SCSven-Olof Yrjö Collin

Sven-Olof Yrjö Collin

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Sven-Olof Yrjö Collin has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    A Critique Of The Ideology Of Sustainability Among Academics And Universities

    by Sven-Olof Collin

    Sustainability has turned into an ideology, promoted by commercial and political organizations, but now also by academics and their universities. Here I discuss sustainability as a conservative ideology, that through activist actions by academics and universities refute the academic ground of academic freedom. Through anecdotal examples from my own academic subject, business administration, I notice that it has ideological elements and that it has elements that are in accordance to sustainability. I end by a call for academics to not be political agents, so called activists, but to perform their academic duty, to critically study reality and to give scientific knowledge to society, in order to make society better able to perform sustainable actions.

  • Open Access

    Governance, delegation or constellation?: An empirical study of corporate governance in a Swedish municipal corporation in the waste industry

    by Sven-Olof Yrjö Collin, Elin Smith

    Corporate governance studies are dominated by a delegation view stating that governance rights originate from the owners and are delegated to agents, such as the board and the chief executive officer (CEO). We contrast this view with a constellation view where rights are located among governance actors. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the relevance of these two dichotomous views. Using a structured induction method on a single case study of a Swedish municipal corporation we abstracted three concepts: octopus governance, interactive governance and potentiality of governance. By relating them to the two views we conclude that the constellation view of governance is empirically more relevant under moderate situations, while the delegation view is more relevant in dramatic situations.

  • Open Access

    Board functions in governance arenas: a comparative case study of four Swedish family firms

    by Jenny Ahlberg, Sven-Olof Yrjö Collin, Elin Smith, Timur Uman

    Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore board functions and their location in family firms.Design/methodology/approach: Through structured induction in a four-case study of medium-sized Swedish family firms, the authors demonstrate that board functions can be located in other arenas than in the common board and suggest propositions that explain their distribution.Findings: (1) The board is but one of several arenas where board functions are performed. (2) The functions performed by the board vary in type and emphasis. (3) The non-family directors in a family firm serve the owners, even sometimes governing them, in what the authors term “bidirectional governance”. (4) The kin strategy of the family influences their governance. (5) The utilization of a board for governance stems from the family (together with its constitution, kin strategy and governance strategy), the board composition and the business conditions of the firm.Research limitations/implications: Being a case study the findings are restricted to concepts and theoretical propositions. Using structured induction, the study is not solely inductive but still contains the subjectivity of induction.Practical implications: Governance agents should have an instrumental view on the board, considering it one possible governance arena among others, thereby economizing on governance.Social implications: The institutional pressure toward active boards could paradoxically reduce the importance of the board in family firms.Originality/value: The board of a family company differs in its emphasis of board functions and these functions are performed with varying emphases in different governance arenas. The authors propose the concept of kin strategy, which refers to the governance importance of the structure of the owner and observations on bi-directional governance, indicating that the board can govern the owners.


  • Open Access

    Towards a Critique of Corporate Governance Research

    by Sven-Olof Collin

    Corporate governance research contains ontological assumptions, perspectives and methodologies that enable, but at the same time, restricts our understanding of governance. In this document I present a critique of corporate governance where I will point out some limitations and suggest some possible extensions and different conceptualizations in order to make corporate governance research more empirically relevant and, at least, more conscious of its ideological content, thereby improving the CG research’s capacity to perform its societal duty to explain and understand corporate governance. I end with a reflection on us, the researchers, and the role we could and even should play when performing our social duty as researchers of corporate governance.

  • Exploring Board Behaviour in a Public Context - Experiences from a Swedish Municipal Corporation

    by Elin Marianne Smith, Timur Uman, Sven-Olof Collin

    Based on an eclectic theoretical approach of board behaviour and longitudinal case-observations of a local municipal corporation this study aims at exploring what constitutes board behaviour in the...

