Ji-Chai Lin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ji-Chai Lin has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
John S. Howe
4 shared publicationsMichael S. Rozeff
State University of New York at Buffalo
4 shared publicationsAjai K. Singh
3 shared publicationsYu-Jane Liu
3 shared publicationsG. Geoffrey Booth
2 shared publicationsMustafa Chowdhury
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Wiley in International Review of Finance
- Vol. 26 (2) , e70078
Market Reactions to Old Innovation News: Evidence From Patent Disclosures in China
This paper examines how investors' past inattention affects market reactions to corporate innovation announcements, leveraging a unique setting in China where many publicly listed firms voluntarily disclose patent grants—information already public via the Patent Gazette . Using a hand‐collected dataset of 2086 announcements from 2010 to 2018, we find a significant market reaction on the corporate news announcement day. Our analysis shows that this market reaction to stale patent news is positively related to investors' past limited attention, rather than to attention‐driven overreaction or other factors influencing returns. Subsample analyses further show that this relationship is more pronounced among firms with low institutional ownership and opaque information environments, and is stronger for announcements preceded by the same type of innovation disclosure within the prior 3 months. In addition, we find that retail investors drive this relationship. Our evidence also indicates that managers take proactive actions to mitigate investors' attention constraints, thereby enhancing the market's pricing of innovation news.
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Wiley in International Review of Finance
- Vol. 26 (2) , e70078
Open AccessMarket Reactions to Old Innovation News: Evidence From Patent Disclosures in China
This paper examines how investors' past inattention affects market reactions to corporate innovation announcements, leveraging a unique setting in China where many publicly listed firms voluntarily disclose patent grants—information already public via the Patent Gazette . Using a hand‐collected dataset of 2086 announcements from 2010 to 2018, we find a significant market reaction on the corporate news announcement day. Our analysis shows that this market reaction to stale patent news is positively related to investors' past limited attention, rather than to attention‐driven overreaction or other factors influencing returns. Subsample analyses further show that this relationship is more pronounced among firms with low institutional ownership and opaque information environments, and is stronger for announcements preceded by the same type of innovation disclosure within the prior 3 months. In addition, we find that retail investors drive this relationship. Our evidence also indicates that managers take proactive actions to mitigate investors' attention constraints, thereby enhancing the market's pricing of innovation news.
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Global Finance Journal
- Vol. 41, 13-31
Why have many U.S.-listed Chinese firms announced delisting recently?
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Global Finance Journal
- Vol. 41, 13-31
Why have many U.S.-listed Chinese firms announced delisting recently?
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 46, 34-50
What do stock price levels tell us about the firms?
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 46, 34-50
What do stock price levels tell us about the firms?
- 1 September 2015
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 91 (3) , 955-971
The R&D Premium and Takeover Risk
To explain why firms with high research and development (R&D) intensity offer their investors higher stock returns, we argue that (1) high R&D capacity relative to firm valuation makes R&D-intensive firms attractive takeover targets, and that (2) the higher takeover probability leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, as proposed by Cremers, Nair, and John (2009), and require higher returns. We find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Furthermore, we find that takeover probability also relates to large R&D increases, but not to innovation efficiency. Accordingly, we expect and find that takeover risk helps to explain the premium associated with large R&D increases, but not the innovation efficiency premium previously documented. JEL Classifications: G12; O31.
- 1 September 2015
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 91 (3) , 955-971
The R&D Premium and Takeover Risk
To explain why firms with high research and development (R&D) intensity offer their investors higher stock returns, we argue that (1) high R&D capacity relative to firm valuation makes R&D-intensive firms attractive takeover targets, and that (2) the higher takeover probability leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, as proposed by Cremers, Nair, and John (2009), and require higher returns. We find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Furthermore, we find that takeover probability also relates to large R&D increases, but not to innovation efficiency. Accordingly, we expect and find that takeover risk helps to explain the premium associated with large R&D increases, but not the innovation efficiency premium previously documented. JEL Classifications: G12; O31.
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 42, 283-301
Limited attention, share repurchases, and takeover risk
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 42, 283-301
Limited attention, share repurchases, and takeover risk
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Markets
- Vol. 17, 150-173
Price delay premium and liquidity risk
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Markets
- Vol. 17, 150-173
Price delay premium and liquidity risk
- 18 June 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 40 (9-10) , 1276-1303
Underwriting Fees and Shareholder Rights
- 18 June 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 40 (9-10) , 1276-1303
Underwriting Fees and Shareholder Rights
- 18 April 2013
- Published by Wiley in Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies
- Vol. 42 (2) , 228-261
Corporate Governance and Analyst Behavior: Evidence from an Emerging Market
This study examines how analysts would recommend poorly governed firms to their clients in an emerging market where information asymmetry tends to be high and shareholder rights are not well protected by legal systems. Given that analysts have incentives to access managers and to help their brokerage houses win investment banking deals, we hypothesize that poor corporate governance reveals a firm's preference for upward‐bias recommendations, while good corporate governance reveals its preference for more accurate information, and that analysts are inclined to give what the firm prefers. We examine 55 652 recommendations on firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Our study implies that analysts' buy recommendations on firms with poorer corporate governance are less reliable. Furthermore, improving corporate governance not only can reduce agency problems within firms, but can also enhance information quality produced by analysts and reduce information risk faced by investors.
- 18 April 2013
- Published by Wiley in Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies
- Vol. 42 (2) , 228-261
Corporate Governance and Analyst Behavior: Evidence from an Emerging Market
This study examines how analysts would recommend poorly governed firms to their clients in an emerging market where information asymmetry tends to be high and shareholder rights are not well protected by legal systems. Given that analysts have incentives to access managers and to help their brokerage houses win investment banking deals, we hypothesize that poor corporate governance reveals a firm's preference for upward‐bias recommendations, while good corporate governance reveals its preference for more accurate information, and that analysts are inclined to give what the firm prefers. We examine 55 652 recommendations on firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Our study implies that analysts' buy recommendations on firms with poorer corporate governance are less reliable. Furthermore, improving corporate governance not only can reduce agency problems within firms, but can also enhance information quality produced by analysts and reduce information risk faced by investors.
- 1 February 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 19, 95-118
SEO timing and liquidity risk
- 1 February 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 19, 95-118
SEO timing and liquidity risk
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 33 (9) , 1636-1651
Information, sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 33 (9) , 1636-1651
Information, sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance