’ sustainability. After states and international organizations overcome the collective action problem of forming a mission and deploying it, it is puzzling that so many missions drop out before completion. We adopt a competing risks framework in our analysis to identify the forces that determine whether peacekeepers stay until the end of a conflict or withdraw early. Our explanation argues that peacekeepers are more likely to stay the course as the capacity of the mission increases, the costs and risks of peacekeeping diminish, and traction towards peace is observed.