  • Open Access

    Independent directors in Sweden and their influence on earnings through accrual and real activities management

    by Sven-Olof Yrjö Collin, Yuliya Ponomareva, Fredrik Björklund, David Krieg

    The dominating perspective grounded in agency theory predicts that independent boards are more effective in monitoring and thereby reducing earnings management, yet the extant empirical evidence is inconclusive. We nuance the relationship between board independence and earnings management by introducing two additional theories that explain independent directors’ role on the board: the theory of personal dependence and praxis theory. According to personal dependence theory, the influence of independent directors on earnings management is a function of their competitiveness in the labor market, whereas the praxis theory attributes directors’ influence to the influence of the dominant coalition. We focus on two dimensions of earnings management  accrual and real activities management, and account for both direction and magnitude of directors’ influence. Through an empirical test on 148 Swedish corporations from 2017, our findings indicate that the presence of independent directors may not necessarily reduce earnings management. Instead, independent directors may be subject to multiple and sometimes conflicting task demands which differently influence both magnitude and direction of earnings management. Implications for our understanding of the role of independent directors and their influence on corporations are presented


  • Open Access

    The cost of conformity to good governance: Board design and compensation

    by Yuliya Ponomareva, Ryan Federo, Ruth V. Aguilera, Sven‐Olof Collin

    Research question/issue: Albeit the fact that the “one‐size‐fits‐all” corporate governance model has been mostly discarded, the debate on what constitutes a well‐governed firm has converged toward a set of practices that comprise what we refer to as the global good governance norm. Whereas extant research has focused mainly on the benefits of good governance, we build on neo‐institutional theory to explore how firm conformity or nonconformity to this global norm is associated with the cost of board governance, captured as board compensation.Research findings/insights: Using a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of firms listed in the Stockholm Stock Exchange, we find that the configurations of board practices conforming to the global good governance norm are associated with higher board compensation than those that score low on conformity. Based on our findings, we deduce four archetypical board design strategies jointly shaped by two central forces: the pressure toward conformity to the good governance norm and the extent of governance discretion, denoting firm agentic behavior.Theoretical/academic implications: First, our study highlights that conformity to the global good governance norm is accompanied with higher costs than nonconformity. Second, while most of the extant research discusses conformity and agentic behavior as two opposing forces, we uncover that they simultaneously co‐exist in board governance, stressing their interconnectedness.Practitioner/policy implications: Conformity to the global good governance norm influences the strategic choices of board designs and the costs associated with such choices.


  • Open Access

    Duty Governing Human Actions: To Act Because It Is Righteous

    by Sven-Olof Collin

    It can be claimed that humans have at least three basic instincts: the instincts of selfishness, of belongingness and of duty. Selfishness and belongingness are in focus in economic and sociological studies. Duty has been locked into practical philosophy and, more recently, has been used in organizational justice studies. The paper focuses on duty and explores the instinct of duty by defining it, indicating how it works, and examining its function and origin. This is accomplished by extracting knowledge from a literature review, describing its origin in Kantian moral thinking and extracting some implications of duty, and through case studies analysing the actions of three persons. Duty is found when an individual applies his/her Weltanschauung, containing maxims of action. Duty varies according to the individual, the person with whom the individual is dealing (the ‘exchange person’), the situation and the environment.


  • Open Access

    Independent directors in Sweden and their influence on earnings through accounting and cash flow management

    by Fredrik Björklund, Sven-Olof Yrjö Collin, David Krieg, Yuliya Ponomareva

    In this paper we distinguish between the two domains of monitoring arguing that CFM revolves around long-term action for corporate value creation, and ultimately affects shareholder profit, thus being at the heart of an independent directors’ duty. Empirical results indicate that the share of independent directors is positively correlated with AM and negatively with CFM and remain consistent against several robustness checks. Our theory and empirical results put into question the generally accepted notion that AM is an indicator of opportunism. It could be suggested, on the contrary, that the positive correlation with AM could be an indicator of directors’ performing their fiduciary duty of reducing information asymmetry