Carmen E. Pavel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Carmen E. Pavel has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Lefkowitz
University of Richmond
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Global Constitutionalism
- Vol. 15 (1) , 85-110
The ethics of state consent to international law
State consent is the primary mechanism by which international legal rules are generated and amended and by which states undertake legal obligations. The focus on state consent is celebrated for its strong protection of state sovereignty and for expressing the will of states. The main purpose of this article is to raise some doubts about this understanding of the value of state consent. I argue that far from protecting state sovereignty, unrestricted state consent can undermine it. I show that it is false to think that the virtually unlimited freedom to act protected by state consent safeguards state sovereignty in an environment in which every other state possesses the same unlimited freedom to act. I suggest one possible way of reconceiving state consent in line with existing trends in international law to increase the scope of nonconsensual mechanisms for making international legal rules.
- 27 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Global Constitutionalism
- Vol. 15 (1) , 85-110
Open AccessThe ethics of state consent to international law
State consent is the primary mechanism by which international legal rules are generated and amended and by which states undertake legal obligations. The focus on state consent is celebrated for its strong protection of state sovereignty and for expressing the will of states. The main purpose of this article is to raise some doubts about this understanding of the value of state consent. I argue that far from protecting state sovereignty, unrestricted state consent can undermine it. I show that it is false to think that the virtually unlimited freedom to act protected by state consent safeguards state sovereignty in an environment in which every other state possesses the same unlimited freedom to act. I suggest one possible way of reconceiving state consent in line with existing trends in international law to increase the scope of nonconsensual mechanisms for making international legal rules.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of International Political Theory
- Vol. 21 (2) , 166-184
Constituent power and constituent capacity in the making of a global constitutional treaty
International law is quasi-constitutionalized, and there is a case to be made for further constitutionalization. But who should be in charge for making a global constitution? At the domestic level, the answer is the popular sovereign, namely the citizens understood as constitutional subjects who individually and collectively hold constituent power. We do not have an easy answer to the question of who holds constituent power at the global level. This article highlights some challenges for identifying the holders of constituent power in international law. The international community contains numerous authoritarian states. In the absence of reliable processes of representation of their citizens’ voice and interests, the inclusion of those states’ officials or representatives in negotiating the fundamental values and principles of a just global constitutional order raises special problems. We have reliable evidence that authoritarian states’ officials would undermine good faith negotiation of constitutional rules and principles, and even try to hijack the process for their own, narrowly self-interested ends. I will draw on the literature on constituent power to assess the limitations of a process by which the international community could articulate, activate, and exercise constituent power to negotiate and draft a morally defensible constitutional agreement.
- 1 June 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of International Political Theory
- Vol. 21 (2) , 166-184
Open AccessConstituent power and constituent capacity in the making of a global constitutional treaty
International law is quasi-constitutionalized, and there is a case to be made for further constitutionalization. But who should be in charge for making a global constitution? At the domestic level, the answer is the popular sovereign, namely the citizens understood as constitutional subjects who individually and collectively hold constituent power. We do not have an easy answer to the question of who holds constituent power at the global level. This article highlights some challenges for identifying the holders of constituent power in international law. The international community contains numerous authoritarian states. In the absence of reliable processes of representation of their citizens’ voice and interests, the inclusion of those states’ officials or representatives in negotiating the fundamental values and principles of a just global constitutional order raises special problems. We have reliable evidence that authoritarian states’ officials would undermine good faith negotiation of constitutional rules and principles, and even try to hijack the process for their own, narrowly self-interested ends. I will draw on the literature on constituent power to assess the limitations of a process by which the international community could articulate, activate, and exercise constituent power to negotiate and draft a morally defensible constitutional agreement.
- 19 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 357-371
Constitutionalism for International Law
Constitutionalism and rule of law principles are tightly connected in contemporary legal systems. This chapter explores that connection in a surprising new context, namely international law. Partly due to misunderstandings about how and whether it works, international law remains a neglected stepsister in constitutional theory. I develop a normatively rich, morally demanding account of constitutionalism as a model for global constitutionalism. I argue that despite the obvious challenges of the scale and nature of the commitment problem in international politics, and the character of the collective agents involved, constitutionalism could strengthen the internal morality of international law. Constitutionalism increases legalization, creates direct effects for certain minimal rules of international law, and brings about the possibility of judicial review. Fundamentally, its purpose is to fortify the protections of the rights of states and individuals, to limit the unchecked power of international institutions over states, and of states over each other.
- 19 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 357-371
Constitutionalism for International Law
Constitutionalism and rule of law principles are tightly connected in contemporary legal systems. This chapter explores that connection in a surprising new context, namely international law. Partly due to misunderstandings about how and whether it works, international law remains a neglected stepsister in constitutional theory. I develop a normatively rich, morally demanding account of constitutionalism as a model for global constitutionalism. I argue that despite the obvious challenges of the scale and nature of the commitment problem in international politics, and the character of the collective agents involved, constitutionalism could strengthen the internal morality of international law. Constitutionalism increases legalization, creates direct effects for certain minimal rules of international law, and brings about the possibility of judicial review. Fundamentally, its purpose is to fortify the protections of the rights of states and individuals, to limit the unchecked power of international institutions over states, and of states over each other.
- 11 March 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 58-85
Normative Judgment, Realism, and International Law
A strand of thought within international relations realism claims that international law, understood as the dense network of multilateral and bilateral treaties, customary law, and institutions tasked with interpreting and applying them, cannot have meaningfully legal authority. This chapter traces the genealogy of the realist take on international law to a problematic use of the rational choice model for state behavior. Namely, realists derive skeptical positions about the authority and value of international law by using the rational choice model applied to states prescriptively rather than merely descriptively. With parsimonious assumptions about instrumental rationality, preferences, and choice situations, realists have put the model to good use to explain state action in the context of international politics. But they go much further, by taking the rational actor model to articulate an implicit moral ideal for states.
- 11 March 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 58-85
Normative Judgment, Realism, and International Law
A strand of thought within international relations realism claims that international law, understood as the dense network of multilateral and bilateral treaties, customary law, and institutions tasked with interpreting and applying them, cannot have meaningfully legal authority. This chapter traces the genealogy of the realist take on international law to a problematic use of the rational choice model for state behavior. Namely, realists derive skeptical positions about the authority and value of international law by using the rational choice model applied to states prescriptively rather than merely descriptively. With parsimonious assumptions about instrumental rationality, preferences, and choice situations, realists have put the model to good use to explain state action in the context of international politics. But they go much further, by taking the rational actor model to articulate an implicit moral ideal for states.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Legal Theory
- Vol. 27 (1) , 70-95
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LIMITS OF ANARCHY
Anarchy is often contrasted with law, order, or security. But anarchist societies, by which I mean societies that lack a monopoly of coercive force, need not be lawless. They can develop sophisticated legal systems that regulate the behavior of their members and protect their rights. International law, market anarchism, and other models of anarchism such as the one proposed by Chandran Kukathas already exhibit or could plausibly exhibit complex legal rules and institutions. I will show that insofar as these models rely on consent, they all share similar structural flaws, namely, that they cannot meet basic rule-of-law values such as equality before the law and access to legal remedies for wrongs that embody and respect individual moral equality, even minimally conceived. The implication of this argument is not to vindicate state-based legal systems. Rather it is to show that legal systems, state-based or not, must have a strong nonconsensual, coercive element: the process of making, applying, and enforcing law must, to some extent, be severed from consent if law is to perform its function of providing for minimal justice.
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Legal Theory
- Vol. 27 (1) , 70-95
Open AccessTHE RULE OF LAW AND THE LIMITS OF ANARCHY
Anarchy is often contrasted with law, order, or security. But anarchist societies, by which I mean societies that lack a monopoly of coercive force, need not be lawless. They can develop sophisticated legal systems that regulate the behavior of their members and protect their rights. International law, market anarchism, and other models of anarchism such as the one proposed by Chandran Kukathas already exhibit or could plausibly exhibit complex legal rules and institutions. I will show that insofar as these models rely on consent, they all share similar structural flaws, namely, that they cannot meet basic rule-of-law values such as equality before the law and access to legal remedies for wrongs that embody and respect individual moral equality, even minimally conceived. The implication of this argument is not to vindicate state-based legal systems. Rather it is to show that legal systems, state-based or not, must have a strong nonconsensual, coercive element: the process of making, applying, and enforcing law must, to some extent, be severed from consent if law is to perform its function of providing for minimal justice.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by OpenEdition in Revus
- Vol. 43 (in print)
Justice-aptness and international law
In contrast to theories that seek to find necessary and sufficient conditions which individuate law as a system of rules, Miodrag A. Jovanović provides a fruitful rethinking of the nature of law. Building on Frederick Schauer’s work, Jovanović identifies prototypical features of law that teach us about law’s characteristics, but dispense with the notion that they must be jointly present in all instances we categorize as law. This new approach opens up prolific new ways of thinking about the nature of international law. Jovanović proposes four such features:1) its function to provide rules of behavior and dispute settlement, 2) institutionality, 3) coercive guaranteeing, and 4) justice-aptness. He argues that international law displays them to a sufficient degree for us to recognize its law-like character. I discuss some of the features of this account and propose three avenues of further developing the idea that international law is justice-apt.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by OpenEdition in Revus
- Vol. 43 (in print)
Open AccessJustice-aptness and international law
In contrast to theories that seek to find necessary and sufficient conditions which individuate law as a system of rules, Miodrag A. Jovanović provides a fruitful rethinking of the nature of law. Building on Frederick Schauer’s work, Jovanović identifies prototypical features of law that teach us about law’s characteristics, but dispense with the notion that they must be jointly present in all instances we categorize as law. This new approach opens up prolific new ways of thinking about the nature of international law. Jovanović proposes four such features:1) its function to provide rules of behavior and dispute settlement, 2) institutionality, 3) coercive guaranteeing, and 4) justice-aptness. He argues that international law displays them to a sufficient degree for us to recognize its law-like character. I discuss some of the features of this account and propose three avenues of further developing the idea that international law is justice-apt.
