Yuichi Komano
Research Subjects
Yuichi Komano has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Kazuo Ohta
Department of Informatics, The University of Electro-Communications, Chofu, Tokyo, JAPAN
14 shared publications- Shinichi Kawamura
Toshiba Corporation
7 shared publications - Takaaki Mizuki
Tohoku University
7 shared publications Atsushi Shimbo
Toshiba Corporation
5 shared publicationsHideo Shimizu
Toshiba Corporation
3 shared publicationsYoshikazu Hanatani
Corporate Research & Development Center, Toshiba Corporation, Saiwai-ku, Kawasaki, Japan
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 96-115
Suken BINGO: An Application of Card-Based Cryptography to Psychological Board Games
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 96-115
Suken BINGO: An Application of Card-Based Cryptography to Psychological Board Games
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 79-95
Card-Based Representation of Floating-Point Numbers and Arithmetic Operations
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 79-95
Card-Based Representation of Floating-Point Numbers and Arithmetic Operations
- 27 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 118-134
Card-Based Arithmetic Operations and Application to Statistical Data Aggregation
- 27 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 118-134
Card-Based Arithmetic Operations and Application to Statistical Data Aggregation
- Open Access
- 24 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in New Generation Computing
- Vol. 42 (3) , 399-428
Physical Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocols for Topswops and Botdrops
Suppose that a sequence of $${\varvec{n}}$$ cards, numbered 1 to $${\varvec{n}}$$ , is placed face up in random order. Let $${\varvec{k}}$$ be the number on the first card in the sequence. Then take the first $${\varvec{k}}$$ cards from the sequence, rearrange that subsequence of $${\varvec{k}}$$ cards in reverse order, and return them to the original sequence. Repeat this prefix reversal until the number on the first card in the sequence becomes 1. This is a one-player card game called Topswops. The computational complexity of Topswops has not been thoroughly investigated. For example, letting $${\varvec{f}}({\varvec{n}})$$ denote the maximum number of prefix reversals for Topswops with $${\varvec{n}}$$ cards, values of $${\varvec{f}}({\varvec{n}})$$ for $${\varvec{n}}\ge 20$$ remain unknown. In general, there is no known efficient algorithm for finding an initial sequence of $${\varvec{n}}$$ cards that requires exactly $$\ell $$ prefix reversals for any integers $${\varvec{n}}$$ and $${\varvec{\ell }}$$ . In this paper, using a deck of cards, we propose a physical zero-knowledge proof protocol that allows a prover to convince a verifier that the prover knows an initial sequence of $${\varvec{n}}$$ cards that requires $${\varvec{\ell }}$$ prefix reversals without leaking knowledge of that sequence. We also deal with Botdrops, a variant of Topswops.- 24 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in New Generation Computing
- Vol. 42 (3) , 399-428
Open AccessPhysical Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocols for Topswops and Botdrops
Suppose that a sequence of $${\varvec{n}}$$ cards, numbered 1 to $${\varvec{n}}$$ , is placed face up in random order. Let $${\varvec{k}}$$ be the number on the first card in the sequence. Then take the first $${\varvec{k}}$$ cards from the sequence, rearrange that subsequence of $${\varvec{k}}$$ cards in reverse order, and return them to the original sequence. Repeat this prefix reversal until the number on the first card in the sequence becomes 1. This is a one-player card game called Topswops. The computational complexity of Topswops has not been thoroughly investigated. For example, letting $${\varvec{f}}({\varvec{n}})$$ denote the maximum number of prefix reversals for Topswops with $${\varvec{n}}$$ cards, values of $${\varvec{f}}({\varvec{n}})$$ for $${\varvec{n}}\ge 20$$ remain unknown. In general, there is no known efficient algorithm for finding an initial sequence of $${\varvec{n}}$$ cards that requires exactly $$\ell $$ prefix reversals for any integers $${\varvec{n}}$$ and $${\varvec{\ell }}$$ . In this paper, using a deck of cards, we propose a physical zero-knowledge proof protocol that allows a prover to convince a verifier that the prover knows an initial sequence of $${\varvec{n}}$$ cards that requires $${\varvec{\ell }}$$ prefix reversals without leaking knowledge of that sequence. We also deal with Botdrops, a variant of Topswops. - 12 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 203-221
Lightweight Authentication Using Noisy Key Derived from Physically Unclonable Function
- 12 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 203-221
Lightweight Authentication Using Noisy Key Derived from Physically Unclonable Function
- 12 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 222-239
Card-Based Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocol for Pancake Sorting
- 12 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 222-239
Card-Based Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocol for Pancake Sorting
- 19 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 537-553
Physical Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocol for Topswops
- 19 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 537-553
Physical Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocol for Topswops
- Open Access
- 14 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Information and Computation
- Vol. 285
Information leakage due to operative errors in card-based protocols
- 14 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Information and Computation
- Vol. 285
Open AccessInformation leakage due to operative errors in card-based protocols
- Open Access
- 6 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 21 (4) , 833-846
Coin-based Secure Computations
In the history of cryptography, many cryptographic protocols have relied on random coin tosses to prove their security. Although flipping coins is indispensable in this manner, the coins themselves have never been in the spotlight. Therefore, we would like to make physical coins rise to the level of cryptography, just as a deck of physical playing cards has been used to perform a secure multi-party computation. Such a card-based protocol is known to be helpful both to perform a secure computation without any black-box computers and to understand the principles of secure protocols. In this paper, we propose a new framework of secure multi-party computation using physical coins, named a coin-based protocol. One advantage of the use of coins is that they are more ubiquitous than cards. Whereas a face-down card can conceal the information about its face side, one side of a coin reveals the information of its other side. Hence, more careful design is required for a secure coin-based protocol than for a card-based one. We formalize a computational model of the coin-based protocol and explicitly give protocols for NOT, AND, COPY, OR, and XOR computations. We also discuss the composability of the extended protocols and how to implement them in practice.
- 6 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Information Security
- Vol. 21 (4) , 833-846
Open AccessCoin-based Secure Computations
In the history of cryptography, many cryptographic protocols have relied on random coin tosses to prove their security. Although flipping coins is indispensable in this manner, the coins themselves have never been in the spotlight. Therefore, we would like to make physical coins rise to the level of cryptography, just as a deck of physical playing cards has been used to perform a secure multi-party computation. Such a card-based protocol is known to be helpful both to perform a secure computation without any black-box computers and to understand the principles of secure protocols. In this paper, we propose a new framework of secure multi-party computation using physical coins, named a coin-based protocol. One advantage of the use of coins is that they are more ubiquitous than cards. Whereas a face-down card can conceal the information about its face side, one side of a coin reveals the information of its other side. Hence, more careful design is required for a secure coin-based protocol than for a card-based one. We formalize a computational model of the coin-based protocol and explicitly give protocols for NOT, AND, COPY, OR, and XOR computations. We also discuss the composability of the extended protocols and how to implement them in practice.
- Open Access
- 28 February 2020
- Published by IOP Publishing in Japanese Journal of Applied Physics
- Vol. 59 (SG) , SGGL02
An IC-level countermeasure against laser fault injection attack by information leakage sensing based on laser-induced opto-electric bulk current density
Laser fault injection (LFI) attacks on cryptographic processor ICs are a critical threat to information systems. This paper proposes an IC-level integrated countermeasure employing an information leakage sensor against an LFI attack. Distributed bulk current sensors monitor abnormal bulk current density caused by laser irradiation for LFI. Time-interleaved sensor operation and sensitivity tuning can obtain partial secret key leakage bit information with small layout area penalty. Based on the leakage information, the secret key can be securely updated to realize high-availability resilient systems. The test chip was designed and fabricated in a 0.18 μm standard CMOS, integrating a 128-bit advanced encryption standard cryptographic processor with the proposed information leakage sensor. This evaluation successfully demonstrated bulk current density and leakage bit monitoring.
- 28 February 2020
- Published by IOP Publishing in Japanese Journal of Applied Physics
- Vol. 59 (SG) , SGGL02
Open AccessAn IC-level countermeasure against laser fault injection attack by information leakage sensing based on laser-induced opto-electric bulk current density
Laser fault injection (LFI) attacks on cryptographic processor ICs are a critical threat to information systems. This paper proposes an IC-level integrated countermeasure employing an information leakage sensor against an LFI attack. Distributed bulk current sensors monitor abnormal bulk current density caused by laser irradiation for LFI. Time-interleaved sensor operation and sensitivity tuning can obtain partial secret key leakage bit information with small layout area penalty. Based on the leakage information, the secret key can be securely updated to realize high-availability resilient systems. The test chip was designed and fabricated in a 0.18 μm standard CMOS, integrating a 128-bit advanced encryption standard cryptographic processor with the proposed information leakage sensor. This evaluation successfully demonstrated bulk current density and leakage bit monitoring.