Dayi He

Consumer innovation resistance can persist even when consumers value environmental performance. This study examines how resistance affects green‐product pricing and innovation, and when producer subsidies, consumer subsidies, or private promotion improve market outcomes and welfare. A differentiated duopoly model allows the green firm to choose product greenness before price competition. Explicit equilibrium expressions and boundary comparisons identify economically admissible green‐degree choices. With endogenous greenness, greater resistance reduces innovation except at a knife‐edge cost coefficient, while increasing the green firm's optimized profit; the green‐demand response depends on the unit‐cost coefficient. Producer subsidies increase innovation, but need not increase green demand. Consumer subsidies increase optimized green‐firm profit, while the consumer‐paid price rises when induced innovation exceeds an explicit pass‐through threshold. Private promotion increases demand, effort, and profit on the strict interior branch. For low unit‐cost coefficients, its innovation effect changes sign at an analytical conversion‐efficiency threshold: beyond that threshold, promotion substitutes for product improvement. Welfare comparisons yield environmental‐benefit and public‐funds thresholds rather than a universal ranking of the three channels. Numerical experiments evaluate magnitudes and ranking reversals across structural parameters, report feasibility margins, and exclude combinations without strict interior maximizing solutions. The results distinguish adoption gains from innovation incentives and identify the economic conditions under which public support or private promotion is socially valuable.

1. Organizational resilience has become a critical research focus as enterprises navigate highly volatile environments. This capability allows organizations to withstand disturbances, recover rapid...

The forestry carbon offset policy has been implemented for a short time, and in order to study its optimization mechanism and pressure-sharing emission reduction effect, this paper applies the directional distance function to calculate the marginal abatement cost of each province/city based on the panel data of 30 provinces/cities in China from 2000 to 2020. Then, we utilize the synthetic control method to analyze the forestry carbon offset policy by taking Beijing, Guangdong, and Fujian as a natural experiment. Finally, placebo tests and differences-in-differences tests were used to verify the experiment’s effectiveness. The study has the following results. (1) The forestry carbon offset policy is a Pareto improvement after integrating multiple benefits. The proportion of FCS offset should be increased, and government subsidies should be reduced when carbon quotas are tightened, followed by the gradual inclusion of more industries and enterprises in the scope of mandatory emission reductions. (2) The impact of forestry carbon offset policy on sharing the abatement pressure has regional heterogeneity, which is affected mainly by geographical location, economic level, and industrial structure. It can be obtained that the forestry carbon offset policy has shared the pressure for emission reductions in Guangdong and Fujian. This study provides a theoretical basis for promoting forestry carbon offset policies and their coupling with other carbon-reduction policies.

Supply chain green technology collaborative innovation is an important means for enterprises to improve the greenness of their products. This paper takes supply chain green technology innovation collaboration as the research object and constructs a stochastic differential game model, which not only provides reference for enterprises to choose the optimal type of technology innovation by combining with their own characteristics, but also provides a reference for their innovation decision-making in different market competition environments. The study shows the following: (1) in green product innovation, the formation of the cost-sharing contract is less affected by the intensity of competition in the green market when the market preference for greenness is relatively low. Therefore, government subsidies become an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. As market competition intensifies, manufacturers’ incentives to suppliers will shift from reducing costs to increasing demand. (2) In green process innovation, when the intensity of green competition is low and suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is high, manufacturers should bear more costs; when the market preference for greenness is low, the market competition is intense, and the suppliers’ process innovation efficiency is low, the suppliers should bear more costs to help the manufacturers gain more market shares. (3) When retailers’ preference for greenness is relatively low, the government subsidy becomes an important tool to effectively guide the market mechanism to achieve the desired goal. (4) When the retailer’s green promotion performance is higher than the manufacturer’s, the manufacturer should bear more green promotion costs; conversely, the retailer should bear more green promotion costs. (5) Over time, the marginal increase in price over the marginal increase in greenness helps stabilise price volatility, considering consumer preferences. Conversely, it helps to increase the average value of prices.

