Alessandro Pellegata
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Alessandro Pellegata has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Francesco Visconti
LUISS Guido Carli
3 shared publications - Giovanni Carbone
Università degli Studi di Milano
2 shared publications - Vincenzo Memoli
University of Catania
2 shared publications - Andrea Pedrazzani
University of Milan
1 shared publication - Ann-Kathrin Reinl
Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, GESIS
1 shared publication - Anna Kyriazi
University of Milan, Milan, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-26
Here comes the flood: crisis learning and public support for EU disaster solidarity
Over the past 15 years, the European Union (EU) has come under increasing strain as a series of international challenges have put the Union to the test. This period began with the Euro area crisis ...
- 28 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-26
Here comes the flood: crisis learning and public support for EU disaster solidarity
Over the past 15 years, the European Union (EU) has come under increasing strain as a series of international challenges have put the Union to the test. This period began with the Euro area crisis ...
- 30 July 2024
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 63 (3) , 839-859
European Solidarity Takes the Field: The Dimensional Structure of Political Competition in the European Union After the Polycrisis
Most studies investigating the dimensionality of political space in Europe demonstrate that European Union (EU)‐related issues are orthogonal to the economic left–right dimension. This literature usually employs survey items tapping into general support for the EU. However, the multiple crises that hit Europe after 2008 have polarized even Europhile voters on the more specific issue of European solidarity. This article aims to investigate how voters' attitudes towards European solidarity interplay with their position on the left–right and European integration dimensions, as well as specific economic and cultural issues. Empirical analyses employ original survey data collected in 2019 in 10 EU countries. Results partially support the expectations of regional differences in the dimensionality of the political space, with European solidarity more strongly associated with left–right, EU integration and immigration in Northern EU member states than in Eastern and Southern countries, in which voters are more likely to support solidarity notwithstanding their general political orientations.
- 30 July 2024
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 63 (3) , 839-859
European Solidarity Takes the Field: The Dimensional Structure of Political Competition in the European Union After the Polycrisis
Most studies investigating the dimensionality of political space in Europe demonstrate that European Union (EU)‐related issues are orthogonal to the economic left–right dimension. This literature usually employs survey items tapping into general support for the EU. However, the multiple crises that hit Europe after 2008 have polarized even Europhile voters on the more specific issue of European solidarity. This article aims to investigate how voters' attitudes towards European solidarity interplay with their position on the left–right and European integration dimensions, as well as specific economic and cultural issues. Empirical analyses employ original survey data collected in 2019 in 10 EU countries. Results partially support the expectations of regional differences in the dimensionality of the political space, with European solidarity more strongly associated with left–right, EU integration and immigration in Northern EU member states than in Eastern and Southern countries, in which voters are more likely to support solidarity notwithstanding their general political orientations.
- 17 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary European Studies
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1307-1322
Mapping citizens, voters, and parties’ preferences on European solidarity across EU member states
- 17 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary European Studies
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1307-1322
Mapping citizens, voters, and parties’ preferences on European solidarity across EU member states
- Open Access
- 7 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 21 (4) , 535-553
Closer in hard times? The drivers of European solidarity in ‘normal’ and ‘crisis’ times
This article examines the trends and differences in predictors of public support for European Union (EU) fiscal solidarity using two individual surveys conducted in 2019 and 2020, before and during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, in six Western European countries. We focus on individual self-interest and European/national identification as the two major determinants of public preference formation. Empirical analyses show that, while the average level of public support for European fiscal solidarity did not change from 2019 to 2020, the negative associations between exclusive national identification and economic vulnerability, on the one hand, and EU fiscal solidarity on the other were weakened. Among both, the identitarian source retained substantive (although reduced) relevance in 2020, while utility did not. Country-level analyses reveal a more complex picture, but the overall pattern holds across the member states included in our sample. We argue that the reduced explanatory power of these typical heuristics that individuals use to shape their attitudes towards European solidarity is connected to the nature of the pandemic as an exogenous ‘common crisis’, affecting all member states in a supposedly symmetric manner, at least in the first phase, and inducing interdependencies among them.
- 7 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 21 (4) , 535-553
Open AccessCloser in hard times? The drivers of European solidarity in ‘normal’ and ‘crisis’ times
This article examines the trends and differences in predictors of public support for European Union (EU) fiscal solidarity using two individual surveys conducted in 2019 and 2020, before and during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, in six Western European countries. We focus on individual self-interest and European/national identification as the two major determinants of public preference formation. Empirical analyses show that, while the average level of public support for European fiscal solidarity did not change from 2019 to 2020, the negative associations between exclusive national identification and economic vulnerability, on the one hand, and EU fiscal solidarity on the other were weakened. Among both, the identitarian source retained substantive (although reduced) relevance in 2020, while utility did not. Country-level analyses reveal a more complex picture, but the overall pattern holds across the member states included in our sample. We argue that the reduced explanatory power of these typical heuristics that individuals use to shape their attitudes towards European solidarity is connected to the nature of the pandemic as an exogenous ‘common crisis’, affecting all member states in a supposedly symmetric manner, at least in the first phase, and inducing interdependencies among them.
- Open Access
- 17 October 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 46 (7) , 1369-1395
Multi-level blame attribution and public support for EU welfare policies
Since the Eurozone crisis, intense political debate has resurfaced about deservingness judgements in European solidarity. To contribute to this debate, this article proposes a refined concept of ‘multi-level blame attribution’. It postulates that public support for EU-level welfare policies crucially depends on how citizens attribute responsibility for economic outcomes across different levels of agency. Results from an original public opinion survey conducted in 10 European Union member states demonstrate that attributing blame to individuals decreases citizens’ willingness to show solidarity with needy Europeans, whereas attributing blame to the EU increases support. The role of attributing blame to national governments is dependent on the country context; beliefs that worse economic outcomes are caused by national governments’ policy decisions tend to dampen support for EU targeted welfare policies only in the Nordic welfare states. The article concludes by discussing the implications of multi-level blame attribution for the formation of public attitudes towards European solidarity.
- 17 October 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 46 (7) , 1369-1395
Open AccessMulti-level blame attribution and public support for EU welfare policies
Since the Eurozone crisis, intense political debate has resurfaced about deservingness judgements in European solidarity. To contribute to this debate, this article proposes a refined concept of ‘multi-level blame attribution’. It postulates that public support for EU-level welfare policies crucially depends on how citizens attribute responsibility for economic outcomes across different levels of agency. Results from an original public opinion survey conducted in 10 European Union member states demonstrate that attributing blame to individuals decreases citizens’ willingness to show solidarity with needy Europeans, whereas attributing blame to the EU increases support. The role of attributing blame to national governments is dependent on the country context; beliefs that worse economic outcomes are caused by national governments’ policy decisions tend to dampen support for EU targeted welfare policies only in the Nordic welfare states. The article concludes by discussing the implications of multi-level blame attribution for the formation of public attitudes towards European solidarity.
- Open Access
- 28 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 42-63
Should EU member states help each other? How the national context shapes individual preferences for European solidarity
With the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, the idea of providing cross-national financial transfers to countries in economic and financial difficulties has exacerbated the political divide between EU member states with strong macroeconomic performances, which were only weakly hit by the crisis, and the countries of the Eurozone periphery that struggled with a harsh economic downturn. This paper aims to explain which factors drive public support for cross-national solidarity within and across countries. We argue that the national context in which citizens live affects their preferences for providing financial help to other European countries, and moderates the role played by subjective egotropic and sociotropic economic concerns, ideological predispositions, and Eurosceptic vote choices in shaping public support for European solidarity. Using the original REScEU 2016 survey, we find that subjective economic motivations provide a limited contribution in explaining support for European solidarity, and almost only in countries weakly hit by the crisis. On the contrary, left–right positions, and especially Eurosceptic vote choices, strongly polarize preferences for EU financial assistance, both within and across countries with voters from Eurosceptic parties more(less) likely to support European solidarity in countries strongly(weakly) hit by the Eurozone crisis.
- 28 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 42-63
Open AccessShould EU member states help each other? How the national context shapes individual preferences for European solidarity
With the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, the idea of providing cross-national financial transfers to countries in economic and financial difficulties has exacerbated the political divide between EU member states with strong macroeconomic performances, which were only weakly hit by the crisis, and the countries of the Eurozone periphery that struggled with a harsh economic downturn. This paper aims to explain which factors drive public support for cross-national solidarity within and across countries. We argue that the national context in which citizens live affects their preferences for providing financial help to other European countries, and moderates the role played by subjective egotropic and sociotropic economic concerns, ideological predispositions, and Eurosceptic vote choices in shaping public support for European solidarity. Using the original REScEU 2016 survey, we find that subjective economic motivations provide a limited contribution in explaining support for European solidarity, and almost only in countries weakly hit by the crisis. On the contrary, left–right positions, and especially Eurosceptic vote choices, strongly polarize preferences for EU financial assistance, both within and across countries with voters from Eurosceptic parties more(less) likely to support European solidarity in countries strongly(weakly) hit by the Eurozone crisis.