- Open Access
- 16 May 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Theory
- Vol. 49 (2) , 215-242
Hume’s Dynamic Coordination and International Law
At the heart of the tension between state autonomy and international law is the question of whether states should willingly restrict their freedom of action for the sake of international security, human rights, trade, communication, and the environment. David Hume offers surprising insights to answer this question. He argues that the same interests in cooperation arise among individuals as well as states and that their interactions should be regulated by the same principles. Drawing on his model of dynamic coordination, I will reconstruct the Humean case for developing international law into a more robust legal system and also highlight the limitation of Hume’s account of justice for such a reconstructive project. Hume’s lessons are enduring; we must strengthen the essential features of international law that allow states and individuals to reap the benefits of its protections, such as nonoptional rules that articulate a moral minimum, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and stronger mechanisms of enforcement.
- 16 May 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Theory
- Vol. 49 (2) , 215-242
Open AccessHume’s Dynamic Coordination and International Law
At the heart of the tension between state autonomy and international law is the question of whether states should willingly restrict their freedom of action for the sake of international security, human rights, trade, communication, and the environment. David Hume offers surprising insights to answer this question. He argues that the same interests in cooperation arise among individuals as well as states and that their interactions should be regulated by the same principles. Drawing on his model of dynamic coordination, I will reconstruct the Humean case for developing international law into a more robust legal system and also highlight the limitation of Hume’s account of justice for such a reconstructive project. Hume’s lessons are enduring; we must strengthen the essential features of international law that allow states and individuals to reap the benefits of its protections, such as nonoptional rules that articulate a moral minimum, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and stronger mechanisms of enforcement.
- 22 February 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 35 (3) , 499-520
Healthcare: between a human and a conventional right
One of the most prevalent rationales for public healthcare policies is a human right to healthcare. Governments are the typical duty-bearers, but they differ vastly in their capacity to help those vulnerable to serious health problems and those with severe disabilities. A right to healthcare is out of the reach of many developing economies that struggle to provide the most basic services to their citizens. If human rights to provision of such goods exist, then governments would be violating rights without doing anything wrong. I argue that such variable ability to provide healthcare depends not only on financial resources, but on institutional capacity, and that the latter represents a more fundamental challenge to the existence of a human right to healthcare than previously recognized. This challenge does not imply that government has no obligations to protect and improve the health of their citizens, but that it is best to think of such obligations as generated by conventional rights, namely rights arising from local legal and social conventions, which require governments to pursue health-related moral goals such as reducing suffering, closing opportunity gaps for the disadvantaged, and preventing the spread of contagious diseases. We need not think of such moral goals in terms of human rights.
- 22 February 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 35 (3) , 499-520
Healthcare: between a human and a conventional right
One of the most prevalent rationales for public healthcare policies is a human right to healthcare. Governments are the typical duty-bearers, but they differ vastly in their capacity to help those vulnerable to serious health problems and those with severe disabilities. A right to healthcare is out of the reach of many developing economies that struggle to provide the most basic services to their citizens. If human rights to provision of such goods exist, then governments would be violating rights without doing anything wrong. I argue that such variable ability to provide healthcare depends not only on financial resources, but on institutional capacity, and that the latter represents a more fundamental challenge to the existence of a human right to healthcare than previously recognized. This challenge does not imply that government has no obligations to protect and improve the health of their citizens, but that it is best to think of such obligations as generated by conventional rights, namely rights arising from local legal and social conventions, which require governments to pursue health-related moral goals such as reducing suffering, closing opportunity gaps for the disadvantaged, and preventing the spread of contagious diseases. We need not think of such moral goals in terms of human rights.
- 15 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
- Vol. 23 (3) , 332-351
The international rule of law
The rule of law is a moral ideal that protects distinctive legal values such as generality, equality before the law, the independence of courts, and due process rights. I argue that one of the main goals of an international rule of the law is the protection of individual and state autonomy from the arbitrary interference of international institutions, and that the best way to codify this protection is through constitutional rules restraining the reach of international law into the internal affairs of a state. State autonomy does not have any intrinsic value or moral status of its own. Its value is derivative, resulting from the role it plays as the most efficient means of protecting autonomy for individuals and groups. Therefore, the goal of protecting state autonomy form the encroachment of international law will have to be constrained by, and balanced against the more fundamental goal of an international rule of law, the protection of the autonomy of individual persons, best realized through the entrenchment of basic human rights.
- 15 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
- Vol. 23 (3) , 332-351
The international rule of law
The rule of law is a moral ideal that protects distinctive legal values such as generality, equality before the law, the independence of courts, and due process rights. I argue that one of the main goals of an international rule of the law is the protection of individual and state autonomy from the arbitrary interference of international institutions, and that the best way to codify this protection is through constitutional rules restraining the reach of international law into the internal affairs of a state. State autonomy does not have any intrinsic value or moral status of its own. Its value is derivative, resulting from the role it plays as the most efficient means of protecting autonomy for individuals and groups. Therefore, the goal of protecting state autonomy form the encroachment of international law will have to be constrained by, and balanced against the more fundamental goal of an international rule of law, the protection of the autonomy of individual persons, best realized through the entrenchment of basic human rights.