Joona Räsänen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Joona Räsänen has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Anna Smajdor
University of Oslo
3 shared publications- Anna Smajdor
IFIKK, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
3 shared publications - Christopher Stratman
Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, USA
3 shared publications - Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Department of Politics, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark
3 shared publications - Matti Häyry
Aalto University ( Finland )
3 shared publications - Adrian Villalba
Department of Philosophy II, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Human Genetics
- p. 1-2
Manufactured gametes and the principle of genetic caution
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Human Genetics
- p. 1-2
Open AccessManufactured gametes and the principle of genetic caution
- Open Access
- 8 July 2026
- Published by BMJ in JME Practical Bioethics
- Vol. 2 (3) , e000290
Global Bioethics Bulletin: dispatches on access to abortion
This bulletin examines access to abortion across the world by focusing on who has decision-making authority and how authorisation takes place in practice. Our focus is on the practical ethical questions that arise after a law, court or other authority has determined that abortion may be available under specified conditions. We examine the factors that influence whether a pregnant person’s 1 informed request is treated as sufficient to proceed, or whether it is overridden, deferred or made conditional on approval from a spouse, parent, committee, clinic or individual healthcare provider.
- 8 July 2026
- Published by BMJ in JME Practical Bioethics
- Vol. 2 (3) , e000290
Open AccessGlobal Bioethics Bulletin: dispatches on access to abortion
This bulletin examines access to abortion across the world by focusing on who has decision-making authority and how authorisation takes place in practice. Our focus is on the practical ethical questions that arise after a law, court or other authority has determined that abortion may be available under specified conditions. We examine the factors that influence whether a pregnant person’s 1 informed request is treated as sufficient to proceed, or whether it is overridden, deferred or made conditional on approval from a spouse, parent, committee, clinic or individual healthcare provider.
- 5 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 143-164
Are Gestatelings Newborn Infants?
This chapter explores various conceptual and ethical questions regarding the definition of “birth” in the context of ectogestation. Should gestatelings be considered “born”, and if so, do they possess the same moral rights and legal protections as newborn infants? While some argue that gestatelings are morally and legally equivalent to newborns, others maintain that they are not because they have not been born in the relevant sense. In this chapter, we defend the claim that the best arguments for the conventional definition of “birth” are unsupported.
- 5 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 143-164
Are Gestatelings Newborn Infants?
This chapter explores various conceptual and ethical questions regarding the definition of “birth” in the context of ectogestation. Should gestatelings be considered “born”, and if so, do they possess the same moral rights and legal protections as newborn infants? While some argue that gestatelings are morally and legally equivalent to newborns, others maintain that they are not because they have not been born in the relevant sense. In this chapter, we defend the claim that the best arguments for the conventional definition of “birth” are unsupported.
- 5 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-13
Introduction to the Ethics of Ectogestation
- 5 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
Ectogestation and the Future of Reproductive Rights
- 5 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 167-185
Genetic Privacy and a Case for Ending the Life of the Fetus
- 5 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 167-185
Genetic Privacy and a Case for Ending the Life of the Fetus
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 26 (4) , 24-26
Applying Phenomenology of Pregnancy in Abortion Debate
In her article, Laura Hermer (2026) makes a valuable point by arguing that embodiment must be taken into account in reproductive policy and abortion law. She claims that the physiological and hormo...
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 26 (4) , 24-26
Applying Phenomenology of Pregnancy in Abortion Debate
In her article, Laura Hermer (2026) makes a valuable point by arguing that embodiment must be taken into account in reproductive policy and abortion law. She claims that the physiological and hormo...
- Open Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by BMJ in JME Practical Bioethics
- Vol. 2 (2) , e000120
How (not) to argue against infanticide
Important conversations never die. Johnny Sakr resurrects the debate on infanticide by offering another rebuttal of the now (in)famous article ‘After-birth abortion: Why should the baby live?’ by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva (G&M).1 G&M claimed that since abortion can be permissible even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus’ health, and since, on their view, the moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus (they argue that neither are persons in philosophers’ technical sense, as this requires such things as self-awareness, future-directed desires and the capacity to value one’s own existence), infanticide should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is. Sakr challenges the argument on three grounds.2
- 1 April 2026
- Published by BMJ in JME Practical Bioethics
- Vol. 2 (2) , e000120
Open AccessHow (not) to argue against infanticide
Important conversations never die. Johnny Sakr resurrects the debate on infanticide by offering another rebuttal of the now (in)famous article ‘After-birth abortion: Why should the baby live?’ by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva (G&M).1 G&M claimed that since abortion can be permissible even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus’ health, and since, on their view, the moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus (they argue that neither are persons in philosophers’ technical sense, as this requires such things as self-awareness, future-directed desires and the capacity to value one’s own existence), infanticide should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is. Sakr challenges the argument on three grounds.2
- Open Access
- 6 January 2026
- Published by BMJ in JME Practical Bioethics
- Vol. 2 (1) , e000083
Global Bioethics Bulletin: dispatches on climate justice
- 6 January 2026
- Published by BMJ in JME Practical Bioethics
- Vol. 2 (1) , e000083
Open AccessGlobal Bioethics Bulletin: dispatches on climate justice
- Open Access
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The New Bioethics
- Vol. 32 (1) , 55-65
OnlyFans and Deep Fake Porn – Can We Accept the Former but Condemn the Latter?
Many people think that producing online pornography, such as creating sexual content at OnlyFans, is permissible. Many of the same people also think that creating deepfake pornography without or against the consent of the person is wrong. I argue that accepting online sex work is inconsistent with judging pornographic deepfakes as worse than non-pornographic deepfakes. This claim resembles similarity with a broader problem in sexual ethics raised by David Benatar. I apply Benatar's argument in the context of online sexual activities to highlight the ethical issues recent technological developments raise. I do this neither as a case against the permissibility of online sex work nor as a defense of pornographic deep fakes. The purpose is to point out the inconsistency. One could avoid the problem by extending or limiting the range of permissible sexual practices online. But if I am right, we cannot both accept OnlyFans and condemn non-consensual pornographic deep fakes.
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The New Bioethics
- Vol. 32 (1) , 55-65
Open AccessOnlyFans and Deep Fake Porn – Can We Accept the Former but Condemn the Latter?
Many people think that producing online pornography, such as creating sexual content at OnlyFans, is permissible. Many of the same people also think that creating deepfake pornography without or against the consent of the person is wrong. I argue that accepting online sex work is inconsistent with judging pornographic deepfakes as worse than non-pornographic deepfakes. This claim resembles similarity with a broader problem in sexual ethics raised by David Benatar. I apply Benatar's argument in the context of online sexual activities to highlight the ethical issues recent technological developments raise. I do this neither as a case against the permissibility of online sex work nor as a defense of pornographic deep fakes. The purpose is to point out the inconsistency. One could avoid the problem by extending or limiting the range of permissible sexual practices online. But if I am right, we cannot both accept OnlyFans and condemn non-consensual pornographic deep fakes.