- 5 August 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 23 (1) , 79-99
Voting for a social Europe? European solidarity and voting behaviour in the 2019 European elections
This article investigates whether public preferences for European solidarity are associated with vote choices in the 2019 European elections. After multiple crises, the politicisation of European Union affairs has increased, polarising voters and parties between those favouring the redistribution of risks across member states and those prioritising national responsibility in coping with the consequences of the crises. We expect pro-solidarity voters to be more prone to vote for green and radical-left parties and less prone to vote for conservative and radical-right parties. Testing these hypotheses in 10 European Union countries with original survey data, we find that green and radical-left parties profited from European solidarity voting only in some countries, while being pro-solidarity reduced the likelihood of voting for both moderate and radical-right parties in each sample country.
- 5 August 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 23 (1) , 79-99
Voting for a social Europe? European solidarity and voting behaviour in the 2019 European elections
This article investigates whether public preferences for European solidarity are associated with vote choices in the 2019 European elections. After multiple crises, the politicisation of European Union affairs has increased, polarising voters and parties between those favouring the redistribution of risks across member states and those prioritising national responsibility in coping with the consequences of the crises. We expect pro-solidarity voters to be more prone to vote for green and radical-left parties and less prone to vote for conservative and radical-right parties. Testing these hypotheses in 10 European Union countries with original survey data, we find that green and radical-left parties profited from European solidarity voting only in some countries, while being pro-solidarity reduced the likelihood of voting for both moderate and radical-right parties in each sample country.
- Open Access
- 17 June 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 44 (5-6) , 1232-1257
A cure worse than the disease? Exploring the health-economy trade-off during COVID-19
Nationwide lockdowns implemented by governments to confront the COVID-19 pandemic came at a high economic price. The article investigates citizens’ evaluation of the trade-off between public health measures and their economic consequences. Using a vignette experiment conducted in June 2020 on 7,500 respondents in seven European countries the article tests whether perceived threats of the health and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic affect citizens’ preferences for strict or mild lockdown measures. Findings show that European citizens tend to prefer strict measures protecting public health despite their damage to the economy. Even individuals more concerned about the pandemic’s economic impact do not prefer milder restrictions. Sociodemographic factors only indirectly affect public preferences, through perceived threats. Additionally, findings show that trust in experts and political orientations matter. These results resonate with previous research showing that public opinion in hard times is likely to be guided by risk perceptions and subjective attitudes. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1933310 .
- 17 June 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 44 (5-6) , 1232-1257
Open AccessA cure worse than the disease? Exploring the health-economy trade-off during COVID-19
Nationwide lockdowns implemented by governments to confront the COVID-19 pandemic came at a high economic price. The article investigates citizens’ evaluation of the trade-off between public health measures and their economic consequences. Using a vignette experiment conducted in June 2020 on 7,500 respondents in seven European countries the article tests whether perceived threats of the health and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic affect citizens’ preferences for strict or mild lockdown measures. Findings show that European citizens tend to prefer strict measures protecting public health despite their damage to the economy. Even individuals more concerned about the pandemic’s economic impact do not prefer milder restrictions. Sociodemographic factors only indirectly affect public preferences, through perceived threats. Additionally, findings show that trust in experts and political orientations matter. These results resonate with previous research showing that public opinion in hard times is likely to be guided by risk perceptions and subjective attitudes. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1933310 .
- 17 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in South European Society and Politics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 55-82
Transnationalism and Welfare Chauvinism in Italy: Evidence from the 2018 Election Campaign
This paper investigates the factors which explain public attitudes to welfare chauvinism in Italy. The notion of ‘welfare chauvinism’ refers to the idea that foreigners, considered as out-groups, should have limited or even no access to domestic social security benefits. We focus on the role played by individual transnationalism: i.e. direct and indirect ties and connections with people and cultures of other European countries. We postulate that transnationalism dilutes fears and anxieties, fostering pro-opening attitudes. We test the research hypotheses by using original survey data collected during the 2018 Italian elections, in which the issues of welfare benefits and immigration shaped the election campaign.
- 17 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in South European Society and Politics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 55-82
Transnationalism and Welfare Chauvinism in Italy: Evidence from the 2018 Election Campaign
This paper investigates the factors which explain public attitudes to welfare chauvinism in Italy. The notion of ‘welfare chauvinism’ refers to the idea that foreigners, considered as out-groups, should have limited or even no access to domestic social security benefits. We focus on the role played by individual transnationalism: i.e. direct and indirect ties and connections with people and cultures of other European countries. We postulate that transnationalism dilutes fears and anxieties, fostering pro-opening attitudes. We test the research hypotheses by using original survey data collected during the 2018 Italian elections, in which the issues of welfare benefits and immigration shaped the election campaign.
- 19 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 60-78
The Africa Leadership Change (ALC) Dataset
Political Leadership in Africa - by Giovanni Carbone March 2020
- 19 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 60-78
The Africa Leadership Change (ALC) Dataset
Political Leadership in Africa - by Giovanni Carbone March 2020