Focusing on the moral hazard of third-party environmental service providers in monitoring and controlling the emission of pollutants by enterprises, this paper takes the third-party governance of environmental pollution under the incentive-and-constraint mechanism as its research object. It also constructs a game model involving emission-producing enterprises producing emissions, third-party environmental service providers, and local governments. Adopting this evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the mechanism of local government’s role in effectively resolving the moral hazard between emission-producing enterprises producing emissions and third-party environmental service providers by exploring the conditions of spontaneous cooperation between emission-producing enterprises producing emissions and third-party environmental service providers. This paper provides a possible solution to the problem of emission-producing enterprises or third-party environmental service providers stealing and leaking emissions, as well as collusion between the two. The study presents two major findings. (1) There are three possible scenarios of breach of contract: unilateral breach by third-party environmental service providers, unilateral breach by emissions-producing enterprises, and collusion between the two. When a third-party environmental service provider unilaterally breaches a contract, emission-producing enterprises have regulatory responsibilities toward them. In such cases, local governments should reduce the penalties imposed on emission-producing enterprises. This measure would decrease the willingness of these enterprises to allocate a higher proportion of collusion payments to third-party environmental service providers. However, it would simultaneously provide a new avenue through which third-party environmental service providers would gain benefits, thereby increasing their expected gains from collusion. This would create a new game between the two parties, leading to the failure of collusion negotiations. (2) The efficacy of incentive-constraint mechanisms is influenced by the severity of contractual breaches, represented by the magnitude of stealing and leaking emissions. When false emissions reduction is at a high level, increasing the incentives for emission-producing enterprises and third-party environmental service providers cannot effectively prevent collusion; when the level is moderate, incentives for third-party environmental service providers can effectively prevent collusion, but incentives for emission-producing enterprises cannot; when the level is low, increasing the incentives for emission-producing enterprises and third-party environmental service providers can help prevent collusion. (3) When emission-producing enterprises engage in unilateral discharge, if a local government’s incentive for third-party environmental service providers exceeds the benefits it can obtain from regulating the discharged amount, third-party environmental service providers tacitly approve the company’s discharge behavior. However, with the strengthening of local government regulations, emission-producing enterprises tend to engage in more clandestine discharging of pollutants to obtain greater rewards. This practice infringes upon the revenue of third-party environmental service providers, as their earnings are positively correlated with the amount of pollution abated. Third-party environmental service providers no longer acquiesce to corporate emissions theft, resulting in an increase in the probability of the detection of emission-producing enterprises’ illicit discharges; in this way, the behavior of these enterprises is regulated.

Aiming at the gap between supply and demand in forestry carbon sequestration trading, an evolutionary game model of forest farmers, emission-controlled enterprises (ECEs), and the government is established, where the purchasing behavior of ECEs is divided into offsetting carbon emission and speculation in the carbon emission trade market. By sorting out the stable conditions of each equilibrium point, the causes of the gap between supply and demand are analyzed to explore the coupling mechanism between financial means and market regulation. At last, a numerical case of actual background is applied to verify the rationality of the conclusions. The study found that: (1) The combination of government financial subsidies with the market mechanism is based on subsidies to ECEs. (2) The best time for the government to reduce financial subsidies to forest farmers is when the carbon quota is tightened and more industries are included in the carbon trading system; the best time for the government to reduce subsidies to ECEs is when the carbon quota tightening policy dominates. (3) The reasons for market imbalance in the early and late stages of forestry carbon neutralization mechanism development are different.

As an important way to reduce emission, forestry carbon sink (FCS) has not been implemented effectively. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the effectiveness and mechanism of applying blockchain technology in FCS projects by utilizing the differential game model. A Stackelberg differential game model between forest farmers and emission-controlled enterprises (ECEs) is developed to analyze the optimal emission reduction efforts and the optimal trajectory of forest farmers and ECEs before and after introducing blockchain technology. It is found that: (1) At the initial stage of the utilization of blockchain technology, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stabilizing carbon prices, the ECEs prefer to purchase FCS instead of reducing emissions by their own technology. On the contrary, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stimulating the vitality of the carbon trading market, ECEs tend to use emission abatement technology to meet the carbon quote requirements. (2) In the later stage, the incentive and stabilizing effects of blockchain technology on carbon prices tend to be balanced, and the emission reduction efforts of ECEs are lower than the efforts before applying blockchain technology. (3) The application of blockchain technology increases forest farmers’ willingness to reduce emissions because of its effection of cost reduction and efficiency improvement. Meanwhile, blockchain technology reduces abatement costs by influencing carbon prices. Therefore, blockchain technology improves forest farmers’ emission reduction efforts on the whole.

Because of the risks existing in supply chain finance, taking accounts receivable factoring business as the research object, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to analyzes the factors affecting the decision-making of the participants in supply chain finance, constructs an evolutionary game model between small and medium-sized enterprises and financial institutions, and analyzes the mechanism of blockchain to solve the financial risks of the supply chain by comparing the changes of evolutionary stability strategies before and after the introduction of blockchain technology. This paper aims to reduce financing risks by analyzing the mechanism of blockchain technology in supply chain finance. It is found that, firstly, blockchain technology can reduce the credit risk of financial institutions and solve financing problem. Credit risk plays a decisive role in whether financial institutions accept financing business decisions. Blockchain technology can reduce the operational risk of financial institutions and improve the business income of financial institutions. Secondly, the strict regulatory environment formed by blockchain technology makes the default behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises and core enterprises in a high-risk state at all times. No matter the profit distribution proportion that small and medium-sized enterprises can obtain through collusion, they will not choose to default, which effectively solves the paradox that small and medium-sized enterprises cannot obtain loans from financial institutions despite the increased probability of compliance. Then, the evolutionary game between financial institutions and small and medium-sized enterprises is balanced in that financial institutions accept business applications, small and medium-sized enterprises abide by the contract, and the convergence effect is better. Therefore, blockchain technology not only reduces the financing risk of financial institutions but also helps to solve the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises.